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Abstract 
Stereotype threat refers to the performance decrement that is typically experienced following 
exposure to a negative ingroup stereotype. Conversely, stereotype lift refers to the 
performance enhancement that people typically exhibit when exposed to a positive ingroup 
stereotype. The current thesis sought to investigate variables that moderate – or whose 
effects are moderated by - exposure to stereotype threat or stereotype lift. Experiments 1, 2, 
3 and 4 provided evidence for the hypothesis that the impact of positive and negative 
stereotypes on task performance is moderated by regulatory focus (promotion vs. 
prevention) and motivational state (challenge vs. threat). Experiments 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 
examined the effect of stereotype threat on belief in man-made global warming, both 
directly and through interactions with a variety of variables: implicit theories of ability, 
temperature, and the content or framing of a message about man-made global warming. 
Experiments 11, 12 and 13 examined the extent to which the effects of public and private 
self-consciousness and self-awareness (the state version of self-consciousness) vary as a 
function of stereotype threat. In experiments 11 and 12, the “source” of the stereotype threat 
to which participants were exposed was manipulated – that is, participants were induced to 
be concerned about displaying stereotypical behaviour to themselves (self-as-source 
stereotype threat) or to others (other-as-source stereotype threat). As a whole, the results of 
these experiments indicate that the effects of stereotype threat and stereotype lift are not 
equivalent across situations, but rather interact with a range of contextual factors in exerting 
their effects on important outcome variables. The theoretical significance of these findings is 
discussed. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Stereotype Threat 
Stigmatised groups such as Blacks, Hispanics and individuals of low socio-
economic status tend to perform worse on IQ tests and other intellectually demanding tasks 
compared to their non-stigmatized counterparts (Gonzales, Blanton & Williams, 2002; 
Keller, 2012). Similarly, women tend to exhibit inferior performance relative to men on tests 
of spatial ability (Mäntylä, 2013). Numerous factors have been proposed to underlie these 
performance differences - researchers have invoked findings of increased exposure to 
childhood stress, malnutrition and inadequate education among disadvantaged groups to 
explain their relatively poor test performance (Gailliot, 2014; Gasquoine, 2009; Sharkey, 
2010).  
However, evidence suggests that at least part of the intellectual impairment observed 
among disadvantaged or stigmatized groups stems from a situationally-specific handicap 
known as stereotype threat (Sackett, Hardison & Cullen, 2004). Stereotype threat refers to 
the performance decrement that is typically experienced following exposure to a negative 
ingroup stereotype (Steele & Aronson, 1995). For example, informing women that their 
gender is characterised by inferior performance on a forthcoming task results in an actual 
reduction in performance (Spencer, Steele & Quinn, 1999). Likewise, Blacks, Hispanics and 
individuals of low socio-economic status display worsened performance when reminded of 
negative task-relevant stereotypes about their respective groups (Thames et al., 2013; 
Gonzales et al., 2002; Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir & Zhao, 2013).   
Moreover, a number of meta-analyses (Flore & Witcherts, 2014; Nguyen & Ryan, 
2008; Picho, Rodriguez & Finnie, 2013; Stoet & Geary, 2012; Walton & Cohen, 2003; 
Walton & Spencer, 2009) have confirmed that stereotype threat exerts a significant influence 
on the task performance of negatively stereotyped individuals. Although Flore and Witcherts 
(2014) discovered evidence of publication bias in the stereotype threat literature (studies 
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with larger samples tend to find lower effect sizes), their meta-analysis nevertheless found a 
significant effect of stereotype threat consistent with past research. However, it should be 
noted that the size of stereotype threat’s effect on performance (as estimated by the above 
meta-analyses) is not sufficient in magnitude to generate of the observed performance gaps 
between certain social groups in the real world (e.g. IQ performance for African-Americans 
and Caucasian Americans; Wax, 2009). As such, it is likely that the performance gaps 
observed between stigmatized and non-stigmatized groups on intellectually demanding tests 
are partly – but not wholly - attributable to stereotype threat.  
Indeed, stereotype threat can be activated by cues that are likely to be present in 
real-world testing situations. For example, simply describing a test as a measure of 
intelligence (rather than as a learning exercise) is sufficient to enhance the accessibility of 
the stereotype that ‘black people are less intelligent’, thereby impairing performance among 
black individuals (Steele & Aronson, 1995, study 3). Since widely used standardized tests 
(e.g. the SATs) are typically presented as measures of ability, it follows that performance 
thereon is likely to be undermined by stereotype threat for members of stigmatized groups 
(Steele, 1997). Similarly, maths performance among women has been found to be impaired 
merely as a result of writing one’s gender before, rather than after, taking a test (Danaher & 
Crandall, 2008). Since examinees are often asked to report their gender and other 
demographic characteristics before beginning a test (Danaher & Crandall, 2008), this implies 
that stereotype threat has important implications for performance differences across groups 
in wider society. Likewise, studies showing that the absence of fellow ingroup members in a 
testing environment can exacerbate the detrimental consequences of negative ingroup 
stereotypes on performance (e.g. Johns, Inzlicht & Schmader, 2008) indicate that academic 
contexts in which blacks and females are under-represented could function as stereotype 
threat triggers (Logel, Iserman, Davies, Quinn & Spencer, 2009). Thus, the performance 
impairments and other inimical effects associated with stereotype threat present practical 
issues across a wide range of real-world situations.  
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As such, an understanding of the mechanisms through which negative stereotypes 
harm performance, and of effective methods for disrupting the operation of these 
mechanisms, is of clear theoretical and practical usage in terms of attempts to eliminate 
racial, socio-economic and gender disparities in test performance. The current work is 
therefore aimed at identifying the existence of variables that interact with manipulations of 
stereotype threat to predict performance and other important outcome variables. In doing so, 
it is hoped that the mechanisms of stereotype threat will be further elucidated, thereby 
building the groundwork for the development of interventions that can alleviate its inimical 
effects.  
To this end, I will begin by presenting a selective overview of the existing literature 
on stereotype threat in which I will explore areas of research that are particularly relevant to 
the questions that I will seek to address. Specifically, I will discuss which types of tasks are 
susceptible to stereotype threat effects, the causal mechanisms through which stereotype 
threat operates, the existence of different forms of stereotype threat, and the extent to which 
stereotype threat constitutes a parallel phenomenon to stereotype lift (the performance 
improvement resulting from exposure to a positive ingroup stereotype (Walton & Cohen, 
2003). I will also explore similarities between stereotype threat and a motivational 
phenomenon known as choking under pressure (Baumeister, 1984), with a view to 
expanding the understanding of stereotype threat by importing principles derived from 
research on choking under pressure. I will then describe a number of variables that I believe 
are likely to moderate the effects of, or are likely to be moderated by, stereotype threat, 
before presenting data from experiments designed to assess these hypothesised interactions. 
The Causal Mechanisms of Stereotype Threat 
The inimical consequences of exposure to negative stereotypes have been 
demonstrated for a wide range of tasks, including intelligence tests (Steele & Aronson, 
1995), tests of spatial ability (McGlone & Aronson, 2006), maths tests (Spencer et al., 
1999), tests of neurocognitive functioning (Suhr & Gunstad, 2002), and long term memory 
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tests (Hess, Auman, Colcombe, & Rahhal, 2003). Performance on tasks that are social in 
nature (e.g. sustaining a friendly interaction with a child) is also negatively affected by 
stereotype threat (Bosson, Haymovitz & Pinel, 2004). Similarly, stereotype threat has been 
shown to hamper performance on tasks that require the inhibition of habitual tendencies 
(Jamieson & Harkins, 2007) and implicit racial prejudices (Frantz, Cuddy, Burnette, Ray & 
Hart, 2004).  
One clear unifying feature of these tasks is their reliance on working memory. 
Working memory is a capacity limited cognitive resource that is recruited in virtually all 
cognitively demanding tasks (Cowan, 2005). All of the tasks listed above have been shown 
to recruit working memory resources (Baddeley, 2003). For instance, social interactions 
require the maintenance and manipulation of socially-relevant information in short term 
memory, which necessitates the engagement of “social working memory” (Meyer, Spunt, 
Berkman, Taylor & Lieberman, 2012). Similarly, inhibiting one’s own implicitly-held racial 
stereotypes recruits similar brain regions to those used in working memory tasks (Stanley, 
Phelps & Banaji, 2008). On this basis, Schmader, Johns and Forbes (2008) have argued that 
stereotype threat tends to exert its effects on task performance by draining working memory 
capacity. Indeed, this mediating role of working memory depletion has been empirically 
demonstrated (Schmader & Johns, 2003). Moreover, on very easy tasks (which have low 
working memory demands), evidence indicates that stereotype threat actually has a positive 
effect on performance (Nguyen & Ryan, 2008).  
However, there are some tasks that do not recruit substantial working memory 
resources but are nevertheless susceptible to stereotype threat-induced impairments. 
Specifically, motor and athletic tasks (e.g. dribbling a football or shooting a golf ball) are 
performed more poorly under stereotype threat, even though they are not working memory-
dependent (Beilock, Jellison, Rydell, McConnell & Carr, 2006; Chalabaev, Stone, Sarrazin 
& Croizet, 2008). Beilock et al. (2006; see also Schmader et al., 2008) argue that in the case 
of these sorts of tasks, the effects of stereotype threat are mediated by a heightened tendency 
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to monitor one’s own motor output. They reason that consciously attending to one’s motor 
behaviours disrupts the automated processes that optimally guide their operation, resulting in 
impaired task performance. Indeed, it is well documented that people perform worse on 
motor tasks when instructed to focus consciously on their own motor output (Beckmann, 
Gröpel & Ehrlenspiel, 2013). Moreover, when participants are subject to cognitive load 
(diminishing their capacity to consciously process their own motor output), the negative 
impact of stereotype threat is eliminated (Beilock et al., 2006). Thus, in the case of motor 
tasks, the detrimental impact of stereotype threat appears to be mediated by a heightened 
tendency to attend to one’s own motor output (Schmader et al., 2008).  
In summary, the available evidence suggests that stereotype threat has a negative 
impact on the performance of motor tasks and cognitively demanding tasks (including social 
tasks). However, the mechanisms underlying these effects differ for different types of tasks – 
according to Schmader et al. (2008), performance impairments on cognitively demanding 
tasks are mediated by working memory depletion, whereas impairments on motor tasks are 
mediated by a heightened tendency to monitor one’s own motor output. Performance on 
very easy tasks is enhanced under stereotype threat (Nguyen & Ryan, 2008).  
However, the question remains as to how stereotype threat triggers this working 
memory depletion and heightened self-monitoring. Schmader et al. (2008) argue that these 
processes occur as a result of the cognitive dissonance that stereotype threat evokes. 
Cognitive dissonance refers to the unpleasant affective state that emerges when an individual 
holds two or more incompatible cognitions (Festinger, 1956) or a set of cognitions that is 
incompatible with a desired belief (Steele, 1988). Cognitive dissonance motivates people to 
alter their thoughts or behaviour in a manner that eliminates the perceived inconsistency 
(Harmon-Jones, Brehm, Greenberg, Simon & Nelson, 2009). For instance, people who 
engage in counter-attitudinal behaviour may change their attitudes to be more consistent 
with their behaviour, thereby resolving the cognitive dissonance between the cognitions “I 
did X” and “I disapprove of X” (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Harmon-Jones, Brehm, 
13 
 
Greenberg & Simon, 1996; Zanna & Cooper, 1974). Alternatively, when reminded of past 
counter-attitudinal behaviours, they may commit to making greater effort to behave in a pro-
attitudinal manner, thereby eliminating the perceived inconsistency between attitude and 
behaviour (Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow & Fried, 1994).  
Schmader et al. (2008) have proposed that when stereotype threat-inducing cues are 
presented, stereotype-threatened individuals perceive an inconsistency between three 
cognitions: “Members of group Y lack ability X”, “I am a member of group Y” and “I want 
to display ability X”. Indeed, people who are subject to stereotype threat often display 
behaviours that are indicative of attempts to eliminate the cognitive dissonance caused by 
this inconsistency. For example, they have a tendency to devalue the importance of the 
stereotyped domain (altering the proposition “I want to display ability X”; Major & 
Schmader, 1998; Schmader, Major & Gramzow, 2001), to distance themselves from the 
stereotyped group (altering the proposition “I am a member of group Y” Steele & Aronson, 
1995; Pronin, Steele & Ross, 2004) and to cast doubt on the veracity of the negative 
stereotype (altering the proposition “members of group Y lack ability X”; Von Hippel, Von 
Hippel, Conway, Preacher, Schooler & Radvansky, 2005). 
Moreover, interventions that challenge one of the three inconsistent cognitions have 
been shown to eliminate or ameliorate the inimical effects of stereotype threat on test 
performance (Schmader et al., 2008). For instance, procedures that explicitly or implicitly 
invalidate the negative stereotype (Marx & Roman, 2002; McIntyre, Paulson & Lord, 2003; 
Smith & White, 2002), that cause the stereotype-threatened individual to feel distinct from 
the stereotyped group (Shih et al., 1999) or that inhibit the desire to display the stereotype-
relevant ability (Aronson et al., 2002; Mendoza-Denton, Kahn & Chan 2008) have been 
found to reduce the impact of stereotype threat on test performance. Consistent with 
Schmader et al.’s (2008) reasoning, this indicates that the effects of stereotype threat on 
performance result from the cognitive dissonance that it evokes. When new information is 
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presented to help resolve this cognitive dissonance, the effects of stereotype threat on 
performance are eliminated.  
Schmader et al. (2008) propose three distinct causal pathways by which stereotype 
threat-induced cognitive dissonance causes working memory depletion, thereby impairing 
task performance. One of these proposed causal pathways (pathway 1) involves the internal 
monitoring processes that are activated by the cognitive dissonance that stereotype threat 
induces. One way for an individual to resolve stereotype threat–induced cognitive 
dissonance is to invalidate the negative stereotype by demonstrating his or her own ability in 
the stereotyped domain (Schmader et al., 2008). By showing that they themselves have high 
ability, people can provide a counter-example to the stereotype, thereby calling its veracity 
into question (Jamieson & Harkins, 2007; Marx & Roman, 2002; McIntyre et al., 2003). 
This enables them to abandon the “my group lacks ability X” cognition, thus resolving the 
stereotype threat-induced cognitive dissonance. Consequently, stereotype threat increases 
people’s motivation to display high ability in the stereotyped domain as a means of 
eliminating the cognitive dissonance that it induces. 
According to Schmader et al. (2008), the consequent desire to perform well in 
situations that evoke stereotype threat renders the prospect of making a mistake particularly 
daunting, leading to a tendency to monitor one’s own behaviour in order to ensure the 
absence of mistakes. Indeed, there is a general tendency to attend more closely to 
information that is perceived as threatening or potentially harmful (Öhman, Flykt & Esteves, 
2001). Since stereotype threat causes people to view personal errors as harmful to their self-
perceived ability, it follows that they would attend more closely to such errors and to the 
behaviours believed to be linked to them (Schmader et al., 2008) 
Likewise, stereotype-threatened individuals are likely to monitor their own internal 
mental state in order to identify thoughts or feelings that could be detrimental for 
performance, so that these can be suppressed (Logel et al., 2009). According to Schmader et 
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al. (2008), this is why stereotype threat results in an enhanced tendency to monitor one’s 
own motor output and internal thought processes.  
Indeed, studies have found that stereotype threat enhances the intensity of neural 
activity linked to error monitoring (Forbes, Schmader & Allen 2008), and that stereotype-
threatened individuals are particularly quick to correct their own mistakes when they occur 
(Jamieson & Harkins, 2007). Moreover, stereotype threat triggers increased attention 
towards words related to negative thoughts and feelings (e.g. anxiety-related words; Johns et 
al., 2008), which is indicative of increased monitoring of these thoughts and feelings. Thus, 
Schmader et al. (2008) argue that the increased monitoring of one’s own motor output that is 
observed in the context of stereotype threat results from an increased motivation to avoid 
errors. Increased monitoring for negative thoughts and feelings occurs for the same reason. 
Schmader et al. (2008) argue further that these monitoring processes are deliberative 
and effortful, meaning that their operation drains working memory resources. Indeed, 
evidence shows that monitoring for any internal or external signal can take up working 
memory capacity (Vogel & Luck, 2002). Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that the 
monitoring processes that arise amongst stereotype-threatened individuals can be inhibited 
through the imposition of cognitive load, which indicates that these processes require 
working memory capacity to operate (Beilock et al., 2006). Thus, according to Schmader et 
al. (2008), the heightened monitoring that occurs among stereotype-threatened individuals is 
one of the causes of working memory depletion. Hence, the first causal pathway linking 
stereotype threat-induced cognitive dissonance to working memory depletion in Schamder et 
al.’s (2008) model involves the tendency to monitor for errors and for negative thoughts and 
emotions. 
The second causal pathway linking stereotype threat-induced cognitive dissonance 
and working memory depletion involves the physiological processes that are believed to be 
activated by the former. Schmader et al. (2008) note that cognitive dissonance generally 
evokes increased physiological arousal (Croyle & Cooper, 1983; Harmon-Jones et al., 1996), 
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which is also observed in the specific case of stereotype threat. For example, stereotype 
threat has been shown to lead to increases in blood pressure (Blascovich, Spencer, Quinn & 
Steele, 2001) and heightened blood concentrations of the stress hormone cortisol 
(Townsend, Major, Gangi & Mendes, 2011). These physiological responses are known to be 
detrimental to performance on working memory tasks (Elzinga & Roelofs, 2005), leading 
Schmader et al. (2008) to the conclusion that stereotype threat-induced working memory 
impairment is partly mediated by physiological arousal. Indeed, stereotype threat has been 
found to enhance performance on tasks for which heightened stress is beneficial, such as 
very easy tasks (Nguyen & Ryan, 2008; O’Brien & Crandall, 2003). Thus, evidence suggests 
that working memory depletion under stereotype threat is partly mediated by the enhanced 
physiological arousal that it evokes.   
The third causal pathway linking stereotype threat-induced cognitive dissonance to 
working memory depletion in Schmader et al.’s (2008) model involves a heightened 
tendency to suppress negative thoughts and feelings. As noted above, evidence suggests that 
stereotype-threatened individuals monitor their own mental state in order to identify negative 
thoughts and feelings (as per pathway 2). According to Schmader et al. (2008), people 
experiencing stereotype threat seek to suppress these thoughts and feelings when they are 
detected, because they are perceived to have a negative influence on task performance. 
Consequently, stereotype threat leads to heightened attempts to suppress negative thoughts 
and feelings.  
Johns et al. (2008) produced evidence for this proposed mediating role of 
suppression using a task designed to assess participants’ attentional biases, known as the 
dot-probe task (MacLeod & Matthews, 1988). This task assesses reaction times to respond to 
a dot that appears on one of two positions on a computer screen. Before the dot appears, a 
stimulus (in this case a word) is presented in one of these two positions. If participants 
respond faster when the dot appears in a position previously occupied by a particular type of 
word, then an attentional bias to that class of word can be inferred. For example, in Johns et 
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al.’s (2008) experiment, stereotype-threatened women were quicker to respond to the dot 
when it appeared in the position previously occupied by an anxiety-related (vs. neutral) word 
compared to control women, indicating an attentional bias to anxiety-related stimuli. 
However, when the stereotype-threatened women were told how this task worked 
prior to taking it, they did not display the attentional bias. Johns et al. (2008) therefore 
concluded that the stereotype-threatened women in their experiment were attempting to 
suppress overt displays of anxiety – when they were unaware of how the dot-probe task 
worked, they had no way to conceal their attentional bias towards anxiety-related words. 
When they were given the informational tools to enable them to avoid displaying their 
anxiety, they successfully did so. This suggests that stereotype threat induced a tendency to 
attempt to suppress negative emotions, because the mechanisms involved in concealing 
public displays of emotion are the same as those involved in inhibiting internal emotional 
experiences (Wegner, 2009).  
Further evidence to support the mediating role of suppression in driving the effects 
of stereotype threat comes from a series of studies undertaken by Logel et al. (2009). These 
studies assessed the extent to which stereotype-threatened individuals exhibited cognitive 
symptoms that are known to be associated with suppression attempts (Wegner, 2009). When 
people attempt to suppress a particular thought or feeling, two separate cognitive processes 
are activated: the first process (known as the ironic process) operates automatically and 
attempts to detect the to-be-suppressed thoughts or feelings in order to monitor whether or 
not the goal to suppress them is being achieved. The second process recruits working 
memory resources and seeks to focus the individual’s attention on information that is 
unrelated to the thoughts and feelings that they are attempting to suppress (Wenzlaff & 
Wegner, 2000). When cognitive load is imposed, the second process functions less 
effectively, because it requires cognitive resources. Conversely, the first process continues to 
operate under cognitive load, because the process of simply monitoring for a particular 
18 
 
thought or feeling requires minimal cognitive resources (Wegner, 2009).1 Consequently, 
cognitive load produces a paradoxical increase in the accessibility of thoughts and feelings 
that the individual is attempting to suppress because the ironic process, which monitors for 
to-be-suppressed information, remains active whilst the individual no longer has the 
cognitive resources to actively bring unrelated thoughts to mind (Wegner, 2009). Increased 
accessibility of a particular thought under cognitive load can therefore serve as an indication 
that the thought in question is being suppressed. 
Using this principle, Logel et al. (2009, study 2) found that that stereotype-
threatened individuals attempt to suppress negative stereotype-related information. 
Specifically, women under stereotype threat were quicker to make word/non-word 
discriminations for negative stereotype-related words relative to stereotype-irrelevant words 
(indicating enhanced accessibility of the former). However, this was only true when 
cognitive load was imposed, indicating that the stereotype-threatened women in Logel et 
al.’s (2009, study 2) experiment were attempting to suppress negative stereotype-related 
words (see also Logel et al., 2009, studies 3-5). 
According to Schmader et al. (2008), this suppression is one of the causes of 
working memory depletion under stereotype threat. Evidence indicates that the suppression 
of thoughts or feelings requires working memory resources (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000), 
meaning that the heightened tendency to suppress negative stereotype-related thoughts and 
feelings that occurs in the context of stereotype threat (Logel et al., 2009) is likely to be a 
cause of the working memory depletion that occurs therein. Thus, the third causal pathway 
                                                            
1 It should be noted that the view that monitoring for a given thought does not require cognitive 
resources (Wegner, 2009) contradicts Schmader et al.’s (2008) view that the monitoring processes 
operating in the context of stereotype threat deplete working memory. The balance of evidence 
appears to support Wegner’s (2009) position. Wegner (2009) presents a large body of evidence 
showing that people can efficiently monitor for specific thoughts and emotions, whereas Schmader et 
al.’s (2008) sole piece of supporting evidence for the reverse claim comes from a study that examined 
people’s capacity to monitor for external visual stimuli over long periods of time (Grier, Warm 
Dember, Matthews, Galinsky & Parasuraman, 2003). Moreover, Schmader inferred that the 
monitoring task used by Grier et al. (2003) had taxed working memory simply because Grier et al. 
(2003) observed performance decrements over time, but these decrements may in fact have been 
attributable to other factors, such as declining motivation.  
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linking stereotype threat-induced cognitive dissonance to working memory depletion in 
Schmader et al.’s (2008) model involves a heightened tendency to suppress negative 
thoughts and feelings. 
Thus, according to Schmader et al. (2008), working memory depletion due to 
physiological arousal, monitoring processes and suppression of negative thoughts and 
feelings leads to impaired performance on cognitively demanding tasks under stereotype 
threat. However, Schmader et al. (2008) note that the effects of stereotype threat are not 
limited to cognitively demanding tasks. For instance, stereotype threat impairs performance 
on motor tasks (Heidrich & Chiviacowsky, 2015) and enhances performance on easy tasks 
(Nguyen & Ryan, 2008; O’Brien & Crandall, 2003), neither of which are heavily dependent 
on working memory capacity. Since working memory depletion therefore cannot account for 
the effects of stereotype threat on these tasks, Schmader et al. (2008) postulate a different 
causal pathway to account for these effects.  
Specifically, Schmader et al. (2008) argue that the heightened tendency to monitor 
one’s own behaviour for errors that is induced by stereotype threat impairs the performance 
of motor tasks. Indeed, there is evidence showing that consciously monitoring one’s own 
actions is detrimental to the performance of motor tasks (Beckmann et al., 2013). Moreover, 
alterations to the performance setting that prevent people from consciously monitoring their 
own movements have been shown to eliminate the deleterious effects of stereotype threat on 
motor task performance (Beilock, Carr, MacMahon & Starkes, 2002). Thus, according to 
Schmader et al. (2008), the heightened tendency to monitor one’s own motor output that is 
induced by stereotype threat leads to impairments in task performance. 
Regarding easy tasks, Schmader et al. (2008) argue that the cognitive dissonance 
induced by stereotype threat increases people’s motivation to perform well – doing so would 
invalidate the negative stereotype and thereby resolve the individual’s cognitive dissonance. 
Indeed, studies have shown that stereotype threat increases people’s desire to perform well 
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on stereotype-related tasks (Jamieson & Harkins, 2007). Schmader et al. (2008) propose that 
this heightened motivation leads to enhanced performance on easy tasks. 
This line of reason begs an obvious question – if an increased motivation to perform 
well under stereotype threat leads to superior performance on easy tasks, then why would the 
same not be true on more difficult tasks and motor tasks? Schmader et al. (2008) answer that 
in the case of difficult tasks - which are working memory-dependent - the detrimental impact 
of working memory depletion overshadows the beneficial effect of increased motivation. 
Likewise, for motor tasks, the inimical effect of self-monitoring overshadows the beneficial 
impact of increased motivation. Conversely, easy tasks are not working memory-dependent 
and are thus not subject to performance decrements when working memory resources are 
depleted under stereotype threat. Consequently, stereotype threat-induced increases in 
motivation lead to enhanced performance on easy tasks, even though the same effect is not 
observed for other tasks. 
Schmader et al.’s (2008) model is summarised in Figure 1. The model proposes that 
situations and cues that evoke stereotype threat cause a state of cognitive dissonance. This 
cognitive dissonance results in the operation of a monitoring process (whereby the 
individual monitors for negative thoughts and feelings and for personal errors), heightened 
physiological anxiety and an increased tendency to suppress negative thoughts and feelings. 
These processes all lead to working memory depletion, resulting in impaired performance on 
cognitively demanding tasks. Additionally, the monitoring processes activated by stereotype 
threat impair performance on motor tasks, and the increased motivation to perform well 
resulting from stereotype threat-induced cognitive dissonance leads to enhanced 
performance on easy tasks. Note that Schmader et al. (2008) imply (without stating 
explicitly) that all the processes outlined in their model arise in all instances of stereotype 
threat. 
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Figure 1 
Causal Mechanisms of Stereotype Threat in Schmader et al.’s (2008) model 
Different Varieties of Stereotype Threat 
Stereotype threat has typically been understood as a unitary phenomenon, with 
researchers assuming that all occurrences of stereotype threat can be directly equated 
(Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995). However, Shapiro and Neuberg (2007; Shapiro, 
2011) have argued that a given individual in a particular situation may experience one of a 
variety of types of stereotype threat. According to the Multi-Threat Framework presented by 
these authors, there are different forms of stereotype threat that vary on two dimensions: 
source (self, ingroup, or outgroup) and target (self or group). Ingroup-as-source stereotype 
threat arises when the stereotype-threatened individual is concerned about the possibility of 
confirming the negative stereotype in the minds of other ingroup members. Outgroup-as-
source stereotype threat arises when the stereotype-threatened individual is concerned about 
the possibility of confirming the negative stereotype in the minds of outgroup members. 
Self-as-source stereotype threat arises when the stereotype-threatened individual is 
concerned about the possibility of confirming the negative stereotype within their own mind. 
Outgroup- and ingroup-as-source stereotype threat are sometimes grouped together as other-
as-source stereotype threat. Thus, Shapiro and Neuberg (2007) argue that stereotype-
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threatened individuals worry about how poor performance on their part will enhance 
endorsement of the negative stereotype among different types of people. The person or 
people whose opinion the stereotype-threatened individual is concerned about constitute(s) 
the ‘source’ of the stereotype threat.  
The ‘target’ dimension in Shapiro and Neuberg’s (2007) framework draws upon 
research showing that people seek to preserve favourable beliefs about themselves (McKay 
& Dennet, 2009; Sedikides, Gaertner & Cai, 2015) and about the groups to which they 
belong (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Van Bavel, Packer & Cunningham, 2011). Group-as-target 
stereotype threat arises when the stereotype-threatened individual is concerned about the 
possibility of damaging the image of their group through poor performance. Self-as-target 
stereotype threat arises when the stereotype-threatened individual is concerned about the 
possibility of damaging their own personal reputation though poor performance (Shapiro, 
2011). Hence, within Shapiro and Neuberg’s (2007) framework there are six possible 
varieties of stereotype threat emerging from the crossing of the target (self vs. group) and 
source (self vs. ingroup vs. outgroup) dimensions. However, Shapiro and Neuberg (2007) 
note that, in principle, it would be possible for two or more different forms of stereotype 
threat to arise simultaneously – for instance, woman X might worry about giving men a 
negative impression both of the maths ability of women in general and of herself in 
particular, resulting in a combination of outgroup-as-source/group-as-target and outgroup-
as-source/self-as-target stereotype threat.  
A fairly strong body of evidence has been collected in support of Shapiro and 
Neuberg’s (2007) classification system. For instance, Shapiro, Williams and Hambarchyan 
(2013) told female participants that the forthcoming task was designed to measure their 
individual intellectual ability (self-as-target stereotype threat) or the typical intellectual 
ability of women in general (group-as-target stereotype threat). They found that engaging in 
self-affirmation (i.e. reminding oneself of positive personal characteristics) improved 
performance for participants who were subject to self-as-target stereotype threat, whilst 
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group affirmation (i.e. reminding oneself of positive characteristics associated with one’s 
group) improved performance for participants who were subject to group-as-target 
stereotype threat. 
Shapiro et al. (2013) reasoned that the participants who were subject to self-as-target 
stereotype threat would have been concerned primarily about preserving the integrity of their 
own personal self-concept. Therefore, establishing this integrity through self-affirmation 
would have reduced the perceived threat, thereby improving performance. Conversely, 
participants who were subject to group-as-target stereotype threat would have been 
concerned about preserving the integrity of their group identity, so that establishing the 
group’s value through group affirmation would have reduced the perceived threat, thereby 
enhancing performance. Shapiro et al.’s (2013) results therefore support the view that there 
are important psychological differences associated with self- and group-as-target of 
stereotype threat.   
There is also evidence to support the validity of the source dimension of the Multi-
Threat Framework. For instance, research shows that people are motivated to perform well 
on ability-diagnostic tests even when their results will be known only to themselves (Leary, 
Barnes, Griebel, Mason & McCormack, 1987), indicating that people care about maintaining 
a positive view of their own ability. This is consistent with Shapiro and Neuberg’s (2007) 
proposal that under self-as-source stereotype threat, people are concerned about how their 
test performance will influence their own consequent beliefs about their personal ability or 
their group’s ability. Likewise, research shows that people are concerned about the public 
reputational consequences of their behaviour (Cialdini, 2001). Indeed, even subtle social 
cues, such as exposure to a pair of eyes, are sufficient to induce people to behave in a 
socially desirable manner (Bourrat, Baumard & McKay, 2011; although see Northover, 
Pederson, Cohen & Andrews, 2016). This is consistent with Shapiro and Neuberg’s (2007) 
claim that stereotype threat can involve concerns relating to the desire to cultivate favourable 
impressions among ingroup or outgroup others. 
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Moreover, Shapiro and Neuberg’s (2007) model predicts that an individual will be 
more likely to experience self-as-source stereotype threat if they endorse the negative 
stereotype in question. People are generally more prone to infer stable traits (such as low 
ability) based on an actor’s behaviour if the trait in question is consistent with a stereotype 
associated with the actor’s group (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003). Thus, an individual 
who endorses a stereotype about their own group’s low ability will be more likely to infer 
low personal ability based on poor performance on a stereotype-related task compared to a 
member of the same group who does not endorse the stereotype. Consequently, a stereotype-
endorsing individual would have more reason to fear the negative impact of poor 
performance on a stereotype-related task on their own sense of self-perceived competence. 
Therefore, the extent to which an individual endorses the validity of a stereotype should be 
positively correlated with their proneness to experience self-as-source stereotype threat, but 
not outgroup-as-source or ingroup-as-source stereotype threat. Using a self-report measure 
of the different types of stereotype threat, Shapiro (2011) found that this was indeed the 
case. Thus, evidence indicates that different forms of stereotype threat can vary along the 
source dimension proposed by Shaprio and Neuberg (2007).  
However, there is currently no experimental evidence supporting the existence of 
Shapiro and Neuberg’s (2007) proposed source dimension. That is, no studies have 
heretofore attempted to manipulate the source of the stereotype threat being induced in order 
to determine whether the effect of such a manipulation corresponds to what would be 
predicted on the basis of Shapiro and Neuberg’s (2007) model. Consequently, one of the 
aims of the current thesis was to test the source dimension of Shapiro and Neuberg’s (2007) 
using experimental, rather than correlational, designs.  
Stereotype Lift 
The negative effects of stereotype threat on performance are mirrored by a parallel 
phenomenon known as stereotype lift. Stereotype lift refers to the performance gain that is 
typically observed when individuals are exposed to a positive stereotype about their own 
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group (Walton & Cohen, 2003). Of relevance to the understanding of both stereotype threat 
and stereotype lift is the degree of overlap between the mechanisms underlying these two 
phenomena.  
For instance, the physiological responses associated with stereotype threat and 
stereotype lift appear to correspond to those that characterise the polar-opposite 
‘Motivational States’ known in the motivation literature as ‘Threat’ and ‘Challenge’, 
respectively (Vick, Seery, Blascovich & Weisbuch, 2008). According to the biopsychosocial 
model (Blascovich, 2008), individuals are likely to view a forthcoming task as a challenge 
when they perceive the resources available to them (e.g. personal ability) as exceeding the 
demands of the task (e.g. difficulty level). When demands are perceived to outweigh 
resources, the task is likely to be evaluated as a threat (Blascovich, Mendes, Tomaka, 
Salomon & Seery, 2003).  
Challenge and threat have been linked to distinct physiological profiles - challenge 
is characterised by increased heart rate and cardiac output (i.e. the amount of blood 
circulated by the heart in a given time period) relative to a resting state; threat is 
characterised by increased heart rate but reduced cardiac output (Seery, 2011). Thus, the 
challenge-threat variable is unidimensional: high challenge necessarily implies low threat, 
and high threat necessarily implies low challenge(Seery, 2011). The fact that the 
physiological responses induced by stereotype threat and stereotype lift correspond to those 
typical of threat and challenge, respectively (Vick et al., 2008), therefore indicates that 
stereotype lift and stereotype threat might operate via similar mechanisms, rather than lift 
and threat being qualitatively different phenomena. It follows that the effects of stereotype 
lift and stereotype threat might potentially be moderated by similar variables. Exploring this 
possibility was among the aims of the current thesis.  
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Choking Under Pressure 
In addition to stereotype lift, there is another motivational phenomenon that has 
important similarities with stereotype threat, and that is known as ‘choking under pressure’ 
(CUP). CUP refers to performance impairment that tends to be observed when the subjective 
importance of strong performance (i.e. ‘pressure’) is increased (Baumeister, 1984). This 
increase in pressure can be induced by offering large financial incentives (Ariely, Gneezy, 
Loewenstein & Mazar, 2009), by presenting the possibility of social evaluation (McKay, 
Lewthwaite & Wulf, 2012), or by creating a perception of physical danger (Pijpers, 
Oudejans & Bakker, 2005).  
Stereotype threat and CUP share a number of common features. Both are 
characterised by increased anxiety (Bosson et al., 2004; Mesagno, Harvey & Janelle, 2012), 
a heightened tendency to monitor one’s own behaviour and motor output (Beckmann et al., 
2013; Beilock et al., 2006), and physiological profiles indicative of threat (as opposed to 
challenge; Allen, Blascovich & Mendes, 2002; Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter & Salomon, 
1999; Derks, Scheepers, Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2011; Vick et al., 2008). Moreover, the 
effects of both CUP and stereotype threat are more pronounced for tasks with high working 
memory demands (Beilock & Carr, 2005; Schmader et al., 2008), and they can be 
ameliorated with similar interventions (Beilock et al., 2006; Beilock & Carr, 2001), such as 
stimulation of the right cerebral hemisphere (Beckmann et al., 2013; Chalabaev, Radel, 
Masicampo & Dru, 2016) or mindfulness training (Bellinger, De Caro & Ralston, 2015; 
Weger, Hooper, Meier & Hopthrow, 2012) 
Is it therefore very likely that our understanding of stereotype threat could be 
informed through consideration of the factors that drive the effects of CUP. One could even 
argue that stereotype threat should be viewed as a particular form of CUP, rather than as a 
separate phenomenon that happens to have certain similarities. CUP is defined as the 
performance decrement that results from an increase in the perceived importance of strong 
performance (Baumeister, 1984). Stereotype threat fits this definition. Exposure to a 
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negative task-related stereotype about one’s ingroup enhances the perceived importance of 
performing well on the task in question, because strong performance is perceived as a means 
to invalidate the stereotype (Jamieson & Harkins, 2007). Indeed, researcher’s definitions of 
stereotype threat often strongly imply that it is a form of CUO. For instance, Weger et al. 
(2011, pp.471) define stereotype threat as “the pressure resulting from social comparisons 
that are perceived as unfavourable” (emphasis added).  Thus, there is both an empirical and a 
theoretical justification for the notion that our understanding of stereotype threat is likely to 
be enhanced by drawing upon research from the CUP literature. From the perspective of the 
current thesis, this means that variables that have been found to modulate the effects of 
pressure on performance can be considered as likely candidates to moderate stereotype threat 
effects.  
Variables that are likely to moderate the effects of Stereotype Threat  
Having presented a brief overview of the most pertinent areas of research in the 
stereotype threat literature, I will next examine how this research can inform hypotheses 
about likely moderators of the effects of stereotype threat. The potential moderating 
variables that will be explored are regulatory focus, motivational state, implicit theories 
about the nature of ability, public and private self-consciousness, and public and private self-
awareness.  
Regulatory Focus 
Regulatory Focus Theory (RFT; Higgins, 1998) proposes the existence of two 
motivational systems that guide goal pursuit in qualitatively different ways. The ‘promotion’ 
system is concerned with ideals, aspirations, nurturance and advancement, whereas the 
‘prevention’ system is concerned with duties, obligations, safety and security (Higgins, 
1998). When an individual’s promotion system is activated, they become “promotion 
focused”, meaning that they focus on promoting improvements in their current state. 
Conversely, when an individual’s prevention system is activated, they become ‘prevention 
focused’, meaning that they focus on preventing deterioration in their current state (Higgins, 
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2002). An individual’s regulatory focus refers to the extent to which they are promotion or 
prevention focused. Regulatory foci exist as stable individual difference variables arising 
from differences in the chronic accessibility of information relevant to the promotion or 
prevention systems (Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, Idson, Ayduk & Taylor, 2001). However, 
the activation of the promotion and prevention systems can also be influenced by situational 
factors. For instance, asking a person to complete a task in which correct responses gain 
points (whilst incorrect responses do not gain points) induces a promotion focus, whereas 
asking them to complete a task in which incorrect responses lose points (and correct 
responses prevent point losses) induces a prevention focus (Liberman, Idson, Camacho & 
Higgins, 1999).  
Studies employing these experimental manipulations have found that promotion and 
prevention foci are differentially associated with a wide range of cognitive, behavioural and 
affective characteristics. Compared to prevention focused individuals, promotion focused 
individuals tend to be more tolerant of risk (Crowe & Higgins, 1997), more creative 
(Friedman & Förster, 2005), more responsive to instructions to make approach motor 
movements (moving the hands towards the body) rather than avoidance movements (moving 
the hands away from the body; Förster, Grant, Idson & Higgins, 2001), more likely to 
process visual input in a holistic manner (Förster & Higgins, 2005), more likely to capitalise 
on opportunities to gain points on a task at the expense of opportunities to avoid losing 
points (Shah, Higgins & Friedman, 1998; Förster, Higgins & Idson, 1998; Förster et al., 
2001), and more likely to experience joy (rather than relief) in response to success and 
disappointment (rather than distress) in response to failure (Scholer & Higgins, 2008).   
These differences between promotion and prevention focused individuals can be 
understood as a manifestation of the respective preferences for seeking advancement and 
preventing deterioration. For instance, risky courses of action generally carry the possibility 
of both gain (advancement) and loss (deterioration), whereas conservative courses of action 
generally involve a low likelihood of both gain and loss (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). 
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Promotion focused individuals are more motivated by the prospect of achieving gains than 
of preventing losses (Higgins, 1998), such that the enhanced opportunity for gain afforded 
by a risky alternative carries more motivational weight than the associated possibility of 
incurring a loss. Consequently, promotion focused decisions prefer high risk options (e.g. a 
50% chance of gaining £10 coupled with a 50% chance of losing £10) to relatively low risk 
options (e.g. a 50% of gaining £5 coupled with a 50% chance of losing £5), because the 
appeal of potential gains outweighs the fear of potential losses of equal magnitude and 
probability. Conversely, prevention focused individuals would ascribe greater motivational 
weight to the possibility of loss than to the possibility of gain, making a risky alternative 
seem less appealing than a corresponding conservative option. This explains why promotion 
focused individuals tend to be more tolerant of risk than prevention focused individuals 
(Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Thus, the behavioural, cognitive and affective characteristics 
associated with promotion and prevention foci can be understood as a manifestation of a 
general preference for maximising gains (in the case of promotion) or minimising losses (in 
the case of prevention; Scholer & Higgins, 2013). 
Regulatory Fit. A key concept within Regulatory Focus Theory is the notion of 
regulatory fit. Regulatory fit is a state that arises when two situational factors, or one 
situational factor and one dispositional factor, induce the same regulatory focus (Cesario, 
Grant & Higgins, 2004; Förster et al., 1998; Lee & Aaker, 2004; Shah et al., 1998; Spiegel, 
Grant-Pillow & Higgins, 2006; Worthy, Markman & Maddox, 2009). For example, Maddox, 
Baldwin and Markman (2006) conducted a study in which two separate manipulations of 
regulatory focus were crossed with each other. The first manipulation involved telling 
participants that strong task performance would be rewarded with a financial gain (inducing 
a promotion focus) or with the prevention of a financial loss (inducing a prevention focus). 
The second manipulation involved telling participants that correct responses on the task 
would gain points whilst incorrect responses would not (inducing a promotion focus) or that 
incorrect responses on the task would lose points whilst correct responses would not 
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(inducing a prevention focus). Maddox et al. (2006) observed an interaction between the two 
manipulations - performance was enhanced in the conditions where the two manipulations 
were matched in terms of the regulatory focus that they induced. In other words, 
performance was enhanced when the two separate manipulations both induced a promotion 
focus and when they both induced a prevention focus compared to when incongruent 
regulatory foci were induced, indicating that regulatory fit enhances task performance (see 
also Plessner, Unkelbach, Memmert & Baltes, 2009; Renkema & Van Yperen, 2008; Shah et 
al., 1998; Worthy et al., 2009). Regulatory fit is also associated with increased message 
persuasiveness (Cesario et al., 2004), increased task enjoyment (Freitas & Higgins, 2002), 
and heightened perceptual fluency (Lee & Aaker, 2004).   
Why might regulatory focus modulate the effects of stereotype threat? Evidence 
indicates that exposure to a positive or negative task-related stereotype induces a promotion 
or prevention focus, respectively (Seibt & Förster, 2004). In light of the principle of 
regulatory fit, it follows that other manipulations of regulatory focus should interact with 
manipulations of stereotype valence to predict task performance. For instance, consider a 
scenario in which a manipulation of stereotype valence (positive vs. negative) is crossed 
with a manipulation of a task’s scoring system (correct responses gain points vs. incorrect 
responses lose points). The gain-based point system and exposure to the positive stereotype 
would both induce a promotion focus, while the loss-based point system and exposure to the 
negative stereotype would both induce a prevention focus (Liberman et al., 1999; Seibt & 
Förster, 2004). Regulatory fit should therefore be higher (leading to enhanced performance) 
for participants exposed to the negative stereotype coupled with the loss-based point system 
or the positive stereotype coupled with the gain-based point system. The same pattern would 
be expected whenever any other manipulation of regulatory focus is crossed with a 
manipulation of stereotype valence. Thus, based on the principle of regulatory fit, one can 
hypothesise that the effects of stereotype threat and stereotype lift on task performance are 
likely to be moderated by regulatory focus. 
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This prediction was tested by Grimm, Markman, Maddox and Balwin (2009) using 
the aforementioned design. These authors found that task performance was optimised when 
stereotype threat was coupled with a loss-based point system and when stereotype lift was 
coupled with a gain-based point system, compared to the conditions in which stereotype 
valence and point system were mismatched in terms of regulatory focus. However, Keller 
and Bless (2008; see also Keller, 2007) produced conflicting results in a study with virtually 
the same design as Grimm et al.’s (2009). Specifically, Keller and Bless (2008) found that 
participants who were presented with a loss-based point system performed better following 
exposure to a positive (rather than negative) stereotype, whereas participants who were 
presented with a gain-based point system performed better following exposure to a negative 
(rather than positive) stereotype.  
In chapter 2, I will attempt to resolve this apparent inconsistency in the results 
produced by Grimm et al. (2009) and Keller and Bless (2008), and will seek to test the 
proposed resolution empirically. In short, I will argue that Keller and Bless’ (2008) point 
system manipulation was actually a manipulation motivational state (not regulatory focus). I 
will then attempt to show that Keller and Bless’ (2008) results are consistent with the 
hypothesised interaction between manipulations of stereotype valence and manipulations of 
motivational state that will be proposed in the following section. The nature of the 
interaction between regulatory focus and stereotype threat vs. lift – which, in Chapter 2, I 
will argue is consistent with the proposals of Grimm et al. (2009) – will henceforth be 
referred to as general research question 1. 
Motivational States 
As mentioned above, an individual’s motivational state refers to the extent to which 
an individual perceives a forthcoming task as a challenge or as a threat (Blascovich, 2008). 
Challenge is experienced when the individual perceives that the resources available to them 
outweigh the demands of the task; threat is experienced when the individual perceives the 
demands of the task to outweigh their resources (Blascovich et al., 2003). It should be noted, 
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however, that challenge and threat states only tend to arise when a task is perceived as 
important – when the outcome of a task is perceived as inconsequential, neither challenge 
nor threat will be experienced (Blascovich & Mendes, 2010; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kibler & 
Ernst, 1997).  
As noted above, challenge and threat are characterised by distinct physiological 
profiles. Challenge is associated with increased heart rate relative to rest, increased cardiac 
output (the amount of blood pumped by the heart in a given unit of time), and reduced total 
peripheral resistance (the physical resistance to blood flow throughout the circulatory 
system). Threat is associated with increased heart rate relative to rest, decreased or 
unchanged cardiac output (in spite of the increased heart rate), and increased total peripheral 
resistance (Seery, 2011). Moreover, there are a number of biological markers of challenge 
and threat states. For instance, increased blood levels of the hormone cortisol are associated 
with threat (Blascovich & Mendes, 2010).  
A number of studies indicate that performance is impaired whenever two situational 
variables both induce the same motivational state, whereas performance is enhanced when 
two situational variables induce different motivational states. For instance, the presence of 
an audience in an unrehearsed performance situation is associated with increased threat 
(Allen et al., 2002; Blascovich et al., 1999). When participants are initially induced to view a 
forthcoming task as a challenge, they perform better in front of an audience than alone. In 
contrast, they perform better alone (than in front of an audience) if they are initially induced 
to view the task as a threat (Feinberg & Aiello, 2010). Similarly, Schmader, Forbes, Zhang 
and Mendes (2009) found that participants who reported high levels of anxiety (indicating 
threat; Skinner & Brewer, 2004) performed better on a cognitively demanding task when 
they were primed with the concept of confidence (inducing challenge) rather than doubt 
(inducing threat). Conversely, being primed with doubt (vs. confidence) was associated with 
superior performance amongst individuals who initially reported low levels of anxiety. 
Drach-Zahavy and Erez (2002) found that an experimental induction of challenge improved 
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performance in the context of high difficulty (which is linked to increased threat; Moore, 
Vine, Wilson & Freeman, 2014), but not in the context of low difficulty. Similarly, exposure 
to two separate positive task-related stereotypes about one’s ingroup (both of which would 
be expected to induce challenge; Vick et al., 2008) leads to inferior performance compared 
to exposure to a single positive stereotype (Rosenthal & Crisp, 2007).   
Likewise, Moore, Vine, Wilson and Freeman (2015) assessed the impact of 
motivational state on performance of a difficult competitive task that was described in a way 
that induced threat (as assessed by measures of cardiac output and total peripheral 
resistance). After a period of baseline performance, half of the participants were told that 
physiological arousal could improve performance and the other half were told nothing. 
Ongoing physiological measurements showed that this ‘arousal reappraisal’ instruction 
resulted in increased challenge relative to the ‘no instructions’ condition. Subsequent to this 
instruction phase of the task, performance was superior among participants in the arousal 
reappraisal condition, indicating that the combination of a factor that induced threat (the 
original task instructions) and a factor that induced challenge (the reappraisal instructions) 
resulted in enhanced performance relative to a single threat-inducing factor. 
Similarly, Kang, Galinsky, Kray and Shirako (2015) found that an experimental 
induction of high social power (which induces challenge; Scheepers, de Wit, Ellemers & 
Sassenberg, 2012) led to improved task performance relative to low social power when 
paired with instructions stating that the task was ability diagnostic (which are likely to 
induce threat; Putwain, Langdale, Woods & Nicholson, 2011), but not in the absence of 
these instructions. Overall, therefore, evidence indicates that performance is enhanced when 
two situational or dispositional factors induce different motivational states. Note that this 
contrasts with the principle of regulatory fit, which states that performance is enhanced 
when two separate factors induce the same regulatory focus (Higgins, 2005).  
Why might motivational state moderate the effects of stereotype threat? The notion 
that performance is enhanced when two factors induce different motivational states allows 
34 
 
the derivation of a hypothesis about how the effects of stereotypes on performance are likely 
to be moderated by separate manipulations of motivational state. Given that stereotype lift is 
associated with increased challenge (Vick et al., 2008), it is likely that the induction of threat 
by a separate factor will enhance performance relative to the induction of challenge in the 
context of a positive stereotype. Conversely, given that stereotype threat is associated with 
increased threat2 (Vick et al., 2008), it is likely that the induction of challenge by a separate 
factor will enhance performance relative to the induction of threat in the context of a 
negative stereotype. This proposed interaction between stereotype threat and motivational 
state will henceforth be referred to as general research question 2 and will be tested in this 
thesis. 
Of relevance to general research question 2 is a study conducted by Alter, Aronson, 
Darley, Rodriguez, and Ruble (2010). These authors manipulated stereotype threat (exposure 
to a negative stereotype vs. no exposure to a negative stereotype) and motivational state 
(challenge vs. threat). Consistent with the aforementioned reasoning, they hypothesised that 
the induction of challenge would lead to enhanced performance relative to the induction of 
threat in the presence of stereotype threat, but not in the absence of stereotype threat; their 
results were consistent with this hypothesis. 
However, one can question the extent to which Alter et al.’s (2010) manipulation of 
motivational state actually influenced the extent to which participants were induced to 
experience challenge or threat. That is, it is possible that the manipulation did not have the 
intended effect on participants’ motivational state. In Alter et al.’s (2010) challenge and 
threat conditions, participants were told that the forthcoming task would be a learning 
opportunity or a test of ability, respectively. However, to my knowledge there is only limited 
                                                            
2 In terms of nomenclature, an unfortunate feature of the academic literature is that “threat” as per the 
biopsychosocial model (Blascovich, 2008) and “stereotype threat” are similar and easily-confused 
terms. For clarity, the current thesis will only ever use the word “threat” in the absence of the directly 
preceding word “stereotype” or “Multi” in cases where the construct of threat as per the 
biopsychosocial model is the point of reference. Similarly, the word “challenge” will only ever be 
used to communicate the concept of “challenge” as per the biopsychosocial model unless a different 
meaning is contextually obvious (e.g. “X evidence challenges hypothesis Y). 
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and indirect evidence linking perceptions of a task’s ability diagnosticity or learning-
enhancing qualities to experiences of challenge or threat, namely a study showing that 
ability-diagnostic instructions led to an attentional bias that is typical of threat states, but not 
exclusive thereto (Putwain et al., 2011). In fact, other studies of stereotype threat (e.g. Steele 
& Aronson, 1995) have also manipulated the task’s description as an ability measure or as a 
learning opportunity, but none of these studies interpreted this manipulation as a 
manipulation of motivational state in the way that Alter et al. (2010) did. Indeed, evidence 
shows that people can view a task as a challenge even if they perceive it to be ability 
diagnostic (Chalabaev, Major, Cury & Salazin, 2009), which suggests that Alter et al. (2010) 
may not have successfully induced threat by stressing that their task was ability diagnostic. 
As such, the available evidence pertaining to the modulation of the effects of stereotype 
threat and stereotype lift by motivational state remains limited. The experiments presented in 
chapter 2 will therefore seek to shed light on this subject. 
Implicit theories about the nature of ability 
Implicit theories about the nature of ability have been found to have important 
motivational consequences in a wide range of performance settings (Dweck, 1999; Molden 
& Dweck, 2006). According to the theoretical framework proposed by Dweck and Leggett 
(1988), individuals vary continuously on an entity-increment dimension. Entity theorists 
view ability as a stable construct that is primarily a matter of natural talent and largely 
unamenable to change. Increment theorists view ability as a variable construct that can be 
altered and improved through learning and the application of effort (Dweck, Chiu & Hong, 
1995). Although this increment-entity distinction is typically studied in terms of beliefs 
about the nature of ability, there is evidence that people’s views on the stability or 
malleability of personality also have important consequences. For instance, Levontin, 
Halperin and Dweck (2013) found that Israelis who were induced to view personality as a 
relatively malleable (as opposed to fixed) construct were subsequently to view the perceived 
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negative behaviour of Arabs as more amenable to change and consequently expressed more 
tolerant attitudes towards Arabs and more willingness to compromise for peace.  
Implicit theories of ability have been found to influence responses to failure. Entity 
theorists are more likely to attribute personal failure to a deficiency in ability, whereas 
increment theorists are more likely to attribute failure to insufficient effort or practice 
(Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin & Wan, 1999). Consequently, increment theorists tend to respond 
to failure by increasing effort, whereas entity theorists respond by withdrawing effort (the 
utility of which is perceived to be negligible given low ability; Grant & Dweck, 2003; 
Molden & Dweck, 2006). As a result, increment theorists tend to display superior 
performance relative to entity theorists following the experience of failure or difficulty 
(Blackwell, Trzesniewski & Dweck, 2005; Mangels, Butterfield, Lamb, Good & Dweck, 
2006). Entity theorists also respond to failure with more negative affect, because they 
perceive its underlying cause (low ability) to be less amenable to change (Grant & Dweck, 
2003).  
Why might implicit theories of ability moderate the effects of stereotype threat? 
There is reason to believe that implicit theories of ability may moderate the effects of 
stereotype threat. Specifically, stereotype threat arises when the individual experiences 
anxiety over the prospect of demonstrating low ability (Chalabaev, Sarrazin, Stone & Cury, 
2008; Smith, 2006). Thus, both stereotype threat and stereotype lift arise from ability-related 
concerns. It follows that increment theorists, who tend to be less concerned about 
demonstrating high ability or avoiding displays of low ability (Dweck & Leggett, 1988), 
should be less susceptible to the effects of both stereotype lift and stereotype threat 
compared to entity theorists.  
A number of studies have provided confirmation for this line of reasoning. Aronson 
(1999) found that the negative effects of stereotype threat on performance are greater for 
entity theorists compared to increment theorists. Aronson et al. (2002) found that an 
intervention designed to encourage students to adopt an increment theory improved the 
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academic performance of African Americans (who frequently experience stereotype threat; 
Steele, 1997; Keller, 2012) relative to whites. Mendoza-Denton et al. (2008) found that men 
and Asian Americans performed better on a maths test when induced to hold an entity 
(rather than increment) theory of ability. However, this was only true when participants were 
exposed to a positive maths-related ingroup stereotype (men/Asians are good at maths), but 
not when the test instructions explicitly challenged the positive stereotype. Finally, 
Froehlich, Martiny, Deaux, Goetz and Mok (2016) found that individuals who were entity 
theorists by disposition were more susceptible to the effects of stereotype threat on 
performance than individuals who were increment theorists by disposition. Thus, the 
available evidence is consistent with the view that increment theorists are less sensitive to 
the effects of stereotype lift and stereotype threat on performance.  
However, several limitations in these studies indicate a need for further research on 
the moderating role of implicit theories of ability. For instance, Aronson’s (1999) study 
measured, but did not manipulate, implicit theories of intelligence, which precludes causal 
inference on the basis of their results. Similarly, Aronson, Fried and Good (2002) did not 
manipulate stereotype threat, but rather based their conclusions on a comparison of black 
participants (who were assumed to experience high levels of stereotype threat) and white 
participants (who were assumed to experience low levels of stereotype threat). The reduction 
of the black-white performance difference produced by their increment-belief intervention 
may therefore have been the result of an interaction between implicit theories and a race-
related factor other than stereotype threat. Similarly, Froehlich et al. (2016) used a measure – 
rather than a manipulation – of implicit theories of ability, meaning that causal inferences 
about the role of this variable cannot definitively made on the basis of their results. 
Moreover, although Mendoza-Denton et al. (2008) found that entity theorists outperformed 
increment theorists in the presence (but not the absence) of stereotype lift, they did not find a 
similar interaction with respect to stereotype threat. Thus, the modulation of the effects of 
stereotype threat by implicit theories of ability is a topic that requires further research. 
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Nevertheless, there is some evidence that the detrimental impact of stereotype threat on task 
performance can be eliminated by inducing people to hold an increment (rather than entity) 
theory of ability. Thus, general research question 3 – which will be addressed in chapter 3 – 
predicted that the effects of stereotype threat would be moderated by people’s implicit 
theories about the nature of the stereotyped ability. Chapter 3 focused on a dependent 
variable that has not hitherto been examined in the stereotype threat literature, namely belief 
in Anthropogenic Global Warming (AGW). Moreover, chapter 3 also explored a range of 
additional proposals pertaining to the moderation of the effects of stereotype threat on belief 
in AGW. However, because the reasoning underlying these additional proposals relates 
uniquely to belief in AGW as a dependent variable (that is, it cannot be generalised to make 
predictions about the effects of stereotype threat on other variables), it will be outlined in 
chapter 3 rather than the current chapter. 
Public and Private Self-Consciousness 
Public self-consciousness is the dispositional tendency to attend to aspects of the 
self that are subject to public observation (e.g. one’s appearance). Private self-consciousness 
is the dispositional tendency to attend to internal thoughts, feelings and sensations 
(Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 1975). Public and private self-consciousness have been linked 
to a range of variables relating to people’s perceptions of themselves, and to the ways in 
which people manage the impressions that they create on others (Mohiyeddini, Bauer & 
Semple, 2013; Sawaoka, Barnes, Blomquist Masheb & Grilo, 2012). For example, 
individuals who are high in public self-consciousness are more likely to seek high numbers 
of Facebook friends as a means of compensating for low self-esteem (Lee, Moore, Park & 
Park, 2012), to conceal gender-atypical sexual preferences (Pachankis & Bernstein, 2012), to 
experience shyness (Tabata, 2009), to be concerned about their weight (Sawaoka et al., 
2012), and to adjust alcohol consumption in line with perceived social norms (Crawford & 
Novak, 2007). Private self-consciousness is associated with more accurate and elaborate 
knowledge of the self (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), greater congruency between attitudes 
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and values (Kemmelmeier, 2001), and a tendency to attend to and categorise one’s own 
internal thoughts (Harrington, Loffredo & Perz, 2014). 
Why might Public Self-Consciousness interact with stereotype threat? Since 
stereotype threat often involves impression management concerns (Brown & Pinel, 2003), 
there is reason to believe that some of its effects might vary as a function of public self-
consciousness. Individuals experiencing stereotype threat often attempt to disguise their 
distress in order to avoid displaying a lack of confidence to observers (Johns et al., 2008; 
Von Hippel et al., 2005), and publicly self-conscious individuals use similar strategies to 
facilitate effective impression management (Mohiyeddini et al., 2013). Since this 
suppression of emotional expression under stereotype threat is proposed to partially underlie 
the performance deficits that it induces (Johns et al., 2008; Schmader et al., 2008), it is 
reasonable to speculate that individuals who are high (vs. low) in public self-consciousness 
may be particularly prone to suppressing their emotions under stereotype threat, and that 
they consequently may be more likely to experience performance impairments when 
exposed thereto. Moreover, choking under pressure is sometimes induced via manipulations 
to which individuals high and low in public self-consciousness are known to be differentially 
sensitive (e.g. the presence of an audience; Geukes, Mesagno, Hanrahan & Kellman, 2012). 
Given the numerous similarities between choking under pressure and stereotype threat, this 
indicates that public self-consciousness may also moderate the effects of stereotype threat.  
However, according to Shaprio and Neuberg’s (2007) multi-threat framework, 
stereotype threat may sometimes be experienced independently of impression management 
concerns: self-as-source stereotype is proposed to arise when the individual experiences 
anxiety over the prospect of confirming the validity of the negative stereotype within their 
own mind (Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2003). This contrasts with other-as-source stereotype 
threat, where the individual experiences anxiety over the prospect of confirming the negative 
stereotype from the perspective of other people. Given that only other-as-source stereotype 
threat, but not self-as-source stereotype threat, derives from outward impression 
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management concerns (Shapiro, 2011), it is possible that the role played by public self-
consciousness in the context of stereotype threat differs as a function of whether the 
stereotype threat in question is of the self-as-source or other-as-source variety. 
Following this reasoning, the trait activation principle (Tett & Guterman, 2000) can 
be used to formulate hypotheses about the possible interaction between stereotype threat 
source on the one hand and public and private self-consciousness on the other. The trait 
activation principle proposes that dispositional traits only exert an influence on cognition, 
affect and behaviour in trait-relevant situations. For instance, dispositional anxiety may only 
lead to anxiety-related cognitions, affective responses and behaviours in situations in which 
the individual perceives a significant possibility of physical or emotional harm (Tett, 
Simonet, Walser & Brown, 2013). In this regard, the different types of stereotype threat 
described by the Multi-Threat Framework (Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007) can be viewed as 
differentially relevant to public and private self-consciousness. Specifically, situations that 
evoke other-as-source stereotype threat can be classified as relevant to public self-
consciousness, because other-as-source stereotype threat and public self-consciousness both 
derive from outward impression management concerns. Conversely, situations that evoke 
self-as-source stereotype threat cannot be viewed as relevant to public self-consciousness 
because they do not involve impression management concerns. It follows from the trait 
activation principle that public self-consciousness should predict important outcome 
variables pertaining to thought and behaviour in the context of other-as-source stereotype 
threat, but not in the context of self-as-source stereotype threat. 
The trait activation principle can also be applied to develop a hypothesis about the 
potential interaction between private self-consciousness and stereotype threat source. 
Situations that evoke self-as-source stereotype threat can be viewed as relevant to private 
self-consciousness, because both self-as-source stereotype threat and private self-
consciousness pertain to the way individuals perceive themselves (Trapnell & Campbell, 
1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007). However, private self-consciousness is unlikely to be 
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relevant to situations in which other-as-source stereotype threat is triggered, because other-
as-source stereotype threat activates concerns about the way in which the self is being 
perceived by others, whereas private self-consciousness pertains to the individual’s private 
self-perception. Based on the trait activation principle (Tett & Gutternman, 2000), it follows 
that private self-consciousness would only be expected to influence cognition, affect and 
behaviour in the context of self-as-source stereotype threat, but not in the context of other-
as-source stereotype threat. In general research question 4, I therefore propose interactions 
between type of stereotype threat (self-as-source vs. other-as-source) and public self-
consciousness and between type of stereotype threat and private self-consciousness.  
Public and Private Self-Awareness 
Public and private self-awareness refer to the state versions of the traits known as 
public self-consciousness and private self-consciousness, respectively. Public self-awareness 
therefore refers to the extent to which an individual is attending to publicly observable 
aspects of the self in a given situation, and private self-awareness refers to the extent to 
which an individual is attending to their internal thoughts, feelings and sensations in a given 
situation (Govern & Marsch, 2001). Public and private self-awareness are two independent 
constructs (Postmes, Spears & Lea, 2002). 
 Why might public and private self-awareness interact with stereotype threat? As 
noted above, there is evidence that stereotype threat impairs performance on motor tasks by 
inducing people to consciously monitor their own motor output (Beilock et al., 2006; 
Schmader et al., 2008; the same is also true of choking under pressure; Beilock et al., 2002). 
It is argued that this conscious monitoring hampers the automated motor programs that 
normally guide motor behaviour, thereby producing performance decrements (Schmader et 
al., 2008).  
However, evidence indicates that monitoring one’s own motor output only harms 
performance in some cases, whilst it other cases it may in fact enhance performance. 
Specifically, numerous studies (Abdollahipour, Wulf, Psotta & Palomo Nieto, 2015; Duke, 
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Cash & Allen, 2011; Poolton, Maxwell, Masters & Raab, 2006; Wulf & Su, 2007) have 
found that when people monitor their own motor output by attending to the effects of their 
actions on their external environment (external attention), performance is enhanced. 
Conversely, when people monitor their own motor output by attending to the internal 
sensations they produce (internal attention), performance is impaired (Wulf, 2013). For 
example, when balancing on an unstable object, people are more likely to fall if they are 
instructed to attend to the sensations in their feet (internal attention) rather than on the 
position of the unstable object (external attention; Wulf, Hoss & Prinz, 1998).  
I will argue that when an individual is induced to monitor their own motor output 
(by, for example, being subject to stereotype threat; Schmader et al., 2008), the manner in 
which this monitoring is undertaken is likely to vary as a function of the individual’s self-
awareness. Specifically, when an individual in a privately self-aware stateis induced to 
monitor his or her motor output, he/she would be likely to undertake this monitoring by 
focusing on the internal sensations produced by their actions (internal attention), because 
private self-awareness involves attending to internal thoughts, feeling and sensations 
(Govern & Marsch, 2001). Conversely, because public self-awareness involves focusing on 
the aspects of the self that are visible to others (Govern & Marsch, 2001), it follows that 
when monitoring their own motor output, individuals in a publicly self-aware state would 
direct their attention to the aspects of their actions that are visible to others, namely their 
external effects (resulting in external attention).  
Since external and internal attention have positive and inimical effects on motor 
performance, respectively (Wulf, 2013), it follows that when individuals are induced to 
monitor their own motor output (e.g. when they are subject to high stereotype threat), high 
public self-awareness would be expected to be conducive to performance whereas high 
private self-awareness would be expected to be detrimental to performance. However, if the 
individual is not induced to monitor their own motor output (e.g. in the absence of stereotype 
threat), then clearly their degree of public or private self-awareness would not be able to 
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influence the manner in which they would engage such self-monitoring, because no such 
self-monitoring would be occurring in the first place. Individuals in a privately self-aware 
state would still focus on private aspects of the self (e.g. their internal emotional state), but 
they would have no reason to attend specifically to the internal sensations associated with 
their motor output. Likewise, individuals in a publicly self-aware state would still focus on 
public aspects of the self (e.g. their appearance), but they would have no reason to attend 
specifically to the effects of actions. Consequently, public and private self-awareness would 
only be expected to affect motor performance in the context of situational factors (such as 
stereotype threat) that induce people to monitor their own motor output. On this basis, it was 
hypothesised that predominant public (vs. private) self-awareness would be associated with 
superior performance following exposure to stereotype threat, but not in the absence of 
stereotype threat. Note that although public and private self-awareness are distinct 
constructs, the predicted interaction pertained to predominant self-awareness. That is, it was 
predicted that people whose state wasmore publicly self-aware than privately self-aware 
would display enhanced performance relative to those whose state was more publicly self-
aware than privately self-aware, but only under high (and not low) stereotype threat (general 
research question 5).3 
In sum, this thesis will present evidence regarding five broad research questions. 
Firstly, the extent to which stereotype threat effects are moderated by regulatory focus 
(general research question 1) and motivational state (general research question 2) will be 
investigated in experiments 1-4 of chapter 2. Thirdly, the thesis will investigate whether the 
effects of stereotype threat are moderated by implicit theories of ability (general research 
question 3), as well as three other variables which will be discussed in more detail below, 
namely the perceived effectiveness of a strategy for coping with stereotype threat, the 
                                                            
3 The prediction was framed in this way for practical, rather than theoretical, reasons – it could be 
tested using a design that contained two self-awareness conditions (high public/low private vs. low 
public/high private) rather than four (low public/low private vs. low public/high private vs. high 
public/low private vs. high public/high private). Whilst the former design entailed methodological 
issues, the sample size requirements for the latter design were in excess of what was possible given 
the resources available for this project. 
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positive or negative framing of a question, and physical temperature. These issues will be 
elaborated upon and examined in experiments 5-10 of chapter 3. Fourthly, experiments 11-
13 of chapter 4 will test whether the source of stereotype threat interacts with public and 
private self-consciousness and whether stereotype threat itself interacts with the type of self-
awareness that a person is experiencing (general research questions 4 and 5). 
Although the research questions to be addressed are diverse, their broad unifying 
theme is the focus on variables that moderate – or whose effects are moderated by – 
stereotype threat or stereotype lift. In so doing, the thesis aims to draw theoretical 
conclusions about the potential causal mechanisms through which stereotype threat and lift 
operate under different circumstances, and to provide insights into how real-world 
interventions can be used to harness the effects of stereotype threat and stereotype lift to 
generate desirable social outcomes.  
In the following paragraphs, the hypotheses which will be tested in this thesis are 
summarised. The theoretical rationales for the predictions will be furnished in the individual 
empirical chapters. The purpose of summarising all hypotheses here is not their justification 
(which will be presented later) but to provide the reader with a comprehensive overview of 
all questions under investigation as a reference guide. 
Summary of all Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 was that exposure to stereotype lift would be associated with superior 
performance relative to exposure to stereotype threat when a promotion focus was induced, 
but that exposure to stereotype threat would be associated with superior performance relative 
to exposure to stereotype threat when a prevention focus was induced. 
Hypothesis 2 was that exposure to stereotype lift would be associated with superior 
performance relative to exposure to stereotype threat when threat was induced, but that 
exposure to stereotype threat would be associated with superior performance relative to 
exposure to a stereotype lift when challenge was induced. 
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Hypothesis 3 was that exposure to high stereotype threat would cause increased 
belief in anthropogenic global warming (AGW) relative to low stereotype threat. 
Hypothesis 4 was that exposure to high (vs. low) stereotype threat would cause 
increased belief in AGW among individuals induced to adopt an entity theory of scientific 
ability, but not among individuals induced to adopt an increment theory of scientific ability. 
Hypothesis 5 was that the effect of high (vs. low) stereotype threat in enhancing 
belief in AGW would be greater for individuals who were induced to view expressing belief 
in AGW as an effective means to cope with stereotype threat compared to individuals who 
were not thusly induced.   
Hypothesis 6 was that individuals exposed to high (vs. low) stereotype threat would 
donate more money to an organisation involved in promoting belief in AGW, and that this 
effect would be mediated by heightened belief in AGW among individuals exposed to high 
(vs. low) stereotype threat. 
Hypothesis 7 was that the effect of high (vs. low) stereotype threat in enhancing 
donations to an organisation involved in promoting belief in AGW would be greater for 
individuals who were induced to view expressing belief in AGW as an effective means to 
cope with stereotype threat compared to individuals who were not thusly induced. 
Hypothesis 7 also proposed that this interaction would be mediated by the interactive effect 
outlined in hypothesis 5. 
Hypothesis 8 was that individuals exposed to a positively framed message about 
AGW would express more belief in AGW compared to individuals exposed to a negatively 
framed message. 
Hypothesis 9 was that the effect of positively framed (vs. negative framed) 
messaging in enhancing belief in AGW would be greater among individuals exposed to high 
stereotype threat relative to those exposed to low stereotype threat. 
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Hypothesis 10 was that high temperatures would be associated with increased belief 
in AGW relative to low temperatures, but only among individuals subject to low stereotype 
threat and not among individuals subject to high stereotype threat. 
Hypothesis 11 was that public self-consciousness would correlate positively with 
challenge perceptions among individuals subject to other-as-source stereotype threat, but not 
among individuals subject to self-as-source stereotype threat. 
Hypothesis 12 was that private self-consciousness would correlate positively with 
challenge perceptions among individuals subject to self-as-source stereotype threat, but not 
among individuals subject to other-as-source stereotype threat. 
Hypothesis 13 was that other-as-source stereotype threat would be associated with 
increased reported self-handicapping relative to self-as-source stereotype threat. 
Hypothesis 14 was that public self-consciousness would be associated with 
increased reported self-handicapping among individuals subject to other-as-source 
stereotype threat, but not among individuals subject to self-as-source stereotype threat. 
Hypothesis 15 was that public self-awareness would be associated with superior 
motor task performance under relative to private self-awareness among individuals subject 
to high stereotype threat, but not among individuals subject to low stereotype threat. 
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Chapter Two: Moderation of the effects of Stereotype 
Threat and Stereotype Lift by Regulatory Focus and 
Motivational State  
As noted in the introduction, there is reason to expect that the effects of stereotype 
lift and stereotype threat are likely to be moderated by regulatory focus and motivational 
state. Research indicates that task performance is enhanced when two separate features of a 
situation encourage the adoption of the same regulatory focus (Keller & Bless, 2006; 
Maddox et al., 2006; Plessner et al., 2009; Shah et al., 1998; Renkema & Van Yperen, 2008; 
Worthy et al., 2009). In other words, performance is enhanced in situations where there are 
two factors inducing a promotion focus or two factors inducing a prevention focus, 
compared to situations in which one factor induces a promotion focus and another factor 
induces a prevention focus. Stereotype threat and stereotype lift induce the adoption of a 
prevention and promotion focus, respectively (Oyserman, Uskul, Yoder, Nesse & Williams, 
2007; Seibt & Förster, 2004). Therefore, performance in situations that evoke stereotype 
threat should be enhanced when there is a separate situational factor inducing the adoption 
of a prevention (rather than a promotion) focus. Conversely, performance in situations that 
evoke stereotype lift should be enhanced when a separate situational factor induces the 
adoption of a promotion (rather than a prevention) focus.  
A similar line of reasoning can be used to guide predictions about the moderation of 
stereotype lift and stereotype threat by motivational state (challenge vs. threat). An 
examination of the available evidence indicates that performance is enhanced when two 
situational factors or one situational and one dispositional factor induce different (rather than 
the same) motivational states. That is, when two features of a situation both induce 
challenge, or when two features of a situation both induce threat, performance is likely to be 
inferior compared to when one feature of a situation induces challenge whilst another 
induces threat (Drach-Zahavy &Erez, 2002; Feinberg & Aiello, 2010; Moore et al., 2015; 
Rosenthal & Crisp, 2007; Schmader et al., 2009). Stereotype lift and stereotype threat induce 
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challenge and threat states, respectively (Vick et al., 2008). Therefore, performance in 
situations that trigger stereotype lift should be enhanced when a separate situational factor 
induces threat (rather than challenge). Conversely, performance in situations that trigger 
stereotype threat should be enhanced when a separate situational factor induces challenge 
(rather than threat).  
In chapter 1, I noted an apparent discrepancy in the results of studies that have 
examined interactions between manipulations of stereotype threat vs. stereotype lift and 
manipulations of regulatory focus. Grimm et al. (2009) randomly assigned participants to 
experience either stereotype lift or stereotype threat. Furthermore, some participants were 
presented with a gain/non-gain point system in the experimental task: correct responses 
resulted in points being gained, whereas incorrect responses failed to gain points. Other 
participants were presented with a loss/non-loss point system: incorrect responses resulted in 
point losses, whereas correct responses averted the loss of points. These different point 
systems have been found to induce promotion (gain/non-gain system) and prevention 
(loss/non-loss system) foci (Liberman et al., 1999). Consistent with the principle of 
regulatory fit, Grimm et al. (2009) found that performance was enhanced when stereotype 
threat was coupled with the loss/non-loss condition (two situational factors both inducing 
prevention foci) and when stereotype lift was coupled with the gain/non-gain condition (two 
situational factors both inducing promotion foci) relative to the other conditions. Grimm, 
Lewis, Maddox & Markman, (2016) replicated this finding using a different task. 
However, Keller & Bless (2008; see also Keller, 2007) conducted a similar 
experiment to Grimm et al. (2009) and produced contradictory results. Keller & Bless (2008) 
assigned participants to experience either stereotype lift or stereotype threat. Some 
participants were completed with a gain/non-gain system (designed to induce a promotion 
focus) in the experimental task. Other participants were presented with a gain/loss point loss 
system, wherein correct responses gained points and incorrect responses lost points. 
Although this gain/loss system differed from Grimm et al.’s (2009) loss/non-loss system, 
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Keller and Bless (2008) nevertheless assumed that it would induce a prevention focus 
because it contained the possibility of losing points. In contrast to Grimm et al. (2009), 
Keller and Bless (2008) found that performance was enhanced when the gain/non-gain 
(promotion focus) point system was coupled with stereotype threat and when the gain/loss 
(prevention focus) point system was coupled with stereotype lift.  
I propose that the apparent contradiction between Grimm et al.’s (2009) and Keller 
and Bless’ (2008) findings can be resolved by considering the nature of the point systems 
used in each study, and the different ways in which regulatory focus and motivational state 
are likely to moderate the effects of stereotype lift and stereotype threat. Specifically, I will 
argue that Keller and Bless’ (2008) point system manipulation, which differed from the one 
used by Grimm et al. (2008), would have manipulated motivational state, not regulatory 
focus. If correct, this would explain why Keller and Bless (2008) produced different results 
to Grimm et al. (2008).  
Keller and Bless’ (2008) promotion point system had a gain/non-gain structure 
(correct responses gained points; incorrect responses gained no points), and the prevention 
point system had a gain/loss structure (correct responses gained points; incorrect responses 
lost points). Thus, the range of possible scores spanned from 0 to the number of questions on 
the task (in the promotion condition) or from a positive to a negative value (in the prevention 
condition). Scales spanning from a negative to a positive value are likely to be interpreted by 
respondents as measuring both competence and incompetence, whereas scales spanning 
from 0 to a positive value are likely to be interpreted as solely measuring competence 
(Schwarz, Grayson, & Knäuper, 1998). 
Therefore, participants in Keller and Bless’ (2008) gain/non-gain condition might 
have viewed the task as designed to assess their competence, whereas participants in the 
gain/loss condition might have viewed the task as designed to assess their competence or 
incompetence. Moreover, tests that are perceived as measuring competence (but not 
incompetence) typically induce challenge, whereas tests that are perceived to measure 
50 
 
incompetence induce threat (Chalabaev et al., 2009). On this basis, one can infer that Keller 
and Bless’ manipulation might have induced different motivational states, i.e. challenge vs. 
threat. In contrast, Grimm et al.’s (2009) point system manipulation included a target 
number of points to gain (or to not lose); participants were encouraged to aim to reach this 
target. Participants presumably used this point target (rather than the range of possible 
scores) as a reference to assess their performance (reaching the target implying high 
competence; failing to do so implying low competence). Thus, the promotion and prevention 
conditions would not have differed in terms of the extent to which participants saw the task 
as indicative of (in)competence, and therefore as a challenge or threat. Thus, one can 
conclude that Grimm et al. (2009) only manipulated promotion vs. prevention focus.  
Given that performance is impaired when two factors induce the same motivational 
state, the fact that Keller and Bless (2008) may have manipulated motivational states would 
explain why they found impaired performance when positive stereotypes were paired with 
the gain/non-gain system (both factors induced challenge) and when negative stereotypes 
were paired with the gain/loss system (both factors induced threat). Conversely, Grimm et 
al.’s (2009) results accord with the principle of regulatory fit – performance was enhanced 
when the loss/non-loss system was paired with negative stereotypes (both induced 
prevention) and when the gain/non-gain system was paired with positive stereotypes (both 
induced promotion). 
The experiments in Chapter 2 tested the accuracy of the proposed roles of 
motivational state and regulatory focus in moderating the effects of stereotype valence. In 
line with Grimm et al. (2009), it was hypothesised (hypothesis 1) that promotion coupled 
with stereotype lift and prevention coupled with stereotype threat would lead to better 
performance (compared to promotion/stereotype threat and prevention/stereotype lift). It was 
also hypothesised (hypothesis 2) that a challenge induction coupled with stereotype threat 
and a threat induction coupled with stereotype lift would lead to better performance 
(compared to challenge/stereotype lift and threat/stereotype threat). A first experiment aimed 
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to demonstrate that Keller and Bless’ (2008) - but not Grimm et al.’s (2009) - manipulation 
would indeed affect a measure of motivational state. Experiment 2 then tested the interactive 
effects of regulatory focus and motivational state with stereotype valence on performance in 
one comprehensive design. Experiments 3 and 4 then attempted to replicate some of the 
results obtained in experiment 2. 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to test the hypothesis that the Keller and Bless’ (2008) 
gain/non-gain point system would be associated with increased challenge and reduced threat 
relative to their gain/loss point system, whereas Grimm et al.’s (2009) gain/non-gain and 
loss/non-loss point system would not induce differences in motivational state.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited using CrowdFlower. Overall, 255 completed responses 
were recorded, 16 of which were excluded for dual participation. Of the remaining 239 
participants, 72 were female. Participants were compensated with $.05.  
Country of participation. Participants were situated a wide range of countries. This 
country distribution is difficult to characterise statistically; noteworthy features were the fact 
that no participants were located in East Asian countries other than three participants from 
Vietnaam, that the most frequent participant locations were India (which provided 23 
participants) and Serbia (which provided 22 participants) and that only 4 participants were 
located in African countries. The sample contained large numbers of participants from both 
developing and developed countries. 
These patterns are broadly consistent with the geographical distribution of the 
samples in the other CrowdFlower experiments (aside from experiment 10, in which only 
Americans participated, and experiments 6-9, in which no Americans participated). As such, 
it has not been deemed necessary to provide details of the geographical distribution of 
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respondents for the CrowdFlower samples of all the experiments herein. 
Design 
 A 4-condition between-subjects design was used, with point system as the 
independent variable and challenge perceptions as the dependent variable. Thus, participants 
were randomly assigned to the following four conditions: Grimm et al.’s (2009) gain/non-
gain or loss/non-loss condition or Keller and Bless’s (2008) challenge or threat condition. 
Determining Sample Sizes 
 The current section is intended to explain the sample sizes used in all of the 
experiments of this thesis, not just experiment 1. 
Several factors influenced the sample sizes that were selected across the experiments 
reported herein. In general, a minimum of 80% power to detect a medium effect size at a p-
value threshold of .05 was required. Most of the experiments exceeded the requisite sample 
size for this criterion; exceptions were experiment 10 and 13, in which 98 and 80 
participants were recruited, respectively (as opposed to the required 124 for the 2x2 
between-subjects design). This was because experiment 10 was originally intended to be an 
exploratory experiment addressing a number of different outcome variables; most of these 
variables were irrelevant to the work of the current thesis and have therefore not been 
mentioned herein (see procedure of experiment 10). For experiment 13, in which 
participation occurred in-person, the low sample size was simply due to the practical 
difficulty of obtaining a sufficient number of participants. 
Attention Check 
 An attention check was included in all of the online experiments of this thesis, 
including experiment 1. Participants were presented with a lengthy passage of text, followed 
by a short question (“what colour are your eyes?”). The passage of text instructed 
participants not to answer the question below, but rather to enter a code word (e.g. ‘corn’) in 
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the space provided. Participants who failed to enter the code word were unable to proceed to 
the experiment proper. 
Procedure and measures 
Participants were told about the point structure of a forthcoming test with 10 
questions. Participants in both of the gain-based conditions (promotion and challenge) were 
told that they would gain points for correct answers, but not for incorrect answers. Those in 
the loss-based system that followed Keller & Bless (2008) were told that they would gain 
and lose points for correct and incorrect answers, respectively (threat), whilst those in the 
loss-based system that followed Grimm et al. (2009) were told that they would lose and not 
lose points for incorrect and correct answers, respectively (prevention). Participants in both 
of the conditions that followed Grimm et al. were also told that they would start with 0 
points and that they should try to gain at least 6 points (lose no more than 4 points) out of 10.  
Participants’ perceptions of challenge and threat regarding the upcoming task were 
assessed with a single item on a 7-point scale (1 = I see it as a threat; 7 = I see it as a 
challenge). Similar items have been used to assess challenge and threat evaluations in 
previous studies (e.g., Chalabaev et al., 2009). The assessment of challenge and threat with 
only one item is consistent with the conceptualisation of challenge-threat as a 
unidimensional variable, such that high challenge necessarily implies low threat and high 
threat necessarily implies low challenge (Blascovich et al., 2003). Also, the usage of a 
single-item measure is appropriate if the measured construct is singular within the mind of 
the individual (Bergkvist & Rossiter, 2007). The materials used in experiment 1 are 
presented in Appendix A. 
Results and Discussion 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on participants’ self-reported challenge 
was conducted, with the point systems as four levels of the independent factor. This yielded 
a significant effect, F(3, 235)=3.481, p=.017, ηp2 =.04. Pairwise comparisons revealed that, 
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as expected, the mean perceived challenge did not differ between the promotion and 
prevention conditions based on Grimm et al.’s (2009) manipulations (p=.59), but did differ 
between the two conditions based on Keller & Bless (2008) (p=.02), supporting the 
prediction that this manipulation would induce differences in motivational state. Moreover, a 
planned contrast revealed that perceptions of challenge were increased in the gain/non gain 
condition based on Keller and Bless (2008) compared to all other conditions: t(235)=3.18; 
p=.002. Means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 1. 
Table 1  
Challenge as a Function of Point System in Experiment 1  
Point System 
Promotion 
(gain/non-gain 
point system with a 
point target) 
Prevention 
(loss/non-loss 
point system with a 
point target) 
Challenge 
(gain/non-gain 
point system with 
no point target) 
Threat 
(gain/loss point 
system with no point  
target) 
5.08 (1.42) 5.22 (1.57) 5.85 (1.30) 5.16 (1.69) 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.  
In sum, these findings support the idea that Grimm et al.’s (2009) manipulation did 
not tap into motivational states of challenge or threat, while Keller and Bless’ (2008) 
manipulation did. Having substantiated this important assumption, a further experiment was 
conducted to test hypotheses 1 and 2 in an attempt to replicate both Grimm et al.’s (2009) 
and Keller and Bless’ (2008) findings.  
Experiment 2 
Having established that the two types of manipulations do indeed exert differential 
effects on motivational state, I next tested the hypotheses that a promotion (vs. prevention) 
focus would enhance performance in the context of stereotype lift and impair performance in 
the context of a stereotype threat (hypothesis 1), whereas challenge (vs. threat) would impair 
performance in the context of a stereotype lift and enhance performance in the context of 
stereotype threat (hypothesis 2).   
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Therefore, a manipulation of stereotype valence (stereotype lift vs. stereotype threat) 
was crossed with the four levels of the point system manipulation used in experiment 1. 
Participants’ performance on a cognitively demanding task was then assessed.  
Method 
Participants and design 
Participants were recruited using the CrowdFlower online data collection platform 
and were compensated with $0.10 – 0.20 for participation. Overall, 562 completed responses 
were recorded; 218 of these were excluded for dual participation. Of the 344 remaining 
participants 94 were female. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 
(stereotype valence positive vs. negative) x 4 (type of manipulation: promotion vs. 
prevention vs. challenge vs. threat) design.4 The dependent variable was performance on a 
cognitively demanding task that was presented as a test of reasoning ability. 
Procedure and Measures  
Type of Manipulation. Participants were informed that they would complete a task 
measuring ‘reasoning ability’. The descriptions of the point system were identical to in 
experiment 1, except for participants in the promotion and prevention conditions being told 
that there would be 20 questions. Moreover, participants in the promotion (prevention) 
conditions were advised to aim to gain (lose) at least (no more than) 14 (6) points. 
Participants in the challenge and threat conditions were told that there would be 20 questions 
but were not given a point target.   
Stereotype Valence. Following the point system instructions, participants were 
informed that either their own gender (positive valence) or the opposite gender (negative 
                                                            
4 Due to a technical error and an error in planning the participant recruitment, participants were not all 
recruited in one batch and random assignment to conditions was not perfect. This should be borne in 
mind when interpreting the results of experiment 2. 
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valence) tended to perform better on the forthcoming test.  
Test Performance. Participants completed a task containing 20 questions that 
primarily involved the detection of spatial or mathematical patterns and mathematical 
reasoning. An example question was: “There were 100 people present at a baseball card 
show, 59 wore glasses, 72 were baseball card collectors. What is the lowest possible number 
of people at the show who wore glasses AND collected baseball cards?” Questions were in a 
multiple choice format, with the number of responses available for each question ranging 
from 5 to 9. Correct answers to any question gained 1 point; incorrect responses lost 1/(n-1) 
points, where n is the number of responses available for that question. Participants lost no 
points for leaving a question blank. This system corrects for guessing.5 Note that this was the 
system used to calculate participants’ scores for the purposes of statistical analysis and was 
independent of the way in which participants were told their scores would be computed 
(which, as specified above, varied across conditions). The materials used in experiment 2 are 
presented in Appendix B. 
Results and Discussion 
A 2 (stereotype valence) x 4 (type of manipulation) ANOVA on participants’ test 
performance score was conducted. Neither of the two main effects were significant 
(stereotype valence F<1; type of manipulation F(3,336)=1.39, p=.25).  
As hypothesised, the interaction between the two factors was significant, F(3,336) = 
4.39, p=.005, ηp2 =.04. Analyses of the simple effect of stereotype valence were conducted 
for each of the manipulation types. Consistent with hypothesis 1, stereotype lift was 
associated with marginally significantly superior performance relative to stereotype threat in 
the promotion condition: F(1,336)=3.35; p=.07; ηp2=.01. Further supporting hypothesis 1, 
stereotype threat was associated with superior performance relative to stereotype lift in the 
                                                            
5 In experiments 2 and 4, a series of self-report questions were asked at the end of the test (e.g. “how 
much effort did you make during the test?”) for purely exploratory purposes. These were not relevant 
to the hypotheses under discussion and have therefore not been mentioned. 
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prevention condition: F(1,336)=5.23; p=.02; ηp2=.02. Consistent with hypothesis 2, 
stereotype threat was associated with marginally superior performance relative to stereotype 
lift in the challenge conditions: F(1,336)=2.83; p=.09; ηp2=.01. The direction of the 
stereotype valence effect in the threat conditions - with stereotype lift associated with 
superior performance relative to stereotype threat - was also consistent with hypothesis 2, 
but did not reach significance: F(1,336)=1.96; p=.16; ηp2=.01. Means and standard 
deviations are displayed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Performance as a Function of Stereotype Valence and Type of Manipulation in Experiment 2 
    
Type of Manipulation 
   Promotion Prevention Challenge Threat 
Stereotype 
Valence 
Stereotype Lift 5.63 (3.05) 4.11 (3.30) 3.37 (2.72) 5.19 (3.37) 
Stereotype 
Threat 4.36 (3.34) 5.64 (3.48) 4.66 (3.60) 4.09 (3.59) 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.  
 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 sought to test part of hypothesis 1 in a real-world (rather than online) 
setting, in order to establish the replicability and generalisability of the effect. Since 
participant recruitment is often more time consuming in real-world settings, to keep 
requirements for sample size at a reasonable level experiment 3 focused solely on the effects 
of manipulating stereotype lift vs. stereotype threat when Grimm et al.’s (2009) gain/non-
gain (promotion focus inducing) point system was used. In line with the rationale of 
hypothesis 1, it was predicted that performance would be superior in the stereotype lift 
condition (where the point system and stereotype lift would both induce a promotion focus) 
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compared to the stereotype threat condition (where the point system would induce a 
promotion focus whilst stereotype threat would induce a prevention focus). 
Method 
Participants and Design 
86 participants (20 males) were either paid £3 or granted course credit as part of 
their Psychology degree at Royal Holloway University. Data from three participants could 
not be included because of a computer error.  
A 2-condition between-subjects design was used, in which stereotype valence 
(stereotype threat vs. stereotype lift) was the independent variable and performance on the 
test of reasoning ability was the dependent variable.  
Procedure 
The same procedure employed in experiment 2 was used in experiment 3, except for 
the fact that the task point system was not manipulated – Grimm et al.’s (2009) gain/non-
gain point system was used for all participants.6 
Results and Discussion 
Consistent with Grimm et al.’s (2009) results and in accordance with hypothesis 1, 
performance on a cognitively demanding task was superior in the stereotype lift condition 
(M=8.76, SD=2.78) relative to the stereotype threat condition (M=6.64, SD=3.37), 
F(1,81)=9.86; p=.002; ηp2=.11. This lends further support to the prediction that regulatory 
focus is an important moderator of the effects of stereotype threat.  
                                                            
6 After the test of experiment 3, participants completed a reaction-time task designed to assess the 
extent to which they were biased to attend to their own name relative to other words. Although the 
data generated from this task were interesting and consistent with the predictions that they were 
designed to test, they are not relevant to the current work and have therefore not been discussed. 
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Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 sought to test the proposed modulatory roles of regulatory focus and 
motivational state (as per hypotheses 1 and 2) using different manipulations of these 
variables to those used in experiments 2 and 3.  
I adapted a commonly used manipulation of regulatory focus (the “mouse in the 
maze” task; Friedman & Förster, 2005) for this purpose. In the “mouse in the maze” task, 
participants are asked to help a mouse navigate its way out of a maze. In the promotion 
condition, a piece of cheese is depicted outside the maze; participants are told to help the 
mouse obtain it. In the prevention condition, an owl is depicted flying above the maze; 
participants are told to help the mouse escape it.  
However, the adaptation that was made to this task in experiment 4 was such that the 
induction of promotion and prevention foci was not achieved purely through the owl vs. 
cheese manipulation used in previous studies (Scholer & Higgins, 2008). Rather, as will be 
explained below, there was one “owl” condition that induced a prevention focus and a 
second “owl” condition that induced a promotion focus; there was likewise one “cheese” 
condition that induced a promotion focus and one “cheese” condition that induced a 
prevention focus. Similarly, one of the “owl” conditions and one of the “cheese” conditions 
was designed to induce challenge whilst another of the “owl” conditions and another of the 
“cheese” conditions was designed to induce threat.  
Rather than solving a maze, participants simply saw a picture thereof, with either an 
owl hovering above or a piece of cheese placed outside (as with the original manipulation; 
Friedman & Förster, 2005).  To manipulate motivational states, half of the participants read 
a passage of text beneath the picture describing how the mouse was longingly anticipating 
the prospect of successfully achieving his goal (i.e. the prospect of successfully obtaining the 
cheese or the prospect of successfully avoiding being eaten). The other participants read a 
passage of text describing how the mouse was dreading the prospect of failing to achieve his 
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goal (i.e. the prospect of remaining hungry after failing to obtain the cheese or the prospect 
of being eaten by the owl). Thus, four conditions were created by crossing a “success vs. 
failure” manipulation with a “cheese vs. owl” manipulation. I reasoned that the “success vs. 
failure” manipulation would induce challenge and threat states, respectively. Cues that 
heighten the accessibility of end-states associated with success and failure have been found 
to induce challenge and threat states, respectively (McTeague, Lang, Laplante, Cuthbert, 
Strauss & Bradley, 2009; Weisbuch-Remington, Mendes, Seery & Blascovich, 2005; 
Williams, Cumming & Balanos, 2010). Indeed, cognitive representations of likely events are 
more accessible than those of unlikely events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Förster, 
Liberman & Higgins, 2005), and the belief that success (failure) is likely is associated with 
challenge (threat) states (Putwain & Symes, 2014). Thus, evidence indicates that increasing 
the accessibility of end-states associated with success and failure induces challenge and 
threat, respectively. In experiment 4, I therefore reasoned that participants who read the 
passage in which the mouse was focused on the prospect of success (failure) would be 
induced to experience challenge (threat).  
I also expected participants in the different conditions to vary in terms of regulatory 
focus. Evidence shows that individuals who are induced to think about failures to achieve 
promotion or prevention goals (such as obtaining nourishment or avoiding death; Higgins, 
2002, 2005) become more prevention or promotion focused, respectively; individuals who 
are induced to think about successes in achieving promotion or prevention goals become 
more promotion or prevention focused, respectively (Higgins et al., 2001). In other words, 
thinking about the prospect of failing to achieve a given goal induces the opposite regulatory 
focus to that contained within the goal, whereas thinking about the prospect of successfully 
achieving a given goal induces the same regulatory focus as that contained within the goal 
(Higgins et al., 2001; Higgins, 2005). 
Thus, reading about the mouse’s anticipated failure in attaining the cheese 
(cheese/failure condition) would involve focusing on the prospect of failing to achieve a 
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promotion goal, which would lead to a prevention focus. Reading about the mouse’s 
anticipated success in attaining the cheese (cheese/success condition) would involve 
focusing on the prospect of successfully achieving a promotion goal, which would lead to an 
increased promotion focus. Reading about the mouse’s anticipated failure in escaping the 
owl (owl/failure condition) would involve focusing on the prospect of failing to achieve a 
prevention goal, which would lead to a reduced prevention focus. Reading about the 
mouse’s anticipated success in escaping the owl (owl/success condition) would involve 
focusing on the prospect of successfully achieving a prevention goal, which would lead to an 
increased prevention focus. Therefore, participants in the cheese/success and owl/failure 
conditions would be predominantly promotion focused relative to participants in the 
cheese/failure and owl/success conditions. Thus, in the following sections the term 
“prevention focus conditions” refers to the owl/success and cheese/failure conditions 
(wherein participants were induced to be prevention focused), whilst the term “promotion 
focus conditions” refers to the owl/failure and cheese/success conditions (wherein 
participants were induced to be promotion focused). 
After reading the passage of text about the mouse, participants were told that they 
were about to complete a test of reasoning ability and were subject to the same manipulation 
of stereotype lift vs. stereotype threat used in experiments 2 and 3. In the stereotype lift 
(threat) condition, participants were told that members of their gender tended to exhibit 
superior (inferior) performance on the forthcoming task.  
In accordance with hypothesis 1, it was predicted that stereotype lift would be 
associated with superior performance relative to stereotype threat in the promotion 
conditions but that stereotype threat would be associated with superior performance relative 
to stereotype lift in the prevention conditions. 
In accordance with hypothesis 2, it was predicted that stereotype threat would be 
associated with superior performance relative to stereotype lift in the challenge conditions 
(i.e. the cheese/success and owl/success conditions), but that stereotype lift would be 
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associated with superior performance relative to stereotype threat in the threat conditions 
(i.e. the cheese/failure and owl/failure conditions). 
Method 
Participants and Design 
222 participants were recruited via CrowdFlower, of whom 34 were excluded for 
dual participation. This left 141 males and 47 females. A 2 (stereotype valence: stereotype 
lift vs. stereotype threat) x 4 (maze condition: cheese/success, cheese/failure, owl/success, 
owl/failure) between-subjects experimental design was used, with test performance as the 
dependent variable. Note that the analyses performed on the data for experiment 2 did not 
treat each maze condition as a separate level of an independent variable; rather, two separate 
analyses were conducted, each of which involved collapsing the 4 maze conditions onto a 2-
level regulatory focus factor or a 2-level motivational state factor. Thus, the data were 
analysed with two 2x2 between-subjects designs; in one of these, stereotype valence 
(stereotype threat vs. stereotype lift) and regulatory focus (promotion vs. prevention) were 
the independent variables; in the other, stereotype valence (stereotype threat vs. stereotype 
lift) and motivational state (challenge vs. threat) were the independent variables. In both 
cases, performance on the reasoning test was the dependent variable. 
Procedure 
Participants were first subject to the regulatory focus and motivational state 
manipulations described above, before being told that they were about to complete a test of 
reasoning ability on which their gender tended to exhibit superior (stereotype lift condition) 
or inferior (stereotype threat condition) performance. No information was given about how 
the task would be scored. The reasoning task used to assess performance was the same as the 
one used in experiments 2 and 3. The materials used in experiment 4 – other than those 
taken from previous experiments – are presented in Appendix C. 
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Results and Discussion 
A 2x2 ANOVA was conducted, using Stereotype Valence (Positive vs. Negative) 
and Regulatory Focus as independent variables, with Score as the dependent variable. 
Neither of the main effects were significant: both Fs<1. Consistent with hypothesis 1, there 
was a significant interaction between Stereotype Valence and Regulatory Focus: 
F(1,184)=4.11; p=.04; ηp2=.02 (see Table 3). Again consistent with hypothesis 1, stereotype 
threat was associated with significantly superior performance relative to stereotype lift when 
a prevention focus was induced: F(1,184)=4.21; p=.04; ηp2=.02. However, stereotype lift 
was associated with only non-significantly superior performance relative to stereotype threat 
when a promotion focus was induced: F(1,184)=.69; p=.41; ηp2=.00. 
Table 3 
Scores as a function of Stereotype Valence and Regulatory Focus in experiment 3 
  
Stereotype Valence 
  
Stereotype Lift Stereotype Threat 
Regulatory 
Focus 
Promotion 4.79(3.73) 4.21(3.38) 
Prevention 4.16(3.23) 5.58(3.19) 
Note: Standard Deviations in Parenthesis 
A second 2x2 ANOVA was conducted, using Stereotype Valence (stereotype lift vs. 
stereotype threat) and Motivational State (challenge vs. threat) as independent variables and 
score as a dependent variable. Consistent with hypothesis 2, the interaction was marginally 
significant: F(1,184)=3.17; p=.08; ηp2=.02 (see Table 4). Further supporting hypothesis 2, 
negative stereotypes were associated with higher scores than positive stereotypes in the 
challenge conditions to a marginally significant degree: F(1,184)=3.50; p=.06; ηp2=.02. 
However, positive stereotypes were associated with only non-significantly higher scores 
than negative stereotypes in the threat conditions: F(1,184)=.45; p=.50; ηp2=.00.  
Table 4  
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Scores as a function of Stereotype Valence and Motivational State in experiment 4 
  
Stereotype Valence 
  
Stereotype Lift Stereotype Threat 
Motivational 
State 
Challenge 4.26(3.66) 5.55(3.27) 
Threat 4.70(3.30) 4.22(3.32) 
Note: Standard Deviations in Parenthesis 
 
Overall, the results of experiment 4 were broadly consistent with the predictions 
derived from hypotheses 1 and 2. The patterns of mean differences that I predicted on the 
basis of these two statistical interactions were largely reflected in the observed data: all the 
simple effects of stereotype valence were all in the hypothesised direction for each level of 
motivation state and regulatory focus, although in two cases these simple effects were not 
significant.   
General Discussion 
The experiments presented in chapter 2 are consistent with the proposed modulation 
of the effects of stereotype threat and stereotype lift by regulatory focus and motivational 
state. Experiment 1 indicated that the point system manipulation employed by Keller and 
Bless (2008; see also Keller, 2007) induced challenge (in the gain/non-gain condition) and 
threat (in the gain/loss condition). However, Grimm et al.’s (2009) similar manipulation did 
not affect motivational state. Since previous studies (Liberman et al., 1999; Maddox et al., 
2006; Renkema & Van Yperen, 2008; Worthy et al., 2009) have shown that Grimm et al.’s 
(2009) point system would have influenced regulatory focus, the results of experiment 1 
therefore offer a resolution to the apparent inconsistency between the results produced by 
Grimm et al. (2009) and Keller and Bless (2008). Grimm et al. (2009) found that stereotype 
lift enhanced performance relative to stereotype threat when a gain/non-gain (promotion 
focus inducing) point system was used, but impaired performance when a loss/non-loss 
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(prevention focus inducing) point system was used. Given that stereotype lift and stereotype 
threat induce promotion and prevention foci, respectively (Seibt & Förster, 2004), this result 
is consistent with hypothesis 1 regarding the modulation of stereotype threat and stereotype 
lift by regulatory focus. 
Keller and Bless (2008) found that performance in the context of stereotype lift was 
enhanced when the (challenge inducing) gain/non-gain point system was used compared to 
when the (threat inducing) gain/loss point system was used. However, the opposite was true 
in the context of stereotype threat. This supports the proposal (hypothesis 2) that 
performance in the context of stereotype lift is impaired when challenge, rather than threat, 
is induced, whilst the opposite is true under stereotype threat.  
Experiment 2 provided evidence in support of hypothesis 1 and 2 and reinforces my 
interpretation of Grimm et al.’s (2009) and Keller & Bless’ (2008) results by showing that 
the reason for the apparent discrepancy in their findings lies in a subtle difference between 
the point system manipulations that they employed. As such, experiment 2 generated further 
evidence for the view that the induction of threat and a promotion focus enhances 
performance in the context of stereotype lift whilst the induction of challenge or a 
prevention focus enhances performance in the context of stereotype threat. Experiment 3 
amassed further evidence in support of hypothesis 1 and reproduced some of the results of 
experiment 2. Finally, experiment 4 reproduced the proposed patterns of moderation by 
regulatory focus and motivational state using different manipulations thereof, although some 
of the predicted simple effects were not significant.  
As well as being consistent with the results of both Grimm et al. (2009; Grimm et 
al., 2016) and Keller (2007; Keller & Bless, 2008), the current findings are consistent with a 
range of studies examining the relationship between stereotype threat and regulatory focus. 
For instance, Chalabaev, Major, Sarrazin and Cury (2012; see also Chalabaev, Dematte, 
Sarrazin & Fontayne, 2015) encouraged participants to focus on avoiding poor performance 
(which induces a prevention focus) or on striving for strong performance (which induces a 
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promotion focus; Renkema & Van Yperen, 2008; Brendl & Higgins, 1996). Participants who 
were subject to stereotype threat performed more strongly when a prevention (rather than 
promotion) focus was induced, whereas the opposite was true for participants subject to 
stereotype lift. Likewise, Deemer, Smith, Carroll and Carpenter (2014) found that people 
who were naturally inclined to seek to avoid poor performance performed more strongly 
under stereotype threat than people who were not inclined thusly. Thus, the current findings 
are consistent with previous research on the relationship between regulatory focus and 
stereotype threat (see also Ståhl, Van Laar & Ellemers, 2012). 
Furthermore, the present results highlight the overlap between choking under 
pressure and stereotype threat. Worthy et al. (2009) and Plessner et al. (2009) both found 
that prevention foci are associated with superior performance in the context of high pressure, 
but not low pressure. This is consistent with the current experiments, which found the same 
effect of manipulating regulatory focus under stereotype threat. The present findings 
therefore contribute to the large literature documenting the similarities between stereotype 
threat and choking under pressure (Allen et al., 2002; Beilock et al., 2002; Beilock et al., 
2006; Bellinger et al., 2015; Jamieson & Harkins, 2010; Mesagno et al., 2012; Vick et al., 
2008; Weger et al., 2012).  
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
The current findings have important implications for research concerning the 
relationship between regulatory focus and motivational state. Some researchers (e.g. Seery, 
Weisbuch & Blascovich, 2009) have suggested that these two dimensions should not be 
regarded as separate: it is argued that challenge is equivalent to a promotion focus and that 
threat is equivalent to a prevention focus. The present experiments, however, conflict with 
these conclusions by indicating that inductions of challenge or a promotion focus (rather 
than of threat or a prevention focus, respectively) have different effects on performance in 
the context of stereotype threat and stereotype lift. This is consistent with research 
conducted by Sassenberg, Sassenrath and Fetterman (2015) suggesting that the attentional 
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effects of challenge and threat induction differ from the effects of manipulating promotion 
and prevention foci, respectively. Thus, the current research is consistent with the view that 
regulatory focus and motivational state are separate constructs.  
At the practical level, the current findings have clear implications for strategies 
designed to ameliorate the potentially detrimental effects of positive or negative stereotypes 
on performance (Steele & Aronson, 1995; Rosenthal & Crisp, 2007). The finding that these 
effects can be modulated by manipulations of regulatory focus or motivational state 
indicates that their negative impact on real-world performance could be reversed through the 
application of fairly minor alterations of the performance situation. For example, the point 
system manipulations used in experiment 2 could easily be implemented in real-life 
performance situations in order to improve the performance of individuals who are at 
heightened risk of experiencing performance impairments due to stereotype threat (e.g. 
Keller, 2012). 
Limitations 
There are a number of limitations that apply to the experiments of chapter 2. 
Participants were always assigned to experience either stereotype threat or stereotype lift, 
with no control condition in which performance stereotypes were not mentioned. As such, it 
is impossible to infer the extent to which the impact of the stereotype manipulation was 
driven by the effect of stereotype lift, the effect of stereotype threat, or both. This limitation 
also applies to some of the previous studies in the same area (Grimm et al., 2009; Keller & 
Bless, study 1, although see Keller, 2007; Keller & Bless, 2008, study 2; Seibt & Förster, 
2004). Increased usage of control conditions when studying the effects of both stereotype 
threat and stereotype lift would therefore be appropriate in future research. An additional 
limitation of the current findings is that experiments 2, 3 and 4 all used the same reasoning 
task to assess task performance. This raises questions about the extent to which chapter 2’s 
findings can be generalised across different performance domains. For instance, the effects 
of stereotype threat on motor task performance are driven by different mechanisms to its 
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effects on cognitively demanding tasks (Schmader et al., 2008). As such, it is unclear 
whether the current findings can be generalised to other tasks, such as motor tasks.  
Conclusion 
The findings of chapter 2 suggest that regulatory focus and motivational state 
moderate effects of stereotype valence on performance: prevention focus and challenge 
induction enhanced performance relative to promotion focus and threat induction in the 
context of negative stereotypes, but the opposite was true in the context of positive 
stereotypes. In addition to their theoretical implications regarding the regulatory focus-
motivational state relationship, these results also have potential practical applications. For 
instance, they suggest that the typical detrimental impact of negative stereotypes on 
performance in real-world settings could be ameliorated by helping test-takers to experience 
increased challenge or an enhanced prevention focus. Likewise, the performance of 
positively stereotyped individuals could be improved by inducing threat or a promotion. The 
fact that motivational state and regulatory focus can be manipulated through something as 
simple as a task’s point system testifies to the practical feasibility of such an approach.  
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Chapter Three: Stereotype Threat and beliefs about 
Anthropogenic Global Warming 
 
Anthropogenic Global Warming 
Numerous independent lines of evidence indicate that the Earth is currently 
warming, primarily as a consequence of anthropogenic increases in carbon dioxide (Karl et 
al., 2015; Rajaratnam, Romano, Tsiang & Diffenbaugh, 2015; Shakun et al., 2012; Vinnikov 
& Grody, 2003). There is consequently an overwhelming consensus among climate 
scientists, and among scientists in general, that anthropogenic global warming (henceforth 
AGW) is occurring (Anderegg, Prall, Harold & Schneider, 2010; Carlton, Perry-Hill, Huber 
& Prokopy, 2015; Cook et al., 2013; Cook et al., 2014; Cook et al., 2016; Doran & 
Zimmerman, 2009). However, in spite of the near total acknowledgement of the reality of 
AGW within the scientific community, rejection of the reality of AGW is prevalent among 
the publics of numerous countries around the world (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Smith & 
Leiserowitz, 2012). Given the importance of public support for policies designed to combat 
the potentially disastrous effects of AGW (Mann, 2013), there is therefore a clear need to 
understand the psychological mechanisms that influence beliefs about climate change and 
the tendency to deny the reality of AGW.  
Prior research in this area has identified the mischaracterisation of climate science 
by the media (Boykoff, 2007; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004) and the dissemination of climate 
change misinformation by groups supported by the fossil fuel industry (Brulle, 2014) as key 
factors responsible for the discrepancy in AGW-related beliefs among the scientific and 
some lay communities. At the individual level, research has shown that priming of political 
identities (Unsworth & Fielding, 2014) and the way in which messages about climate change 
are framed (Nisbet, 2009) can influence beliefs about AGW.  
Given that stereotype threat has been shown to affect attitudes towards and beliefs 
about science among certain stereotyped groups (Cheryan, Meltzoff & Kim, 2011; Cheryan, 
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Plaut, Davies & Steele, 2009; Rios, Cheng, Totton & Shariff, 2015), and given that attitudes 
towards scientists have been found to correlate significantly with views on AGW 
(Hmielowski, Hutchens & Cicchirillo, 2014), there is reason to believe that stereotype threat 
may indeed have an impact on AGW-related beliefs. This could have important implications 
in terms of the methods available to influence public beliefs about AGW in a desirable 
manner. 
Stereotype Threat and Belief in AGW 
When people are subject to stereotype threat, they employ a number of cognitive and 
behavioural strategies to eliminate the negative affective state that it activates (Schmader et 
al., 2008). One such strategy involves denying the validity of the negative stereotype (Von 
Hippel et al., 2005) – if the stereotype is perceived as inaccurate, then the negative 
implications that it has for the individual’s valued group identity are diminished. Indeed, the 
detrimental impact of stereotype threat on performance can be eliminated by exposing 
stereotype-threatened individuals to counter-stereotypical exemplars, which challenge the 
veracity of the stereotype (Marx & Roman, 2002; McIntyre et al., 2003).  
Similarly, stereotype threatened individuals can themselves challenge the veracity of 
the negative stereotype by performing well on a stereotype-related task. In doing so, they 
themselves counterevidence the stereotype, because their strong performance is inconsistent 
with the supposed low ability of their group (Jamieson & Harkins, 2007). Consequently, 
stereotype threat induces an increased desire to disconfirm the negative stereotype by 
displaying high levels of the stereotype-relevant ability (Schmader et al., 2008), as 
evidenced by increased effort (Forbes et al., 2008), and self-reports of thoughts and feelings 
experienced under stereotype threat (Beilock, Rydell & McConnell, 2007).  
I expected (and confirmed in experiment 5) that most people perceive (non-)belief in 
AGW to be indicative of scientific (in)competence. In others words, individuals who are 
described as deniers of AGW are generally perceived as less scientifically competent than 
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individuals who are described as believing in AGW. As such, people exposed to a negative 
science-related stereotype about their group might express increased belief in AGW in order 
to disconfirm the stereotype (Schmader et al., 2008). If most people appreciate that AGW is 
generally recognised as having scientific legitimacy, then they may consider that expressing 
increased belief in AGW would help to affirm their own scientific astuteness, thereby 
countering the negative stereotype about their group’s scientific ability. This would mean 
that enhancing one’s belief in AGW would be utilised as a means of resolving stereotype 
threat-induced discomfort, leading to the hypothesis that high (vs. low) science-related 
stereotype threat would be associated with increased belief in AGW (hypothesis 3).  
 Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that this prediction would apply not only to 
science-related stereotype threat, but also to forms of stereotype threat that relate to some 
other ability domains that are not specifically scientific in nature. If denial of AGW is 
considered to be indicative of scientific incompetence, then it would also be indicative of 
incompetence in ability domains that are perceived to be related – but not equivalent – to 
scientific competence, such as general cognitive ability (Yager & Penick, 1986). For this 
reason, hypothesis 3 was predicted to apply to situations involving science-related stereotype 
threat, but also to situations involving negative stereotypes pertaining to general cognitive 
ability. 
Furthermore, for reasons that will be explained in the following section, I 
hypothesised that there would also be interactions between stereotype threat and four other 
variables in determining belief in AGW. These other variables were implicit beliefs about 
the nature of ability, the perceived effectiveness of a strategy to cope with stereotype threat 
(manipulated via the content of a persuasive message about AGW), the framing of a 
persuasive message about AGW, and temperature. In the following sections, I will explore 
these variables in more detail and outline the justification for their proposed interactions 
with stereotype threat.  
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Implicit Beliefs about Scientific Ability 
Individuals vary in terms of their beliefs about the extent to which ability is fixed or 
malleable (Dweck, 1999). At one extreme, entity theorists view ability as a fixed, largely 
innate trait that is difficult to alter through practice or the application of effort; at the other 
extreme, increment theorists view ability as a highly malleable construct that changes over 
time as a consequence of practice and learning experiences (Grant & Dweck, 2003).  
Entity theorists tend to be more motivated to demonstrate that they possess high 
ability compared to increment theorists (Dweck, 1999). For entity theorists, low ability 
constitutes a permanent handicap that cannot be overcome by increased effort, whereas for 
an increment theorist low ability is a temporary problem that can be remedied through 
subsequent learning (Molden & Dweck, 2006). The idea of having low ability is therefore 
far more aversive for entity theorists than for increment theorists (Dweck & Leggett, 1988), 
and this greater aversion is evident from their reactions to failure. For instance, the error 
related negativity (ERN) is an EEG signal that arises from activity in the anterior cingulate 
cortex around 80ms after the detection of an error (Moser, Moran, Schroder, Donnelan & 
Yeung, 2014). A large body of evidence indicates that ERN magnitude is associated with the 
negative affect triggered by error commission, and that it can thus serve as an index of the 
extent to which an individual wishes to avoid failure and mistakes (Proudfit, Inzlicht & 
Menin, 2013). Entity theorists have been shown to exhibit higher magnitude ERNs 
compared to increment theorists when informed of an error that they have committed 
(Mangels et al., 2006), indicating that entity theorists are more aversive to the low ability 
implications of failure.  
Similarly, entity theorists employ more self-protective strategies following failure 
compared to increment theorists. For instance, the negative affect that arises when one 
realises that one may lack a particular ability (e.g. after failing on a maths test) can be 
diminished by reducing the perceived value of the ability domain (e.g. by adopting the view 
that ‘maths is stupid’; Major, Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe & Crocker,1998). Evidence 
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suggests that entity theorists employ this domain devaluation strategy to a greater extent than 
increment theorists (Aronson et al., 2002), indicating that the former are more averse to the 
prospect of displaying low ability in a valued domain. For instance, Aronson (1997) found 
that entity theorists tended to devalue the ability tested by a task when given bogus failure 
(rather than success) feedback about their performance thereon, whereas this was not the 
case for increment theorists. Thus, holding an entity (rather than increment) theory leads 
people to ascribe greater value and importance to personal ability, as evidenced by increased 
usage of defensive strategies (such as domain devaluation) in response to events that call 
their ability into question (such as task failure; Molden & Dweck, 2006).  
This has implications for the ways in which increment and entity theorists would be 
likely to respond to stereotype threat-inducing situations. Entity theorists would be more 
disturbed by the idea that they or their group have low ability, and would therefore be 
expected to exhibit more intense responses to stereotype threat than increment theorists. 
Indeed, Aronson et al. (2002) found that an intervention designed to encourage students to 
adopt an increment theory improved the academic performance of African Americans (who 
frequently experience stereotype threat; Keller, 2012; Steele, 1997) relative to whites. 
Similarly, Froehlich et al. (2016) found that individuals who held entity beliefs in relation to 
a stereotyped ability were more susceptible to the effects of stereotype threat on performance 
than individuals who held increment beliefs. 
If entity theorists find the idea of having low ability more aversive, then they should 
make more effort to find ways to invalidate negative stereotypes about their group’s ability 
when they are reminded of these stereotypes. Conversely, increment theorists would be 
relatively unconcerned by the idea that they or their group lacks ability, meaning that they 
would be less likely to attempt to disconfirm any negative stereotypes about their group 
(Molden & Dweck, 2006). If expressing belief in AGW is viewed as an effective means of 
challenging a negative science-related stereotype about one’s group (as proposed above), 
then it follows that only entity theorists, but not increment theorists, would increase their 
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belief in AGW when subject to stereotype threat. Thus, it was hypothesised that high vs. low 
stereotype threat would be associated with increased belief in AGW among entity theorists, 
but not among increment theorists (hypothesis 4). Experiments 6 and 7 tested this 
hypothesis. 
Perceived effectiveness of a strategy to cope with Stereotype threat 
It was also hypothesised that the effects of science-related stereotype threat on 
beliefs about AGW would be modulated by the extent to which altering such beliefs would 
be perceived as an effective strategy for coping with stereotype threat (manipulated via the 
content of a persuasive message about climate change).  
This prediction was based on evidence showing that when people experience 
cognitive dissonance, a range of different strategies can be used to facilitate the resolution 
thereof (Festinger, 1956; Stone et al., 1994; Steele, 1988). For instance, the conflict between 
the cognitions “I smoke” and “smoking is unhealthy” can be reduced by denying the 
unhealthy properties of cigarettes, invoking the stress-relieving benefits of smoking, 
devaluing the importance of a healthy lifestyle, or committing to not smoking in future 
(McMaster & Lee, 1991). Festinger (1956) proposed that people’s dissonance-reduction 
strategy selection would favour the option that required the least amount of cognitive effort 
and reality distortion and that minimised the individual’s acceptance of aversive 
conclusions.  
Indeed, evidence indicates that the strategies people use to resolve cognitive 
dissonance vary depending on the relative ease of each strategy. For example, when people 
observe another innocent person’s suffering, they experience cognitive dissonance because 
their observation contradicts the widely-held belief that bad things tend not to happen to 
good people (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway, 2003; Lerner, 1997). When people are 
able to prevent the observed suffering through their own non-costly actions, they almost 
always take these actions in order to resolve the cognitive dissonance (Lerner & Miller, 
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1978). However, when no non-costly courses of action are available to prevent the observed 
suffering, people are forced to utilise alternative strategies to eliminate the cognitive 
dissonance. For instance, people typically make unfavourable evaluations of the victims of 
misfortune so that their suffering is not perceived to contradict the belief that bad things do 
not happen to good people (Lerner & Miller, 1978).  
Likewise, people tend to select the dissonance-reduction strategy that seems most 
realistic and that therefore requires minimal reality distortion (Festinger, 1956). For instance, 
Zagefka, Noor, Brown, de Moura and Hopthrow (2011) found that people are more likely to 
ascribe blame to victims of human-caused, rather than natural, disasters - thereby reducing 
the cognitive dissonance aroused by the knowledge that blameless people are suffering – 
because it seems more reasonable (and thus requires less reality distortion) to blame 
someone for a man-made disaster (which could be evoked by inciting conflict or electing an 
incompetent government) rather than a natural disaster (which people cannot be reasonably 
claimed to control). Thus, dissonance resolution typically follows the ‘path of least 
resistance’, i.e. the alternative that minimises the reality distortion and cognitive effort 
involved in eliminating the perceived inconsistency (Festinger, 1956). 
Moreover, certain dissonance-reduction strategies may be viewed as providing a 
more satisfying resolution to the cognitive dissonance than others, and they may therefore be 
more likely to be selected. For example, stereotype threat-induced cognitive dissonance 
triggers an increased desire to perform well on stereotype-related tasks in order to resolve 
the cognitive dissonance by invalidating the negative stereotype (Forbes et al., 2008; 
Jamieson & Harkins, 2007). Alternative means of resolving the cognitive dissonance, such 
as devaluing the perceived importance of the stereotyped domain (Woodcock, Hernandez, 
Estrada & Schultz, 2012), are less appealing and are therefore only likely to be used if the 
individual believes that they lack the capacity to perform well (Hoyt & Blascovich, 2010). 
Whilst strong performance would provide decisive evidence of the inapplicability of the 
stereotype to the individual, domain devaluation may involve some degree of self-deception 
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and could therefore be perceived as a less convincing resolution to stereotype threat-induced 
cognitive dissonance. Thus, certain methods of resolving cognitive dissonance (e.g. 
exhibiting strong performance in the context of a negative stereotype) may be perceived as 
providing a more convincing resolution than others, and may consequently be more likely to 
be selected when available.  
It follows that altering the extent to which a particular science-related dissonance-
reduction strategy is perceived as effective will influence its likelihood of being used. For 
instance, if people are led to perceive expressing belief in AGW as a highly effective way of 
resolving stereotype threat-induced cognitive dissonance, then their belief in AGW should 
increase when they are subject to science-related stereotype threat. It was therefore predicted 
that altering the extent to which expressing belief in AGW was seen as an effective strategy 
to address stereotype threat (operationalised through the provision of different messages 
about AGW) would influence whether or not this strategy would be used in the fact of 
stereotype threat (hypothesis 5). After all, it would not be sensible to expect people to 
employ strategies which they would perceive as ineffective. Experiment 8 investigated this 
possibility. Following a stereotype threat manipulation relating to their religious identity, 
Christian participants read one of three messages about global warming. These messages 
described how Church leaders (message 1), Scientists (message 2), or both Church leaders 
and scientists (message 3) from across the world had come together in urging governments 
to take action to combat AGW. 
Participants who were reminded of the widespread scientific consensus on AGW (as 
in messages 2 and 3) would be more likely to view belief in AGW as an indication of 
scientific competence, which would enhance the extent to which the endorsement thereof 
would be perceived as an effective way of counter-evidencing the “Christians lack scientific 
ability” stereotype7. Informing participants of the widespread belief in AGW within the 
                                                            
7 Although, as noted above, a large majority of people would already be aware of the scientific 
consensus on AGW, it is likely that explicitly mentioning this consensus would further increase 
people’s tendency to view AGW as a scientifically valid position (van der Linden, Leiserowitz, 
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Church (as in messages 1 and 3) would also enhance the extent to which endorsement of 
AGW would be perceived as an effective way of countering the negative stereotype, because 
such endorsement would not only serve to display personal scientific ability, but it would 
also imply the perceived scientific astuteness of the wider Church through its association 
with a valid scientific position. In contrast, denying the veracity of AGW following exposure 
to message 1 or 3 would imply a lack of scientific competence within the Church, which 
would be detrimental to participants’ attempts to reduce stereotype threat-induced cognitive 
dissonance. Thus, the mention of widespread belief in AGW among scientists (in messages 2 
and 3) and within the Church (in messages 1 and 3) would enhance the tendency to express 
belief in AGW among Christians exposed to the “Christians lack scientific ability” 
stereotype. For participants exposed to message 3, there would therefore be two factors 
within the message serving to enhance the extent to which expressing belief in AGW would 
be perceived as an effective way of reducing stereotype threat-induced cognitive dissonance. 
For participants exposed to messages 1 and 2, there would only be one factor within each 
message serving to enhance the extent to which expressing belief in AGW would be 
perceived as an effective way of reducing stereotype threat-induced cognitive dissonance.  
On this basis, hypothesis 5 led to the prediction that the stereotype threat 
manipulation would interact with the message manipulation in determining belief in AGW. 
Specifically, I predicted that high (vs. low) stereotype threat would be associated with 
increased belief in AGW in all three message conditions, but that the effect of the stereotype 
threat manipulation would be greater for participants exposed to message 3 relative to those 
exposed to messages 2 and 1.  
In addition to investigating the impact of the aforementioned independent variables 
on belief in AGW, experiment 8 also sought to investigate whether their effects would 
                                                            
Feinberg, & Maibach, 2015). Analogously, even though the vast majority of people are aware of the 
negative health effects of smoking, explicit reminders of these negative effects can reduce the appeal 
of cigarettes (Wong, Nisbett & Harvell, 2017). Thus, although most participants would initially view 
endorsement of AGW as a scientifically valid position, an explicit reminder of the related scientific 
consensus would be expected to reinforce and enhance this pre-existing belief.  
78 
 
extend to a behavioural measure related to AGW. Specifically, participants were given the 
opportunity, at no personal cost, to direct a small amount of the experimenter’s money to an 
organisation involved in disseminating accurate information about AGW. Based on previous 
research showing that acknowledgement of the reality and danger of AGW is associated 
with behaviours that facilitate the prevention thereof (Ferguson & Branscombe, 2010; 
Gifford, 2011; Jang, 2013), it was predicted that greater belief in AGW would cause an 
increased tendency to donate money. This led to the hypothesis that high (vs. low) 
stereotype threat would be associated with higher monetary donations; this effect was 
predicted to be mediated by the effect of stereotype threat on belief in AGW (hypothesis 6). 
Furthermore, it was hypothesised that the effect of stereotype threat on donation behaviour 
would be greater for participants exposed to message 3 as opposed to message 1 or 2; again, 
this interaction was predicted to be mediated by the interactive effects of stereotype threat 
and message content on belief in AGW (moderated mediation; hypothesis 7). In other words, 
hypothesis 7 proposed that the cross-condition variation in belief in AGW predicted by 
hypothesis 5 would lead to a corresponding pattern of cross-condition differences in 
donation behaviour as a result of the direct effect of belief in AGW on donation behaviour. 
Message Framing 
I also investigated the way in which differences in message framing could alter the 
impact of stereotype threat. Specifically, I examined whether the effects of climate change 
messages that were framed positively (e.g. “successful mitigation of climate change will 
help the environment”) rather than negatively (e.g. “failure to mitigate climate change will 
harm the environment”) would vary as a function of stereotype threat. 
This possibility was tested in experiment 9, which used a variation of the stereotype 
threat manipulation employed in experiments 6, 7 and 8. American participants were either 
told (high stereotype threat) or not told (low stereotype threat) that Americans tended to 
perform poorly on an ostensibly forthcoming test of cognitive ability. I expected this 
stereotype threat manipulation to have the same effect as the corresponding manipulations in 
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experiments 6, 7 and 8, such that high stereotype threat would be associated with increased 
belief in AGW (hypothesis 3). 
It was also predicted that positively framed messages would be associated with 
greater belief in AGW compared to negatively framed messages (hypothesis 8), and that this 
effect would be particularly pronounced for participants who were subject to high (vs. low) 
stereotype threat (hypothesis 9). This hypothesis was based on the proposal (Proulx, Inzlicht 
& Harmon-Jones, 2012) that the inconsistency resolution mechanisms activated by 
dissonance in one area of cognition can spill over to other areas of cognition. In other words, 
exposure to a single cognitive dissonance-inducing discrepancy can create a general desire to 
achieve consistency in areas that are both related and unrelated to the original discrepancy. 
For example, experimental manipulations that emphasise a discrepancy between the desire 
for personal control and awareness of its absence have been found to increase the tendency 
to perceive consistent relationships between unrelated events (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). 
When people are non-consciously exposed to a perceptual phenomenon that is inconsistent 
with their beliefs about the world, they behave more consistently with their personal values 
by endorsing harsher punishments for people whose behaviour violates those values (Proulx 
& Heine, 2008). The same effect is observed when people are presented with absurd jokes 
(Proulx, Heine & Vohs, 2010) or nonsense word pairs (Randles, Proulx & Heine, 2011). 
Moreover, when people are instructed to argue against their own self-unity (which is 
inconsistent with the desire to function in accordance with a coherent identity), they display 
an enhanced capacity to detect statistical regularities in sequences of letter strings (Proulx & 
Heine, 2009). The same effect occurs when people are presented with nonsense word pairs 
(Randles et al., 2011). Thus, a large body of evidence indicates that exposure to an 
inconsistency in one domain (e.g. a lack of personal control; violation of perceptual or 
linguistic expectancies) leads to an increased desire to detect or perceive consistency in 
domains that are unrelated to the initial inconsistency (e.g., behaviour that is consistent with 
personal values; detecting statistical regularities in sequences of letter strings). This supports 
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the view (Proulx et al., 2012) that the inconsistency resolution mechanisms activated in 
response to the perception of a specific discrepancy can “spill over” into areas of cognition 
that are unrelated to the initial discrepancy. 
It follows that stereotype threat-induced cognitive dissonance should trigger an 
increased motivation to perceive and detect consistency, even in relation to information that 
is irrelevant to the negative stereotype. For instance, messages that highlight the ongoing and 
future negative consequences of AGW (rather than the positive consequences of successful 
prevention thereof) may evoke cognitive dissonance because the idea that the world is 
becoming more dangerous may conflict with the desire to live in a safe world (McCright & 
Dunlap, 2011a; Scruggs & Benegal, 2012). Denying the reality of AGW can serve as a 
means of avoiding the cognitive dissonance associated with this particular belief-desire 
discrepancy (Scruggs & Benegal, 2012). As such, negatively framed (vs. positively framed) 
messages should evoke reduced belief in AGW, because denying AGW would help to 
resolve the cognitive dissonance evoked by a negatively framed message. Thus, one would 
expect a main effect of message framing on AGW-belief-endorsement, so that belief in 
AGW would be higher for positively framed messages (hypothesis 8).  
Moreover, if stereotype threat creates a general desire for consistency, and if 
denying AGW can help to achieve a sense of consistency following exposure to messages 
describing its negative consequences, then it follows that the effect of negatively framed (vs. 
positively framed) messages in reducing belief in AGW should be greater for participants 
exposed to high stereotype threat as opposed to low stereotype threat. Note that, since all 
forms of stereotype threat induce cognitive dissonance regardless of the content of the 
stereotype (Schmader et al., 2008), this proposed interaction should not be dependent on the 
content of the stereotype used to induce stereotype threat (e.g. it should be observed 
regardless of whether the stereotype threat involved is related to scientific ability).  
It was therefore hypothesised that stereotype threat (high vs. low) would interact 
with the content of a persuasive message about climate change (stressing positive 
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implications of successfully preventing AGW vs. stressing potential negative implications of 
failure to prevent AGW) in predicting beliefs about AGW. I predicted that belief in AGW 
would be increased for participants exposed to positively framed (vs. negatively framed) 
messages, and that this effect would be particularly pronounced for participants exposed to 
high (rather than low) stereotype threat (hypothesis 9). Note that in this instance, stereotype 
threat was proposed to be a moderator of the effects of message framing, and not the other 
way around. 
Temperature 
Research indicates that people’s belief in AGW increases following recent 
experiences of warm weather or high temperatures in a laboratory setting (Hamilton & 
Stampone, 2013; Li, Johnson & Zaval, 2011; Zaval, Keenan, Johnson & Weber, 2014). This 
results from a cognitive process known as attribute substitution, where a complex judgement 
(e.g. assessing the existence or extent of AGW) is replaced with a simple judgement (e.g. 
evaluating recent temperature trends; Kahneman, 2003). Attribute substitution reduces the 
amount of cognitive effort required to make a judgement, and it is therefore typically 
observed when individuals are unmotivated to expend cognitive resources (Fazio, 2001). 
However, evidence indicates that cognitive dissonance increases people’s motivation to 
expend cognitive resources in the judgements that they make – including judgements that are 
not related to the source of the cognitive dissonance (Inzlicht, Bartholow & Hirsch, 2015).  
For instance, in the classic Stroop (1935) task, participants are asked to classify the 
font colour of words in which the font and spelling are either congruent (e.g. the word “red” 
written in red font) or incongruent (e.g. the word “red” written in green font). Incongruent 
trials produce cognitive dissonance because the font and spelling activate conflicting 
responses (Harmon-Jones et al., 2009). Brain imaging studies reveal that these incongruent 
trials trigger a cascade of neural responses designed to motivate the increased cognitive 
effort that is necessary to inhibit the inappropriate response activated by the word’s spelling 
(Kerns, Cohen, MacDonald, Cho, Stenger & Carter, 2004). Indeed, incongruent Stroop trials 
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have been found to evoke a range of physiological and affective responses that typically 
occur in the context of increased cognitive effort (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012). Likewise, 
other instances of cognitive dissonance, such as the conflict between the desire to avoid 
errors and the realisation of a recent personal error, also induce increases in cognitive effort 
(Iannaccone, Hauser, Staempfli Walitza, Brandeis & Brem, 2015). Indeed, stereotype threat, 
which is a form of cognitive dissonance, has been found to trigger increased cognitive effort 
during task performance (Forbes et al., 2008; Jamieson & Harkins, 2007). More generally, 
stereotype threat has been found to induce threat (see chapter 2; Vick et al., 2008), and 
people tend to exert more effort in judgement formation when experiencing threat, even for 
judgements that are unrelated to the task that the individual finds threatening (Fonseca, 
Blascovich & Garcia-Marques, 2014). 
Since the use of temperature cues to judge the veracity and extent of AGW is only 
observed in individuals who lack the motivation to exert cognitive effort (Zaval et al., 2014), 
it follows that high (vs. low) stereotype threat would reduce the impact of temperature on 
belief in AGW. On this basis, it was hypothesised that exposure to high (vs. low) 
temperatures would be associated with increased belief in AGW for participants exposed to 
low stereotype threat, but that there would be no effect of temperature on belief in AGW for 
participants exposed to high stereotype threat (hypothesis 10).  
These predictions were tested in experiment 10, in which a sample comprised 
entirely of American participants was used. Participants were either told (high stereotype 
threat condition) or not told (low stereotype threat condition) that Europeans tended to 
outperform Americans on the ostensibly forthcoming science test. Experiment 10 also tested 
the hypothesised stereotype threat*temperature interaction using a measure (rather than a 
manipulation) of perceived temperature – the prediction here was that perceived temperature 
would be correlated with belief in AGW under low, but not high, stereotype threat.  
Experiment 8 also employed a measure of perceived temperature in addition to a 
manipulation thereof in order to test this same prediction. Because the temperature measure 
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was placed after all the other measures in experiment 8, its presence did not affect the 
validity of the rest of the experimental design in any way. Thus, although experiment 10 
undertook the main investigation of hypothesis 10, this hypothesis was also examined in 
experiment 8.  
Summary of Hypotheses of Chapter 3 
In summary, a number of hypotheses were formulated on the basis of Schmader et 
al.’s (2008) view that stereotype threat involves cognitive dissonance.  
Prior to testing these hypotheses, it was first necessary to establish that people generally 
perceive (non-)belief in AGW as indicative of scientific (in)competence, because this was a 
central premise underlying much of the reasoning presented above. Experiment 5 therefore 
tested the prediction that an individual described as believing in AGW would be perceived 
as more scientifically competent than an individual described as not believing in AGW. 
Experiments 6 and 7 tested the prediction that high (vs. low) stereotype threat would 
be associated with increased belief in AGW overall (hypothesis 3), but only for participants 
induced to adopt an entity (rather than increment) theory of ability (hypothesis 4).  
Experiment 8 tested the hypothesis that high (vs. low) stereotype threat would be 
associated with increased belief in AGW, and that this effect would be greater for 
participants exposed to message 3 relative to those exposed to messages 1 or 2 (hypothesis 
5). Experiment 8 also tested the hypothesis that donations to an organisation promoting 
belief in AGW would be increased for participants exposed to high (vs. low) stereotype 
threat, and that this effect would be mediated by increased belief in AGW under high 
stereotype threat (hypothesis 6). Furthermore, experiment 8 tested the hypothesis that the 
enhancing effect of high (vs. low) stereotype threat on amount donated would depend on the 
perceived effectiveness of expressing belief in AGW as a strategy for reducing stereotype 
threat-induced cognitive dissonance (manipulated via exposure to different messages), and 
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that this effect would be mediated by the interaction between stereotype threat and message 
content in determining belief in AGW (hypothesis 7).  
Experiment 9 tested the hypothesis that a negatively framed message about climate 
change would evoke less belief in AGW than a positively framed message (hypothesis 8), 
and that this effect would be greater for participants exposed to high (rather than low) 
stereotype threat (hypothesis 9). 
Experiment 10 tested the hypothesis that exposure to high (vs. low) temperature 
would be associated with increased belief in AGW, but that this would only be true for 
participants exposed to low (vs. high) stereotype threat (hypothesis 10; experiment 8 also 
tested this hypothesis). 
Across all experiments, it was hypothesised that high (vs. low) stereotype threat would be 
associated, via a main effect, with increased belief in AGW (hypothesis 3).  
Experiment 5 
Experiment 5 tested the assumption that people who express belief in AGW are 
generally perceived as more scientifically competent than people who deny AGW. It was 
predicted that a target would be perceived as more scientifically competent when described 
as believing (vs. not believing) in AGW. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
128 non-American participants (31 females) were recruited via CrowdFlower. A 
between-subjects design was employed, wherein a described individual’s belief in AGW 
(belief vs. non-belief) served as the independent variable, with the perceived scientific 
competence of this target individual being the dependent variable.  
 
Procedure 
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Participants were told that they would complete a task in which they would attempt 
to make judgements about others based on limited information. They were then presented 
with a description of a target individual (John). This description listed several of John’s 
characteristics (e.g. “John has black hair”; “John is married”. In the belief condition, the 
final statement about John in this description said “John believes in man-made global 
warming”. In the non-belief condition, the final statement said “John does not believe in 
man-made global warming”. All other statements about John were exactly the same. After 
reading this description, participants were asked: “On a scale of 1 to 7, how good do you 
think John is at thinking scientifically? (1 is "not at all good at thinking scientifically" to 7 = 
"extremely good at thinking scientifically"). Responses to this outcome variable were 
recorded to index perceptions of John’s scientific competence. 
Subsequent to the questions about John, another target (Chloe) was described. No 
aspects of Chloe’s description were manipulated across participants, and no mention of 
global warming was made therein. Participants were then asked to estimate Chloe’s ability 
to think scientifically. The purpose of this addition was to ensure that any effects of the 
experimental manipulation were specific to John. For instance, one might argue that 
mentioning belief vs. non-belief in AGW could differentially activate liberal or conservative 
political identity in the participants (McCright & Dunlap, 2011b), and that this could then 
have general effects on the way all targets are evaluated. This possibility would be ruled out 
by demonstrating that the effect of the experimental manipulation was specific to 
evaluations of John and did not impact evaluations of Chloe.  
Following their evaluations of John and Chloe, participants answered the following 
question on a scale ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”: “People who do 
not believe in man-made global warming are worse at thinking scientifically relative to 
people who do believe in man-made global warming. Do you agree?”. The purpose of this 
was to devise a second, additional test of participants’ general agreement with the position 
that (non-)belief in AGW is associated with scientific (in)competence. It was predicted that 
86 
 
mean responses to this measure would lie significantly above the mid-point (indicating high 
agreement). 
The materials used in experiment 5 are presented in Appendix C.  
Results and Discussion 
A between-subjects one-way ANOVA was conducted, using belief vs. non-belief as 
an independent variable, with participants’ ratings of John’s scientific competence as the 
dependent variable. Consistent with predictions, John was rated as significantly more 
scientifically competent when he was described as believing in AGW (M=4.91; SD=1.33) 
compared to when he was described as rejecting AGW (M=3.32; SD =1.52): 
F(1,126)=37.43; p <.001; ηp2=.23. As expected, no significant effects of the experimental 
manipulation were found for ratings of Chloe’s scientific competence (F<1) 
A one sample t-test was conducted to assess the deviation from the scale midpoint of 
responses to the question addressing the link between belief in AGW and scientific ability. 
As expected, the mean response to the question pertaining to scientific ability was 4.91 
(SD=1.43), which was significantly higher than the scale midpoint of 4.00: t(127)=7.18; p 
<.001.  
Taken together, these results strongly support the key premise of the reasoning 
outlined above, namely that (non-)belief in AGW is generally perceived as indicative of 
scientific (in)competence. 
Experiment 6 
Experiment 6 tested the hypothesis that high (vs. low) stereotype threat would be 
associated with increased belief in AGW, but only for participants induced to adopt an entity 
(rather than increment) theory of ability (hypothesis 4). Participants were subject to 
manipulations of stereotype threat (high vs. low) and implicit theories (increment vs. entity). 
In line with the reasoning presented above, I predicted that when an entity theory was 
induced, participants who were subject to high stereotype threat would display increased 
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endorsement of AGW relative to participants who were not exposed to stereotype threat. 
However, it was predicted that this would not be true of participants who were induced to 
adopt an increment theory of scientific ability. Thus, a 2x2 interaction was hypothesised 
between stereotype threat (high vs. low) and implicit theory (entity vs. increment) in 
determining beliefs about AGW.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
 197 non-American participants (77 females) were recruited via CrowdFlower, of 
whom 3 were excluded for dual participation (leaving 194 participants, including 76 
females). A filter was applied at the participant recruitment phase, such that only people 
with IP addresses located outside the USA were able to participate. Nevertheless, 11 
individuals (not included in the figure of 197 above) answered “yes” to the pre-experiment 
question: “Are you an American?” – these individuals were presumably Americans living 
outside of the USA. None of these 11 people were included in any of the analyses. 
 Participants (including those who were excluded from the analyses) were paid $0.05 
for their participation. 
A 2x2 between-subjects design was used, in which stereotype threat (high vs. low) 
and implicit theory of scientific ability (entity vs. increment) functioned as independent 
variables and Belief in AGW functioned as the dependent variable.  
 
Measures 
Belief in AGW. Following previous studies of beliefs about AGW on expert (Carlton 
et al., 2015) and lay (Hmielowski et al., 2014) samples, the AGW-related beliefs measure 
contained four items that assessed whether or not participants believed that the Earth’s 
average temperature has been increasing in recent history, and four items assessing whether 
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or not participants believed that this temperature increase can be attributed to human actions. 
The four items assessing beliefs about global temperature increases were: “How likely do 
you think it is that global warming is occurring now?”, “Global temperatures have been 
rising significantly over the past decades. Do you agree with this statement?”, “Climate 
change is definitely NOT occurring. Do you agree with this statement?” (reverse coded), and 
“The Earth’s oceans have NOT been increasing in temperature in recent decades. Do you 
agree with this statement?” (reverse coded). The items related specifically to the human role 
in global temperatures were: “Human activities such as burning fossil fuels can significantly 
raise the planet’s temperature. Do you agree with this statement?”, “Human actions have 
NOT resulted in an increase in global temperatures. Do you agree with this statement?” 
(reverse coded), “Global warming CANNOT be reduced by regulating fossil fuel use. Do 
you agree with this statement?” (reverse coded) and “Climate change is real and man-made. 
Do you agree with this statement?”. All items were combined to form a scale of AGW 
endorsement ranging from 1 (lowest possible endorsement) to 5 (highest possible 
endorsement; α =.828).  
Procedure 
Experiment 6 employed a 2x2 between-subjects design, in which stereotype threat 
(high vs. low) and implicit theory of scientific ability (entity vs. increment) were 
manipulated. Subsequent to the manipulations, participants completed the Belief in AGW 
scale.  
Stereotype Threat Manipulation. All participants were told that they were about to 
complete a test of scientific ability (in reality there was no test). Half of the participants were 
told that previous studies had found that test performance was unrelated to the nationality of 
the test taker (low stereotype threat condition). The other participants were told that non-
American participants tended to underperform relative to Americans (high stereotype threat 
condition). 
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Implicit Theory Manipulation. In the entity condition, participants were told that 
some people are naturally gifted when it came to scientific ability whilst others are not. 
These participants were told that performance on the forthcoming test would be determined 
primarily by natural ability, rather than effort or prior learning experiences. In the increment 
condition, participants were informed that according to prior research, their performance on 
the forthcoming test would be determined primarily by practice and prior learning 
experiences, rather than natural ability (see Dinger & Dickhäuser, 2013, for a similar 
manipulation).   
The materials used in experiment 6 are presented in Appendix E. 
Results 
A 2x2 ANOVA using stereotype threat (high vs. low) and implicit theory (entity vs. 
increment) as independent variables was conducted, with belief in AGW as the dependent 
variable. Entity theorists expressed marginally greater belief in AGW relative to increment 
theorists: F(1,190)=3.66; p=.06; ηp2=.02. Moreover, in line with hypothesis 3, high (vs. low) 
stereotype threat was associated with significantly greater belief in AGW: F(1, 190)=4.06; 
p=.05; ηp2=.02. However, as hypothesised, this main effect was qualified by a marginally 
significant interaction: F(1,190)=2.87; p=.09; ηp2=.02 (see Table 5). Although the interaction 
was only marginally significant, the pattern of results for the simple effects were entirely in 
line with the predictions of hypothesis 4. Simple effects revealed that high (vs. low) 
stereotype threat was associated with increased belief in AGW in the entity conditions 
(F(1,190)=6.73; p=.01; ηp2=.03), but not in the increment conditions (F(1,190)=.05; p=.82; 
ηp2=.00).  
Table 5 
Belief in AGW as a Function of Stereotype Threat and Implicit Theory in experiment 6 
    Stereotype Threat 
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  High  Low 
Implicit 
Theory 
Entity 4.29 (.59) a  3.95 (.60) b 
Increment 3.96 (.71) a  3.93 (.57) a 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. Postscripts denote significant differences (row-
wise). 
Discussion 
As hypothesised, the results of experiment 6 indicated that participants who were 
induced to adopt an entity theory of scientific ability expressed greater belief in AGW when 
subject to high (vs. low) stereotype threat, whereas this was not the case for participants 
induced to hold an increment theory of scientific ability (hypothesis 4). This suggests that 
stereotype threat induced a desire to disconfirm the negative stereotype by demonstrating 
ability in the stereotyped domain (Forbes et al., 2008; Schmader et al., 2008; Jamieson & 
Harkins, 2007, 2010), leading participants to enhance their endorsement of the scientific 
consensus on AGW in order to demonstrate their own scientific understanding. However, 
since increment theorists tend to be relatively less concerned about whether or not they 
possess high ability, these individuals would be relatively indifferent to the negative ability 
implications of stereotype threat and would have therefore felt no desire to invalidate the 
negative stereotype by affirming their own scientific abilities. This explains why increment 
theorists did not enhance their reported endorsement of AGW under high (vs. low) 
stereotype threat.  
Following from these results, experiment 7 sought to replicate the results of 
experiment 6 using a different sample and stereotype. Specifically, experiment 7 took 
advantage of the stereotype that Christians lack scientific ability (Rios et al., 2015).  
Experiment 7 
Experiment 7 sought to replicate the findings of experiment 6, utilising a different 
science related stereotype, namely the stereotype that Christians lack scientific ability (Rios 
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et al., 2015). Christian participants were recruited and subject to manipulations of stereotype 
threat (high vs. low) and implicit theories (increment vs. entity). In line with the reasoning 
presented above, I predicted that when an entity theory was induced, Christians who were 
subject to high stereotype threat would display increased endorsement of AGW relative to 
Christians who were not exposed to stereotype threat. However, I predicted that this would 
not be true of Christians who were induced to adopt an increment theory of scientific ability. 
Thus, a 2x2 interaction was hypothesised between stereotype threat (high vs. low) and 
implicit theory (entity vs. increment) in determining beliefs about AGW. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
In order to be included in the study, a given participant had to respond affirmatively 
to the question “Are you a Christian?”, and score above the mid-point on a 5-point scale of 
religiosity. These criteria were used because evidence suggests that only Christians who are 
high in religiosity experience stereotype threat when reminded of the stereotype that 
‘Christians lack scientific ability’ (Rios et al., 2015). Indeed, people in general tend not to be 
susceptible to stereotype threat if they do not identify with the stereotyped group (Schmader, 
2002). Using these criteria, 173 Non-American participants (53 females) qualified to 
participate in the study. The decision to focus solely on Christians (as defined herein) was 
made prior to the collection of the data. 
Participants (including those who were excluded from the analyses) were paid $0.05 for 
their participation. 
A 2x2 between-subjects design was used, in which stereotype threat (high vs. low) 
and implicit theory of scientific ability (entity vs. increment) functioned as independent 
variables and Belief in AGW functioned as the dependent variable.  
Measures 
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Religiosity. The religiosity measure contained four items based on Wilkes, Burnett 
and Howell (1986). Two of these items asked participants to rate, on a scale of 1 to 5, the 
extent to which the following statements were true of them: “I attend religious services 
regularly” and “Spiritual values are more important than material things". They were also 
asked “What is the general importance of God in your life?” (responses were “not at all 
important”; “unimportant”; “somewhat important”; “important” and “very important”) and 
“How would you characterise yourself in terms of religiosity?” (responses were “anti-
religious”; “not at all religious”; “slightly religious”; “moderately religious” and “very 
religious”; α =.522).  
Belief in AGW. The same measure of belief in AGW as used in experiment 6 was 
employed (α =.865).8 
Procedure 
Experiment 7 employed a 2x2 between-subjects design. Participants first stated 
whether or not they were a Christian and completed the religiosity measure. They were then 
told that they were about to complete a test of science ability (in reality they never took this 
test). 
Stereotype Threat Manipulation. Half of the participants were told that previous 
studies had found that test performance was unrelated to the religion of the test-taker (low 
stereotype threat condition). For the other participants, no such information was mentioned 
(high stereotype threat condition). Previous studies have found this to be an effective 
manipulation of stereotype threat among members of groups that are aware of negative 
domain-relevant ingroup stereotypes (Keller & Bless, 2008; Smith & White, 2002). Simply 
mentioning that a test is diagnostic of a stereotyped ability is sufficient to activate stereotype 
threat among these group members, whereas explicitly invalidating the stereotype eliminates 
                                                            
8 Some other measures were administered after the Belief in AGW measure. Since these were purely 
exploratory, the relevant data are not included in the analyses reported herein. 
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the stereotype threat (Keller & Bless, 2008; Smith & White, 2002). Indeed, Rios et al. 
(2015) demonstrated that Christians tend to be aware of the fact that they are perceived as 
lacking scientific ability, meaning that the mention of a forthcoming science test would be 
sufficient to induce them to experience stereotype threat (Steele, 1997).  
Implicit Theory Manipulation. The same implicit theory manipulation as in 
experiment 6 was employed. 
The materials used in experiment 7 – other than those taken from the preceding 
experiments – are presented in Appendix F. 
Results 
 A 2x2 between subjects ANOVA was conducted using implicit theory (increment 
vs. entity) and stereotype threat (high vs. low) as independent variables, with AGW beliefs 
as the dependent variable. Contrary to the predictions of hypothesis 3, the main effect of 
stereotype threat was not significant: F(1,169)=1.55; p=.22; ηp2=.01. Likewise, the main 
effect of implicit theory was not significant: F(1,169)=.037; p=.85; ηp2=.04=.00. However, 
consistent with hypothesis 4, the interaction was significant: F(1,169)=6.52; p=.012; ηp2=.04 
(see Table 6). Simple effects analyses showed that in the entity theory conditions, 
endorsement of AGW was greater for participants who were subject to high stereotype threat 
compared to those subject to low stereotype threat: F(1,169)=3.89; p=.050; ηp2=.02. For the 
increment theory cells, AGW beliefs in the high stereotype threat condition did not differ 
significantly from the low stereotype threat condition: F(1,169)=1.84; p=.18; ηp2=.02. These 
results are consistent with hypothesis 4.  
 
 
Table 6 
Belief in AGW as a Function of Stereotype Threat and Implicit Theory in experiment 7 
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    Stereotype Threat 
 
  High  Low 
Implicit 
Theory 
Entity 4.05 (.75) a  3.74 (.69) b 
Increment 3.90 (.71) a   4.16 (.76) a 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. Postscripts denote significant differences (row-
wise). 
Discussion 
 Consistent with hypothesis 4, the results of experiment 7 replicated those of 
experiment 6, indicating that when an entity theory was induced, participants who 
experienced high stereotype threat expressed greater belief in AGW compared to 
participants who were not subject to stereotype threat. However, this was not true for 
participants who were induced to adopt an increment theory with respect to scientific ability. 
The main effects of stereotype threat and implicit theory of ability were not significant. 
Experiment 8 
Experiment 8 sought to extend the findings of experiments 6 and 7 by investigating 
the impact of stereotype threat on people’s responses in the context of different messages 
about AGW, which implied that endorsing an AGW belief would be a differentially 
effective means of combatting ST. Participants were subject to the stereotype threat 
manipulation used in experiments 6 and 7. Participants then read one of three messages 
about global warming. These messages described how Church leaders (message 1), 
Scientists (message 2), or both Church leaders and scientists (message 3) from across the 
world had come together in urging governments to take action to combat AGW. It was 
predicted that high (vs. low) stereotype threat would be associated with increased belief in 
AGW as a main effect (hypothesis 3). It was further predicted that this effect of stereotype 
threat would be evident among participants in all three message conditions, but that it would 
be significantly greater for participants exposed to message 3 (hypothesis 5).  
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Experiment 8 also tested whether these effects would extend to a behavioural 
measure related to AGW, namely donating (at no personal cost) to an organisation devoted 
to spreading accurate information about AGW. It was hypothesised that high (vs. low) 
stereotype threat would be associated with increased donations, and that this effect would be 
mediated by increased belief in AGW among participants in the high stereotype threat 
conditions (hypothesis 6). It was further hypothesised that the effect of stereotype threat on 
donation behaviour would be increased for participants exposed to message 3 relative to 
those exposed to message 1 or 2. This interaction was predicted to be mediated by the 
interactive effects of stereotype threat and message content on belief in AGW.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
The same criteria employed in experiment 7 to select religious Christian participants 
was employed in experiment 8. 219 non-American participants (70 females) who satisfied 
these criteria were recruited via CrowdFlower.  
Participants (including those who were excluded from the analyses) were paid $0.05 for 
their participation. 
A 2x3 between-subjects experiment design was used, with stereotype threat (high 
vs. low) and message content (Church leaders endorse action against AGW vs. Scientist 
endorse action against AGW vs. Church leaders and Scientists endorse action against AGW) 
as independent variables. Dependent variables of interest were belief in AGW and donations 
to an AGW activism organisation. The former dependent variables was also examined as a 
mediator of the potential interactive effects of the independent variables on the latter. 
Measures 
Religiosity and Belief in AGW. The religiosity measure (α =.496) and the AGW 
belief measure (α =.837) were the same as those used in experiment 7.  
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Donations. Participants were given the opportunity to donate to an organisation 
devoted to informing people about the reality of AGW. Specifically, participants were told 
that they had the opportunity to donate up to $.05 of the experimenter’s money to the 
Skeptical Science organisation, which produces blog posts, apps and scientific publications 
debunking common myths propagated by prominent AGW-denying individuals and 
organisations (Cook et al., 2014). Participants were told (truthfully) that the amount that they 
chose to donate would have no effect on the amount that they were paid for the experiment – 
whatever they chose not to donate to Skeptical Science would be taken back by the 
experimenter.  
Temperature Perceptions. As indicated above, although not the primary focus of this 
study, a temperature measure was also included (c.f. experiment 10, hypothesis 10). 
Participants were asked to rate how hot they currently felt (on a scale from 1 to 10) and how 
hot the temperature today had been in their local area compared to temperatures over the 
past month (on a scale of 1 to 10; inter-item r(217)=.48; p<.001). Responses to these two 
items were averaged to form a single measure of current temperature perceptions (henceforth 
perceived temperature).   
Procedure 
A 2x3 between subjects design was employed wherein stereotype threat and 
message content were manipulated. The procedure for experiment 8 followed that of 
experiment 7, except that this time message content rather than implicit theory was 
manipulated. Before AGW beliefs were measured, participants were subject to the message 
manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of three messages about 
climate change. The first, second and third messages described how Church leaders, 
scientists or Church leaders and scientists, respectively, had come together to urge 
governments to take action against climate change. After belief in AGW was measured, the 
donation and temperature perception measures were administered.  
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Although temperature perceptions were intended to serve as an independent variable 
(with belief in AGW as a dependent variable), they were nevertheless measured after the 
belief in AGW measure was administered. This is because the impact of subtle situational 
cues such as temperature can sometimes be eliminated when participants are explicitly 
directed to focus on these cues (Schwarz et al., 1998). For instance, Schwarz and Clore 
(1991) found that hot weather led participants to report greater subjective wellbeing, but 
only when they were asked to report their perception of the weather after, rather than before, 
reporting their subjective wellbeing. Likewise, focusing on the local temperature before 
being asked about AGW might eliminate the impact of temperature on belief in AGW. For 
this reason, temperature perceptions were assessed after belief in AGW. 
The materials used in experiment 8 – other than those taken from the preceding 
experiments – are presented in Appendix G. 
 
Results 
A 2x3 between subjects ANOVA was conducted, using stereotype threat (high vs. 
low) and message content (Church leaders only [message 1] vs. scientists only [message 2] 
vs. Church leaders and scientists [message 3]) as independent variables and AGW beliefs as 
dependent variables. Contrary to hypothesis 3, the main effect of stereotype threat was not 
significant: F(1,213)=1.69; p=.20; ηp2=.01. Consistent with hypothesis 5, the interaction was 
significant: F(2,213)=3.25; p=.04; ηp2=.03 (see Table 7).  
Table 7 
Belief in AGW as a Function of Stereotype Threat and Message in experiment 8 
   Stereotype Threat 
    High Low 
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Message 
Message 
1 
3.86 (.64) a  4.06 (.64) a 
Message 
2 
4.15 (.64) a 3.97 (.55) a 
Message 
3 
4.17 (.64) a   3.80 (.89) b 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Postscripts denote significant differences (row-
wise). 
 
An analysis of simple effects revealed that high stereotype threat was associated 
with increased AGW endorsement relative to low stereotype threat for participants exposed 
to message 3: F(2,213)=5.27; p=.02; ηp2=.02. However, this was not the case for participants 
exposed to message 1 (F(1,213)=1.61; p=.21) or message 2 (F(2,213)=1.53; p=.22). This 
pattern is consistent with the prediction that the effect of high (vs. low) stereotype threat in 
increasing endorsement of AGW would be observed for participants exposed to message 3 
to a greater extent than for participants exposed to messages 1 or 2 (hypothesis 5). However, 
it is not consistent with the prediction that high (vs. low) stereotype threat would be 
associated with increased belief in AGW in all message conditions (hypothesis 3). 
An additional 2x3 ANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that high (vs. low) 
stereotype threat would increase mean donations, particularly for participants exposed to 
message 3 (relative to those exposed to message 1 or 2). Contrary to hypotheses 6 and 7, the 
interaction and main effects all fell below significance (Fs<1). Because no significant effects 
of stereotype threat on donations were detected, no mediation tests were conducted.  
To test hypothesis 10 (that reported temperature would be correlated with belief in 
AGW under low, but not high, stereotype threat), a multiple regression was conducted. The 
dependent variable was belief in AGW; in the first block, perceived temperature and 
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stereotype threat (high vs. low) were entered as predictor variables; in the second block, the 
interaction term for these two predictor variables was added. In accordance with hypothesis 
10, a marginally significant interaction was observed: β=.473; t(215)=1.94; p=.05. The main 
effect of temperature was significant, with higher temperatures associated with increased 
belief in AGW: β=.15; t(215)=1.94; p=.05. Moreover high stereotype threat was associated 
with significantly greater belief in AGW relative to low stereotype threat: β=-.54; 
t(215)=2.22; p=.03. This result is consistent with hypothesis 3 but conflicts with the 
ANOVA reported above, in which the main effect of stereotype threat was not significant. It 
appears that the effect of stereotype threat only reached significance when variance in belief 
in AGW attributable to perceived temperature and its interaction with stereotype threat was 
accounted for whilst the variance attributable to message content was not.  
Analysis of the correlations between perceived temperature and belief in AGW were 
conducted for the different levels of stereotype threat. Consistent with hypothesis 10, under 
high stereotype threat, the correlation was not significant: r(109)=.02; p=.87, whereas under 
low stereotype threat, the correlation was significant and positive: r(106)=.27; p=.01.  
Discussion 
The results of experiment 8 indicate that stereotype threat can interact with the 
content of a persuasive message to influence beliefs about AGW. High (vs. low) stereotype 
threat enhanced the tendency of religious Christians to accept the reality of AGW when 
exposed to a message emphasising agreement between Church leaders and Scientists on the 
urgent need to combat AGW. The stereotype threat manipulation did not have the same 
effect for participants who were exposed to messages emphasising the widespread 
agreement on this topic among Church leaders only or scientists only.  
The direction of the interaction between stereotype threat and message content was 
consistent with hypothesis 6, which predicted that the enhancing effect of high (vs. low) 
stereotype threat on belief in AGW would be greater for participants exposed to message 3 
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relative to messages 2 or 1. However, the absence of any effect of stereotype threat for 
participants exposed to messages 2 and 1, and the consequent lack of a main effect of 
stereotype threat across message conditions, was inconsistent with predictions. Indeed, the 
interaction appeared to be driven by the fact that belief in AGW was lower in the low 
stereotype threat/message 3 cell relative to the other cells (see Table 7), whereas a 
hypothesis-confirming pattern would have involved higher belief in AGW in the high 
stereotype threat/message 3 cell relative to the other cells.  
Nevertheless, a main effect of stereotype threat was observed in the multiple 
regression. Furthermore, the fact that perceived temperature correlated with belief in AGW 
under low – but not high – stereotype threat is consistent with hypothesis 10. 
Experiment 9 
Following experiment 8, which revealed an interaction between stereotype threat 
and persuasive message content in predicting beliefs about AGW, experiment 9 investigated 
whether the way in which a message is framed can interact with stereotype threat. 
Specifically, I examined the hypothesis (hypothesis 9) that a positively framed message 
about AGW (“successfully mitigating climate change will prevent harm to the 
environment”) would evoke more acceptance thereof compared to a negatively framed 
message about AGW frame (“failing to mitigate climate change will cause harm to the 
environment; Newman, Howlett, Burton, Kozup & Heintz Tangari, 2012). Moreover, I 
examined whether the effect of using a positive frame or a negative frame in a message 
about climate change would vary as a function of stereotype threat (hypothesis 10). A 2x2 
experimental design was used, wherein stereotype threat (high vs. low) and message frame 
(positive vs. negative) were manipulated, with belief in AGW as the outcome variable.  
As explained in the introduction, the interaction between message framing and 
stereotype threat was proposed to be independent of the content of the stereotype threat. 
Thus, rather than using a science-related stereotype, participants in experiment 9 were either 
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led to believe that people of their age group tended to perform worse on an ostensibly 
forthcoming test of cognitive ability (high stereotype threat) or were not told of any group 
differences in performance. A main effect of stereotype threat (with high stereotype threat 
associated with greater belief in AGW than low stereotype threat; hypothesis 4) and a main 
effect of message frame (with the positive frame associated with greater belief in AGW than 
the negative frame; hypothesis 9) were also predicted.   
Method  
Participants and Design 
130 participants (36 females; mean age=35.9; SD=9.1) were recruited online via 
CrowdFlower, with no selection criteria applied on the basis of nationality. One participant 
was excluded because of dual participation. Participants (including those who were excluded 
from the analyses) were paid $0.05 for their participation. 
A 2x2 between-subjects experimental design was used, in which stereotype threat 
(high vs. low) and message frame (positive vs. negative) functioned as independent variables 
and belief in AGW functioned as a dependent variable. 
Measures 
The same measure of belief in AGW used in experiments 6 and 7 was employed (α 
=.867).  
Procedure 
Participants were first asked to state their age and were told that they were about to 
complete a test of cognitive ability. Participants 35 years of age or above were either told 
that people above 34 years of age tended to perform worse on the forthcoming task 
(inducing high stereotype threat) or were told nothing about age differences in performance 
(inducing low stereotype threat). Participants 34 years of age or below were either told that 
people below 35 years of age tended to perform worse on the forthcoming task (inducing 
102 
 
high stereotype threat) or were told nothing about age differences in performance (inducing 
low stereotype threat).  
All participants then read a message stressing the importance of taking action 
against climate change. In the positive frame condition, the message emphasised the positive 
consequences of successfully taking preventative action. In the negative frame condition, the 
message emphasised the negative consequences of failing to take preventative action. 
Participants then completed the measure of belief in AGW used in prior experiments. 
The materials used in experiment 9 – other than those taken from the preceding 
experiments – are presented in Appendix H. 
 
Results 
A 2x2 ANOVA was conducted using stereotype threat (high vs. low) and message 
frame (positive vs. negative) as independent variables, with belief in AGW as a dependent 
variable. Means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 8.  
Table 8 
Belief in AGW as a Function of Stereotype Threat and Message Frame in experiment 9 
    Stereotype Threat 
 
  High  Low 
Message 
Frame 
Positive 4.13 (.57)   3.83  (.87)  
Negative 3.97 (.67)    3.81 (.77)  
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.  
 
Contrary to hypothesis 9, the main effect of message frame was not significant: 
F(1,125)=.515; p=.474; ηp2=.00; . Nevertheless, consistent with hypothesis 3, there was a 
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marginally significant effect of stereotype threat: F(1,122)=3.92; p=.08; ηp2=.03. As 
expected, belief in AGW was greater in the high stereotype threat cells (M=4.07; SD=.61) 
compared to the low stereotype threat cells (M=3.82; SD=.81). Contrary to hypothesis 9, the 
interaction was not significant (F(1,125)=.31; p=.58; ηp2=.00). 
Discussion 
Contrary to hypothesis 9, the effect of positive vs. negative message framing did not 
vary as a function of stereotype threat. Moreover, contrary to hypothesis 8, there was no 
main effect of the framing manipulation on beliefs in AGW. However, the marginally 
significant effect of stereotype threat observed here is consistent with hypothesis 3, 
providing support for the view that people attempt to resolve stereotype threat-induced 
cognitive dissonance by expressing greater belief in AGW.  
Experiment 10 
Experiment 10 sought to investigate the interaction between temperature and 
stereotype threat in predicting belief in AGW. A 2x2 experimental design was employed 
wherein stereotype threat (high vs. low) and temperature (high vs. low) were manipulated, 
with belief in AGW as an outcome variable. Since it would be difficult to directly 
manipulate temperature in the context of an online study, the temperature manipulation 
involved exposure to heat-related or cold-related visual stimuli. This is in line with previous 
research (Wilkowski, Meier, Robinson, Carter, & Feltman, 2009) showing that the 
psychological effects of heat- and cold-related stimuli are similar to the effects of actual 
variations in temperature. It was hypothesised that exposure to high (vs. low) temperatures 
would trigger increased belief in AGW for participants subject to high stereotype threat, but 
not for participants subject to low stereotype threat (hypothesis 10).  
Since experiments 5, 6, 7 and 8 had excluded American participants from their 
samples, experiment 10 also sought to examine whether the hypothesised main effect of 
stereotype threat would generalise to Americans. America is one of the largest carbon 
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emitters in the world and exerts an enormous influence in international politics, including in 
the area of climate change negotiations (Berger, Easterly, Nunn & Satyanath, 2013; 
Keohane, 2015). Moreover, a recent meta-analysis (Floret & Witcherts, 2014) found that 
stereotype threat effects tend to be weaker in American samples. As such, it was deemed 
important to determine whether the hypothesised effect of stereotype threat would be 
observed in an American sample. Participants for experiment 10 were therefore recruited 
exclusively from America.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
100 American participants were recruited via CrowdFlower. Two participants were 
excluded for dual participation, leaving 98 participants (58 females). Participants (including 
those who were excluded from the analyses) were paid $0.05 for their participation. 
A 2x2 between-subjects experimental design was used, in which stereotype threat 
(high vs. low) and depicted temperature (hot vs. cold) functioned as independent variables 
and belief in AGW functioned as a dependent variable. Political orientation was used as a 
covariate. 
Moreover, in a mixed design, stereotype threat (high vs. low) and a measure of 
perceived temperature (continuous) were used as independent variables, with belief in AGW 
as the dependent variable. Political orientation was used as a covariate. 
Measures 
The same AGW belief measure employed in previous experiments was used in 
experiment 10 (α =.945). Temperature perceptions were assessed with a single item: “On a 
scale of 1 to 9, how hot do you feel right now? ‘1’ indicates "extremely cold" and ‘9’ 
indicates "extremely hot". Since experiment 10 used American participants, and since 
liberal/conservative political identification has been found to relate to belief in AGW to a 
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greater extent in America relative to other countries (McCright & Dunlap, 2011a), a measure 
of liberal/conservative political identification was taken prior to the experimental 
manipulations. Specifically, participants rated themselves on a scale of 1 (extremely 
conservative) to 9 (extremely liberal). 
The materials used in experiment 10 – other than those taken from the preceding 
experiments – are presented in Appendix I. 
Procedure 
Participants first reported their political identification before being subject to the 
temperature manipulation, wherein they were asked to classify three images according to 
whether or not they contained an animal. The first two images (a cow and a brick wall) were 
the same for all participants. The third image depicted either a fire (high temperature 
condition) or a snowy forest (low temperature condition), each of which were devoid of 
animals.  
Participants were then told that they were about to complete a test of scientific 
ability. In the high stereotype threat conditions, they were told that Europeans tended to 
outperform Americans on the test. This information was omitted in the low stereotype threat 
conditions. Finally, participants completed the measure of belief in AGW and the perceived 
temperature measure. 
Prior to and following the belief in AGW measure, a number of other measures were 
administered (none of which were administered prior to the manipulations). However, since 
none of these other measures related to the hypotheses presented herein, they are not 
discussed below. 
Results 
A 2x2 ANCOVA was conducted, using temperature (high vs. low) and stereotype 
threat (high vs. low) as independent variables, with belief in AGW as a dependent variable 
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and liberal/conservative orientation as a covariate. Contrary to hypothesis 10, the interaction 
was not significant (F(1,93)=0.00; p=.99; see Table 9). The main effect of temperature was 
also not significant (F(1,93)=.40; p=.53). However, the main effect of stereotype threat was 
significant: F(1,93)=4.03; p=.05; ηp2=.04. Consistent with hypothesis 4, belief in AGW 
(adjusted for liberal/conservative orientation) was higher for participants exposed to high 
stereotype threat (M=4.09; SE=.13) relative to those exposed to low stereotype threat 
(M=3.73; SE=.12).  
Table 9 
Belief in AGW (Adjusted for Liberal/Conservative Orientation) as a Function of Stereotype 
Threat and Message Frame in experiment 10 
 
    Stereotype Threat 
 
  High  Low 
Temperature 
Low 4.15 (.20)   3.78 (.16)  
High 4.03 (.17)   3.67 (.19)  
Note. Standard errors in parentheses.   
 
When liberal/conservative orientation was not used as a covariate, neither the main 
effect of stereotype threat (F(1,94)=.80; p=.37), the main effect of temperature (F(1,94)=.12; 
p=.73) nor the interaction between them (F(1,94)=.08; p=.78) were significant. 
To test the hypothesised stereotype threat*temperature interaction using the measure 
of perceived temperature, a multiple regression was conducted. Terms for the main effect of 
stereotype threat and the main effect of perceived temperature were entered into the first 
block, with the interaction term entered into the second block; belief in AGW was the 
dependent variable. Contrary to hypothesis 10, neither of the main effects nor the interaction 
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were significant (Fs<1). This remained the case even when liberal/conservative orientation 
was used as a covariate. 
 
Discussion 
Contrary to hypothesis 10, high (vs. low) temperatures were not differentially 
associated with belief in AGW as a function of stereotype threat. The lack of either a main 
effect of temperature or an effect of temperature specific to the low stereotype threat 
condition appears to be inconsistent with previous research (Zaval et al., 2014) showing that 
high temperatures – in laboratory and naturalistic settings – are linked to increased belief in 
AGW. However, previous studies have either examined the effects of natural temperature 
variations or used manipulations that directly target temperature, whereas experiment 10 
manipulated exposure to a heat-related or cold-related picture. Although some past research 
indicates that pictorial reminders of temperature can have similar psychological effects to 
actual temperature variation (e.g. heat triggering increased aggression; Wilkowski et al., 
2009), this may not be the case for belief in AGW. Indeed, the pictures that are used to 
represent climate change in the media often depict very low-temperature scenes (e.g. 
struggling polar bears and melting ice caps; Slocum, 2004). It may be that cold-related 
images consequently make the pro-AGW narratives associated with such scenes more 
accessible, thereby countering the normal effect of cold temperatures in reducing belief in 
AGW. This would mean that the overall impact of the temperature manipulation used in 
experiment 10 would be null, regardless of stereotype threat condition. Thus, the failure of 
experiment 10 to provide confirmatory evidence for hypothesis 10 may simply be 
attributable to shortcomings in the temperature manipulation used therein.  
However, it must also be noted that the measure of perceived temperature did not 
correlate with belief in AGW or interact with stereotype threat in predicting belief in AGW. 
The latter observation is inconsistent with hypothesis 10 and the results of experiment 8; the 
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former finding also conflicts with the results of experiment 8 as well as with extensive prior 
research showing that perceived and actual temperatures tend to correlate with belief in 
AGW (Zaval et al., 2014). Possible reasons for this discrepancy – including the difference 
between the measures of perceived temperature used in experiments 8 and 10 – are 
suggested in the general discussion. 
The marginally significant main effect of stereotype threat observed in experiment 
10, with high (vs. low) stereotype threat being associated with increased belief in AGW, is 
consistent with hypothesis 3. This supports the line of reasoning outlined in the introduction, 
wherein I argued that endorsing the scientifically correct position on AGW would be viewed 
as a way for people to resolve stereotype threat-induced cognitive dissonance.   
General Discussion 
Experiment 5 confirmed a central premise of the reasoning outlined in the 
introduction to chapter 3, namely that (non-)belief in AGW is generally perceived as 
indicative of scientific (in)competence. Across the other five experiments of chapter 3, fairly 
consistent evidence was found for the hypothesis that high (vs. low) science-related (or, in 
experiment 9, cognitive ability-related) stereotype threat would be associated with increased 
belief in AGW (hypothesis 3). Evidence for this prediction was found in experiments 6, 9, 
10, and – in one of the two relevant analyses – experiment 8. However, no support for 
hypothesis 3 was found in experiment 7.  
Moreover, experiments 6 and 7 supported the prediction that the effect of science-
related stereotype threat on belief in AGW would be moderated by implicit theories of 
ability (hypothesis 4), such that only people induced to view scientific ability as a fixed 
entity (but not those induced to view it as a malleable construct) would be susceptible to the 
effect of science-related stereotype threat on belief in AGW.  
Experiment 8 found that the enhancing effect of science-related stereotype threat on 
belief in AGW was greatest for participants exposed to a message that rendered AGW 
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endorsement an effective method for coping with stereotype threat, i.e. a message describing 
Church leaders and Scientists (rather than just Church leaders or just Scientists) as united in 
their perception of the urgent need to tackle AGW (hypothesis 5).  
Similarly, experiments 9 and 10 failed to observe mediated effects on donations via 
AGW belief proposed in hypotheses 6 and 7, and they failed to find an effect of positive (vs. 
negative message frames) on AGW belief (hypothesis 8), significant interactions between 
stereotype threat and positive vs. negative message framing (hypothesis 9) and between 
stereotype threat and temperature (hypothesis 10). However, support for hypothesis 10 was 
observed in experiment 8. 
Nevertheless, the present research constitutes - to my knowledge - the first evidence 
for the view that science-related stereotype threat can enhance belief in AGW. This idea has 
potential practical implications in terms of the need to communicate accurate information 
about AGW to the public. However, given the numerous undesirable outcomes that are 
associated with stereotype threat, particularly following chronic exposure (Appel & 
Kronberger, 2012; Schmader et al., 2008), the possibility of using it as a means to enhance 
public acceptance of AGW raises some ethical concerns. However, the idea that expressing 
belief in AGW is used to eliminate stereotype threat does help to counter the 
(unsubstantiated) claim made by some AGW deniers that “fear of anthropogenic “global 
warming” can adversely affect patients’ well-being” (Schulte, 2008, p.281). If, like other 
forms of stereotype disconfirmation (e.g. Marx & Roman, 2002; McIntyre et al., 2003), 
endorsement of AGW does indeed help to reduce stereotype threat, then it would follow that 
believing in AGW may have positive psychological consequences. Stereotype threat can 
lead to numerous physical and psychological problems (Burgess, Warren, Phelan, Dovidio, 
Van Ryn, 2010; Steele, 1997), and the alleviation thereof through belief in AGW may 
therefore be beneficial. Thus, the current findings challenge the unsubstantiated claims made 
by some AGW deniers (Schulte, 2008) that belief in AGW should be discouraged on the 
grounds of health concerns.  
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Moreover, the observation that implicit theories of ability can modulate the impact 
of stereotype threat on belief in AGW supports previous research showing that implicit 
theories of ability can also modulate stereotype threat’s effects on academic performance 
and attitudes (Aronson, 1999; Aronson et al., 2002; Froehlich et al., 2016). The current work 
therefore provides further support for the notion that the induction of an increment theory of 
ability can be a useful intervention technique to reduce the impact of stereotype threat in 
cases where its effects are deemed to be negative.  
Experiments 6 and 7 are, to my knowledge, the first studies examining the effects of 
stereotype threat on beliefs about AGW. Although a previous investigation revealed that 
priming conservative and liberal group identities leads to an accentuation of partisan 
differences in views on AGW (Unsworth & Fielding, 2014), this study focused on the 
effects of social identity activation rather than addressing the effects of negative stereotypes. 
Similarly, it has been postulated (but not empirically confirmed) that the stereotyping of 
climatologists as “alarmist” may lead to them to make unrealistically mild predictions about 
AGW in order to disconfirm the stereotype (Freudenburg & Muselli, 2010; Lewandowsky, 
Oreskes, Risby, Newell & Smithson, 2015). However, these authors did not speculate about 
the effect of stereotype threat on lay-people’s belief in AGW. Thus, the present experiment 
constitutes the first empirical evidence that science-related stereotype threat can increase 
endorsement of the scientific consensus on AGW among entity theorists. 
However, many of the trends in experiments 8, 9 and 10 were inconsistent with the 
relevant hypotheses. In experiments 9 and 10, interactions between stereotype threat and 
message framing or temperature were not observed, and in experiment 8 the simple effect of 
stereotype threat was not significant for participants exposed to message 1 or 2. It is difficult 
to explain this pattern of data. It is also noteworthy that the predicted effects on donation 
behaviour (hypotheses 7 and 8) were not observed in experiment 8. Given that belief in 
AGW has been found to be predictive of related environmentally friendly behaviours 
(Ferguson & Branscombe, 2010; Gifford, 2011; Jang, 2013), it is surprising that the impact 
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of the independent variables on belief in AGW was not mirrored by a similar pattern of 
effects on amount donated. One possible explanation for this is that belief in AGW has only 
a weak effect on corresponding behaviours, meaning that the indirect effect of the 
independent variables on the donation measure would have been too weak to detect. Indeed, 
evidence indicates that attitudes generally have only a small impact on relevant behaviours 
(Juvan & Dolnicar, 2014), and this finding has been replicated in studies examining attitude-
behaviour links in the domain of climate change (Shove, 2010). It is therefore possible that 
the failure to find support for hypotheses 4, 7 and 8 is due to the fact that the indirect effect 
of experiment 8’s independent variables on donation behaviour was too weak to detect.  
Alternatively, it may be that belief in AGW had no causal impact on amount 
donated. Previous studies examining the link between belief in AGW and behaviours 
intended to prevent AGW have used behavioural measures that involve actions that directly 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions (e.g. reducing energy consumption; Ferguson & 
Branscombe, 2010), whereas experiment 8’s behavioural measure assessed donations to an 
activist organisation involved in promoting accurate beliefs about AGW. Even participants 
who strongly believed in AGW may have been unwilling to donate to such an organisation, 
because environmentalist groups are often perceived as disseminators of far-left ideology 
(Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016).  
Moreover, since participants were donating someone else’s (i.e. the experimenter’s) 
money, their donation behaviour may have been less reflective of their personal attitude 
towards AGW. Carlsson, Katari, Lampi and Levati (2011) found that when people were 
given the ability to decide lower limits for others’ donations, their decisions were influenced 
by the extent to which they believed that those others supported the cause to which the 
donations were directed. Similarly, in experiment 8, participants’ donation decisions may 
have been determined by their perception of the experimenter’s support for the cause in 
question (which presumably would not have varied across conditions), rather than their own 
personal support for the cause. Future research should therefore investigate whether the 
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independent variables used in experiment 8 are capable of producing observable effects on 
AGW-related donation behaviour when participants are asked to donate their own money. 
Similarly, the failures to find evidence for the proposed interactions between 
stereotype threat and message framing (experiment 9, hypotheses 8 and 9) and temperature 
(experiment 10, hypothesis 10) can be attributed to a number of possible factors. In 
experiment 9, although the negative message frame may have evoked more cognitive 
dissonance than the positive message frame (McMaster & Lee, 1991), it is possible that 
participants were able to resolve this cognitive dissonance without altering their beliefs 
about the reality of AGW – for instance, they may have convinced themselves that 
technological advances are likely to protect the world from any potential devastation that 
AGW might trigger (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole & Whitmarsh, 2007). This would explain 
why no effect of message frame on belief in AGW was observed in either stereotype threat 
condition. Although this account appears to be inconsistent with research indicating that 
positively framed messages about climate change tend to evoke more pro-environmental 
intentions than negatively framed messages (Newman et al., 2012), it should be noted that 
Newman et al.’s (2012) research addressed the behavioural effects of framing, rather than its 
impact on beliefs about AGW. If people resolve the cognitive dissonance aroused by 
negatively framed messages about AGW by committing to the belief that technological 
advances will avert any problems arising from AGW, then they may consequently perceive 
environmentally friendly behaviour as redundant and may therefore experience a reduced 
desire to engage therein. This would mean that negatively framed messages about AGW 
could reduce environmentally friendly behaviour (relative to positively framed messages) 
without affecting belief in AGW. Thus, the failure to observe any effect of message framing 
in either stereotype threat condition in experiment 9 may be attributable to the fact that 
participants resolved the cognitive dissonance induced by the negative frame in a manner 
that allowed them to preserve their pre-existing level of belief in AGW. Future research 
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examining the impact of message framing on these dissonance-reducing beliefs would 
therefore be useful. 
Alternatively, the hypothesised stereotype threat*message frame interaction may 
have been cancelled-out by an effect of regulatory fit on participants’ beliefs about AGW. 
As noted in chapter 1, regulatory fit occurs when two features of a situation induce an 
individual to adopt the same regulatory focus (i.e. a prevention focus, wherein the goal is to 
minimise losses, or a promotion focus, wherein the goal is to maximise gains). Regulatory 
mismatch occurs when two features of a situation induce the individual to adopt different 
regulatory foci (i.e. when one situational feature induces a promotion focus and another 
induces a prevention focus; Chalabaev et al., 2009; Chalabaev et al., 2015; Förster et al., 
2001; Grimm et al., 2009; Grimm et al., 2015; Seibt & Förster, 2004; Worthy et al., 2009). 
An extensive body of research demonstrates that persuasive messages are more effective 
when they contribute to regulatory fit rather than regulatory mismatch (Koenig, Cesario, 
Molden, Kosloff & Higgins, 2009). For instance, if participants are induced to adopt a 
promotion focus, they are more likely to be persuaded by an advert that focuses on the 
benefits to be gained from buying from the product, rather than the losses that will be 
avoided by buying it. Conversely, participants who are induced to adopt a prevention focus 
will respond more positively to a loss-focused, rather than a gain-focused, advert (Cesario et 
al., 2004; Lee & Aaker, 2004).  
This principle would have been relevant in experiment 9, because stereotype threat 
and negative message frames both induce prevention foci (Lee & Aaker, 2004; Seibt & 
Förster, 2004). This would have meant that participants in the negative frame/high 
stereotype threat condition would have experienced regulatory fit. Since numerous studies 
have demonstrated that message persuasiveness is enhanced by regulatory fit (Cesario et al., 
2004; Higgins, 2002 Koenig et al., 2009; Scholer & Higgins, 2008), the pro-AGW message 
may have been more effective in these conditions. This effect, which would have shifted 
belief in AGW up in the negative frame/high stereotype threat condition, may have 
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counteracted the hypothesised effect wherein the cognitive dissonance evoked by the 
negative (vs. positive) message frame triggered increased denial of AGW when stereotype 
threat was high. If both of these effects were in operation, then the mean belief in AGW in 
the negative frame/high stereotype threat condition would not have been expected to differ 
from the other conditions. This would explain why the hypothesised stereotype 
threat*message frame interaction – which required heightened belief in AGW in the negative 
frame/high stereotype threat condition – was not observed.  
Likewise, there are a number of possible explanations for the failure of experiment 
10 to confirm the hypothesised stereotype threat*temperature interaction. In the 
introduction, it was argued that individuals who were subject to stereotype threat would 
experience increased cognitive dissonance (Schmader et al., 2008), which would lead them 
to process information more carefully (Inzlicht et al., 2015). This increased cognitive effort 
was proposed to reduce the tendency to rely on irrelevant factors to judge the validity of 
AGW (such as current temperature or recent temperature trends; Petty, Wheeler & Bizer, 
1999), thereby eliminating the effect of high (vs. low) temperature in enhancing belief in 
AGW among participants subject to high stereotype threat (hypothesis 10).  
However, it is possible that this effect of the increased cognitive effort triggered by 
stereotype threat-induced cognitive dissonance was counteracted by the depleting effect of 
stereotype threat on working memory (Schmader & Johns, 2003). Working memory is a 
domain-general, capacity-limited cognitive resources that is required to inhibit automatic or 
habitual responses in favour of more deliberated judgements and behaviour (Anderson, 
2002). Since stereotype threat reduces working memory capacity (Schmader & Johns, 2003; 
Beilock et al., 2007; Rydell et al., 2009), stereotype-threatened participants in experiment 10 
may have had a diminished capacity to inhibit the habitual tendency to rely on current and 
recent local temperature trends to judge the validity of AGW (Zaval et al., 2014). Indeed, 
working memory depletion generally leads to increased reliance on heuristics and decreased 
usage of deliberative judgement strategies (Pohl, Erdfelder, Hilbig, Liebke & Stahlberg, 
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2013). Consequently, the reduced reliance on temperature cues caused by stereotype threat-
induced cognitive dissonance may have been counteracted by working memory depletion, 
which would cause participants to rely more heavily on temperature cues. This would 
explain the failure of experiment 10 to find evidence of an interaction between stereotype 
threat and temperature in predicting belief in AGW.  
This would also explain why the stereotype threat*temperature interaction failed to 
reach significance even when the measure (rather than the manipulation) of perceived 
temperature was used as an independent variable. However, it would not explain why, 
contrary to numerous previous studies (Li et al., 2011; Zaval et al., 2014), experiment 10 
failed to find a main effect of either measured or manipulated temperature on belief in 
AGW. Moreover, the hypothesised stereotype threat*temperature interaction in experiment 8 
did reach significance, along with the main effect of temperature on belief in AGW. The 
most plausible explanation for this discrepancy may be the difference between the measures 
of perceived temperature used in experiments 8 and 10. In experiment 8, participants were 
asked to rate both their current temperature and the long-term temperature change in their 
area, whereas in experiment 10 participants were only asked the former. Research indicates 
that perceptions of long term temperature change may be a more significant determinant of 
belief in AGW relative to current absolute temperature (Howe, Markowitz, Lee, Ko & 
Leiserowitz, 2013), which means that the measure in experiment 10 may have been 
incapable of capturing the necessary dimension of perceived temperature variability. 
Limitations 
A number of limitations apply to the experiments of Chapter 3. The exclusion of 
American participants in some experiments not only brings advantages but also limitations, 
given the powerful role played by the United States in international politics (Berger et al., 
20132013). The United States is one of the highest emitters of greenhouse gases in the 
world, but its population contains one of the highest global percentages of AGW deniers 
(McCright & Dunlap, 2011). Moreover, a large amount of misinformation on AGW 
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designed to encourage denial thereof originates from organisations based in the United 
States (Brulle, 2014). As such, research seeking to find ways to counter this misinformation 
should, from a practical perspective, be conducted in a manner that permits generalisation to 
the American population.  
Furthermore, as noted above, the use of a pictorial temperature manipulation in 
experiment 10 may have undermined the capacity to detect an effect of temperature on belief 
in AGW. Pictorial manipulations of temperature (e.g. showing hot and cold pictures) 
sometimes have different effects to manipulations of physical temperature (e.g. varying the 
actual room temperature within the experimental setting; Murphy and Standing, 2014; 
although see Wilkowski et al., 2009), meaning that the use of such a manipulation in 
experiment 10 may have limited the capacity to infer the causal impact of actual variation in 
temperature on belief in AGW. Thus, future studies crossing manipulations of stereotype 
threat with manipulations of actual temperature would be useful. 
Additionally, it should be noted that no inferences can be made on the basis of the 
current experiments about the relative effects of the different types of stereotype threat. 
According to Shapiro and Neuberg (2007), people who are exposed to negative ingroup 
stereotypes can experience a number of different forms of stereotype threat, which vary in 
terms of some of their specific effects. For instance, some forms of stereotype threat involve 
worrying about the prospect of demonstrating one’s own incompetence (self-as-target 
stereotype threat), whereas other forms of stereotype threat involve worrying about the 
prospect of demonstrating that one’s group is incompetent (group-as-target stereotype threat; 
Shapiro, 2011). Some forms of stereotype threat involve worrying about confirming personal 
or group incompetence from one’s own perspective (self-as-source stereotype threat), 
whereas other forms of stereotype threat involve worrying about confirming personal or 
group incompetence from the perspective of others (other-as-source stereotype threat; 
Zhang, Schmader & Hall, 2013). In the current experiments, all of the stereotype threat 
manipulations employed procedures that have been demonstrated to induce the basic 
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cognitive, emotional and behavioural processes that are characteristic of all forms of 
stereotype threat (Schmader et al., 2008). However, it is difficult to determine the specific 
form of stereotype threat that would have been induced in the stereotype threat conditions of 
the current experiments. In other words, although one can be sure that some form of 
stereotype threat was induced as intended, it is unclear exactly which form of stereotype 
threat was induced.  
Consequently, it is unclear whether the findings of the current experiments would be 
applicable to all forms of stereotype threat. For instance, Christians generally believe that 
non-Christians perceive their group as lacking scientific ability, but Christians themselves do 
not share this belief (Rios et al., 2015). Therefore, in experiments 7 and 8, it is unlikely that 
the Christian participants were worried about confirming the negative stereotype in their 
own minds (self-as-source stereotype threat), because they themselves would not have 
endorsed the stereotype. However, it is likely that they believed that other people (e.g. the 
experimenter) endorsed the negative stereotype, meaning that they may have been worried 
about confirming the stereotype from the experimenter’s perspective (other-as-source 
stereotype threat; Shapiro, 2011). If this is correct, then it is possible that the results of 
experiments 7 and 8 would not generalise to situations in which self-as-source stereotype 
threat is induced. However, as Shapiro and Neuberg (2007) note, this is a problem that 
applies to most studies in the stereotype threat literature, because it is generally rare for 
experimenters to deliberately induce a specific form of stereotype threat. Nevertheless, 
future research should investigate whether or not the current findings are specific to a single 
form of stereotype threat. Indeed, one important goal of the studies presented in chapter 4 
was to probe the potential different effects of different types of stereotype threat.  
Conclusions 
The current set of experiments provided fairly consistent evidence that exposure to science-
related or cognitive ability-related stereotype threat leads to increased belief in AGW. 
Consistent with prior research (Aronson, 1999; Aronson et al., 2002) the results of 
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experiments 6 and 7 also indicated that this effect is modulated by implicit theories of 
ability, such that increment theorists’ views of AGW do not change in response to stereotype 
threat. In experiment 8, a significant interaction between stereotype threat and persuasive 
message content was observed, indicating that the effects of stereotype threat on belief in 
AGW can be enhanced following exposure to certain messages. However, further research 
would be needed to fully understand the nature of the observed effects, and their underlying 
mechanisms.  
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Chapter Four: Do public self-consciousness, private self-
consciousness, public self-awareness and private self-
awareness interact with stereotype threat? 
As noted in chapter 1, public self-consciousness is the dispositional tendency to 
attend to publicly observable aspects of the self (e.g. personal appearance), whereas private 
self-consciousness is the dispositional tendency to attend to internal thoughts, sensations and 
feelings (Fenigstein et al., 1975). Public and private self-awareness refer to the state versions 
of public and private self-consciousness, respectively. In other words, public self-awareness 
refers to the extent to which an individual is attending to publicly observable aspects of the 
self within a given situation; private self-awareness refers to the extent to which an 
individual is attending to internal thoughts and sensations within a given situation. 
Chapter 3 sought to investigate the roles of public and private self-consciousness 
(experiments 11 and 12) and public and private self-awareness (experiment 13) in 
moderating the effects of stereotype threat. Although previous studies (Beilock et al., 2007) 
and theoretical models (Schmader et al., 2008) have explored the role of self-directed 
attention in stereotype threat, these papers have generally refrained from describing the 
nature of this self-directed attention in a manner that can be easily mapped onto constructs 
discussed in the self-consciousness and self-awareness literatures. For instance, Schmader et 
al. (2008, p. 343) propose that stereotype threat induces a “conscious and controlled state of 
monitoring the self within the situation”. This monitoring of the self is proposed to involve 
attending to information about other people’s endorsement of the negative stereotype 
(Brown & Pinel, 2003) and about how well one is performing the task (e.g. Forbes et al., 
2008). It is also proposed to involve monitoring and attempting to consciously control one’s 
own behaviour in order to minimise mistakes (e.g. Beilock et al., 2006).  
These processes are clearly similar to the attentional tendencies that characterise 
public and private self-awareness, which are two distinct dimensions (Govern & Marsch, 
2001). However, it is unclear to what extent, if at all, the “monitoring of the self within the 
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situation” described by Schmader et al. (2008, p.343) corresponds to the ways in which 
public and private self-awareness are conceptualised in the relevant literature. For example, 
one might argue that the fact that stereotype threatened individuals attempt to monitor their 
own motor output (Beilock et al., 2006) indicates increased private self-awareness, given 
that private self-awareness involves attending to internal sensations (Govern & Marsch, 
2001), some of which are likely to provide sensorimotor feedback about one’s own motor 
movements. Conversely, one might argue that motor movements can be consciously 
monitored by attending to sensory signals that are publicly visible (Wulf, 2013), such that 
the increased tendency to monitor one’s own motor output that characterises stereotype 
threatened individuals is indicative of enhanced public (not private) self-awareness. Thus, 
although it is clear that some forms of self-directed attention are activated under stereotype 
threat, existing theoretical models (Schmader et al., 2008) are not explicit in their claims 
about whether or not this self-directed attention should be considered the same as, similar to, 
or totally different from public or private self-awareness. 
Experiments 11, 12 and 13 sought to address this issue by directly testing 
hypotheses about the roles played by public and private self-consciousness and self-
awareness in the context of stereotype threat. Despite Schmader et al.’s (2008) proposals 
about the involvement of self-monitoring and performance-monitoring processes in the 
causal mechanisms of stereotype threat, there is currently no direct evidence to suggest that 
these processes should be considered identical to private or public self-awareness. However, 
there is evidence – presented below– to suggest that the effects of public and private self-
consciousness may vary as a function of stereotype threat. Experiments 11 and 12 therefore 
addressed modulation of the effects of public and private self-consciousness by different 
types of stereotype threat . Specifically, experiment 11 investigated the extent to which 
different types of stereotype threat modulate the effects of public and private self-
consciousness on perceptions of challenge and threat on a forthcoming task; experiment 12 
investigated the extent to which the effect of these self-consciousness variables on the 
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tendency to engage in self-handicapping was modulated by different types of stereotype 
threat. Experiment 13 addressed the modulation of the effects of public and private self-
awareness by stereotype threat.  
Stereotype Threat, Self-Consciousness and Perceptions of Challenge and Threat 
In chapter 1, it was argued that the trait activation principle (Tett & Guterman, 2000) 
is useful for the derivation of hypotheses about how public and private self-consciousness 
modulate the effects of different types of stereotype threat. The trait activation principle 
states that dispositional traits only tend to influence cognition, behaviour, and affect in trait-
relevant situations. For instance, dispositional anxiety is only likely to influence anxious 
cognition, emotion, and behaviour in situations that the individual finds threatening (Tett et 
al., 2013).  
Based on this principle, I reasoned that public self-consciousness would only 
influence thought, affect, and behaviour in situations where impression management 
concerns are present. Conversely, I expected that private self-consciousness would only 
influence thought, affect, and behaviour in situations where concerns about one’s own 
private self-perception are present. Since other-as-source stereotype threat arises when the 
individual is concerned about how other people are perceiving them (an impression 
management concern; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007), it follows that public self-consciousness 
should influence thought, affect, and behaviour in situations that trigger other-as-source 
stereotype threat. Moreover, since self-as-source stereotype threat arises when the individual 
is concerned about protecting their personal perception of their own ability level (Shapiro & 
Neuberg, 2007), it follows that private self-consciousness should affect thought, affect, and 
behaviour in situations that trigger self-as-source stereotype threat. 
Geukes et al. (2012) used a similar line of reasoning in forming hypotheses about 
the role played by the two types of self-consciousness in the context of choking under 
pressure. Just as Shapiro and Neuberg (2007) propose that stereotype threat can arise when 
the individual fears confirming the negative stereotype within the minds of others (other-as-
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source) or within their own mind (self-as-source), Geukes et al. (2012) argued that people 
can experience choking under pressure because of the need to impress other people (public 
pressure) or because of motivational needs that are independent of impression management 
concerns (private pressure). For instance, the presence of a large audience might induce 
public pressure because of the need to avoid appearing incompetent in front of the audience 
members (Mesagno et al., 2012), whereas instructions describing a task as ability diagnostic 
might induce private pressure by causing the individual to worry about cultivating a positive 
private self-image (Oulejans et al., 2015). The self-as-source vs. other-as-source distinction 
proposed by Shapiro and Neuberg (2007) is clearly similar to the private pressure vs. public 
pressure distinction proposed by Geukes et al. (2012): private pressure and self-as-source 
stereotype threat both involve concerns pertaining to the way in which the individual 
perceives themselves, whereas public pressure and other-as-source stereotype threat both 
involve concerns pertaining to the way in which the individual is viewed by others. 
Based on the trait activation principle (Tett & Guterman, 2000), Geukes et al. 
(2012), proposed that public and private self-consciousness would differ in their relevance to 
situations involving public and private pressure. Public self-consciousness, which relates to 
dispositional impression management concerns (Sawaoka et al., 2012) would only be 
relevant to situations involving public pressure, in which such concerns are likely to be 
present. Private self-consciousness, which pertains to the way people reflect on their inner 
selves (rather than on the way other people perceive them), would only be relevant in 
situations in which private pressure is induced. On this basis, Geukes et al. (2012) argued 
that public self-consciousness would be expected to influence cognition, affect and 
behaviour in the context of public (but not private) pressure, whereas the reverse would be 
true for private self-consciousness. This led Geukes et al. (2012) to the non-directional 
hypothesis that private self-consciousness would be correlated with performance only in the 
context of private pressure, and that public self-consciousness would be correlated with 
performance only in the context of public pressure. The hypotheses were non-directional 
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because although the trait activation principle permits the derivation of predictions about 
when traits will and will not influence behaviour, it does not necessarily facilitate 
predictions about the nature of this influence. Geukes et al.’s (2012) results confirmed their 
predictions: public self-consciousness was (positively) correlated with performance in the 
context of high public (but not private) pressure, whereas private self-consciousness was 
(negatively) correlated with performance in the context of private (but not public) pressure.  
It stands to reason that public and private self-consciousness should interact with the 
different types of stereotype threat in the same way as they interact with the different types 
of pressure as found by Geukes et al. (2012). In other words, consistent with the trait 
activation principle, public self-consciousness should only influence cognition, affect, and 
behaviour in the context of other-as-source (but not self-as-source) stereotype threat, 
whereas private self-consciousness should only influence cognition, thought, and behaviour 
in the context of self-as-source stereotype threat. 
Experiment 11 tested this proposal using a design similar to that employed by 
Geukes et al. (2012). I manipulated type of stereotype threat (self-as-source vs. other-as-
source) after measuring individual differences in public and private self-consciousness. 
Rather than focusing primarily on task performance, I used perceptions of a forthcoming 
task as a challenge or a threat (Blacovich, 2008) as the primary dependent variable of 
interest. Since other-as-source stereotype threat forces the individual to think about how they 
will be perceived by others (Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007), it follows that people who are well-
accustomed to attending to the way in which others are perceiving them and adapting their 
behaviour to cultivate favourable impressions (i.e. highly publicly self-conscious 
individuals; Miller & Cox, 1982; Mohiyeddini et al., 2013) would feel more able to cope 
with the demands of situations that induce other-as-source stereotype threat. Since challenge 
arises when the individual believes that they have the resources to cope with situational 
demands (Blascovich et al., 2003), this means that public self-consciousness should be 
positively correlated with challenge in the context of other-as-source stereotype threat. 
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However, since the demands of situations involving self-as-source stereotype threat are 
independent of impression management concerns (Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007), I did not 
expect public self-consciousness to influence people’s challenge or threat responses therein 
(hypothesis 11). 
Using the same line of reasoning, I hypothesised that private self-consciousness 
would be positively correlated with challenge in the context of self-as-source stereotype 
threat, but not in the context of other-as-source stereotype threat (hypothesis 12). Privately 
self-conscious individuals would be well-accustomed to evaluating their own character traits 
and ability level (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), and should therefore feel more familiar with 
the demands posed by a situation requiring them to protect their private self-image, such as a 
situation that evokes self-as-source stereotype threat. Consequently, private self-
consciousness would be expected to correlate positively with challenge in the context of 
self-as-source stereotype threat. However, there would be no reason for it to correlate with 
challenge in the context of other-as-source stereotype threat.  
In summary, two hypotheses were proposed. Public self-consciousness was 
predicted to correlate with challenge in the context of other-as-source stereotype threat, but 
not in the context of self-as-source stereotype threat (hypothesis 11). Moreover, private self-
consciousness was predicted to correlate with challenge in the context of self-as-source 
stereotype threat, but not in the context of other-as-source stereotype threat (hypothesis 12).  
In addition to these two hypotheses, a number of hypotheses about the relationship 
between the different types of stereotype threat, public and private self-consciousness and 
self-handicapping were developed. 
Stereotype threat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Handicapping 
Self-handicapping refers to the act of deliberately establishing obstacles (self-
handicaps) that ae likely to impair one’s task performance in order to reap the attributional 
benefits provided by these obstacles (Baumeister, Hamilton & Tice, 1985; Berglas & Jones, 
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1978). For instance, by minimising the time spent practising for a task, an individual can 
allow their poor performance to be attributed to insufficient practice rather than low ability 
(Baumeister & Tice, 1990). Moreover, if performance is unexpectedly strong, then the 
resulting ability inference will be adjusted upwards to take account of the inimical effects of 
the self-handicap on performance (Kelley, 1971). In other words, a self-handicap ensures 
that strong performance will lead to attributions of high ability, whilst poor performance is 
less likely to be attributed to low ability. As such, self-handicapping serves an ego-defensive 
function for people who fear the prospect of demonstrating low ability (Tice, 1991).  
A number of self-handicapping strategies have been identified, including 
consumption of performance impairing drugs (Berglas & Jones, 1978), insufficient practice 
(Baumeister et al., 1985; Stone, 2002), effort reduction (Chen, Wu, Kee, Lin & Shui, 2009), 
and the selection of disadvantageous performance environments (Rhodewalt & Davison, 
1986). However, in addition to actively creating self-handicaps, the attributional benefits of 
self-handicapping can sometimes be obtained simply by reporting the presence of a factor 
that would be likely to harm one’s performance. For instance, by claiming high levels of 
tiredness or anxiety, a person can help to ensure that poor performance is attributed to these 
factors rather than to low ability (Hirt, Deppe & Gordon, 1991). The two forms of self-
handicapping described above are referred to in the literature as behavioural self-
handicapping and reported self-handicapping (Chen, Chen, Lin, Kee, Kuo & Shui, 2008). I 
focused specifically on reported self-handicapping. 
Reported self-handicapping could be used to cope with the impression management 
concerns aroused by stereotype threat, because the act of reporting the presence of a 
handicap –  regardless of whether the handicap is genuinely present - can induce a 
favourable attributional tendency among others (Ferrari, 1991). However, the self-
handicapping individual’s knowledge of the handicap’s (non-)existence would clearly be 
unaffected by the fact that they are reporting the handicap to others (Chen, et al., 2008). 
Therefore, reported self-handicapping would only be expected to enhance other people’s 
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perceptions of the ability level of the individual engaging therein; the individual’s perception 
of his/her own ability level would not be affected by reported self-handicapping. As such, 
reported self-handicapping would be a useful strategy for an individual seeking to enhance 
other’s perception of their ability, but it would not be useful for an individual seeking to 
enhance their own perception of their ability level.  
Note that the utility of reported self-handicapping for cultivating favourable ability 
impressions among others is not dependent on the actual existence of the handicap. If the 
handicap exists, then making others aware of its existence (as opposed to refraining from 
making them aware of its existence) would enhance the ability attributions made by these 
others. Similarly, if the handicap does not in fact exist, then deceptively telling others that it 
does exist (as opposed to refraining from telling others that it exists) would enhance these 
others’ ability attributions (Chen et al., 2008). However, in neither case would the act of 
reporting the handicap affect the individual’s self-perceived ability, because they would 
know about the existence or non-existence of the handicap regardless of whether they had 
reported it to others (Chen et al., 2008).  
Experiment 12 specifically examined reported self-handicapping as an outcome 
variable. Since reported self-handicapping enables the individual to enhance others’ 
impression of their ability without necessarily improving their level of self-perceived 
competence (Hirt et al., 1991), I expected other-as-source stereotype threat to trigger 
increased reported self-handicapping relative to self-as-source stereotype threat. Other-as-
source stereotype threat involves a fear of displaying low personal or ingroup ability to other 
people, whereas self-as-source stereotype threat involves a fear of displaying low ability to 
oneself (Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007). Since reported self-handicapping can only enhance 
others’ perception of one’s abilities (without enhancing one’s own perception of one’s own 
abilities), it would help to advance the goals of individuals who were subject to other-as-
source (but not self-as-source) stereotype threat. For this reason, I predicted that inducement 
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of other-as-source stereotype threat would trigger increased reported self-handicapping 
relative to inducement of self-as-source stereotype threat (hypothesis 13). 
In line with the trait activation principle (Tett & Gutterman, 2000), it was also 
predicted that public self-consciousness would be correlated with the tendency to engage in 
reported self-handicapping in the context of other-as-source, but not self-as-source, 
stereotype threat. Since public self-consciousness reflects a tendency to attend to the way the 
self is perceived by others, it follows that people who are high in public self-consciousness 
would feel a greater need to employ image-protection strategies under other-as-source 
stereotype threat compared to people who are low in public self-consciousness. However, 
under self-as-source stereotype threat, outward image protection concerns would be weaker 
regardless of an individual’s level of public self-consciousness, because situations that evoke 
other-as-source stereotype threat are unlikely to present the possibility of public evaluation 
(Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007). As such, there would be no reason to engage in reported self-
handicapping under self-as-source stereotype threat, irrespective of one’s level of public 
self-consciousness. Thus, it was hypothesised that public self-consciousness would correlate 
positively with reported self-handicapping for participants who were subject to other-as-
source stereotype threat, but not for those subject to self-as-source stereotype threat 
(hypothesis 14). 
Experiment 12 also examined the correlation between private self-consciousness and 
reported self-handicapping under different types of stereotype threat. Private self-
consciousness was not hypothesised to correlate with reported self-handicapping under 
either form of stereotype threat. High private self-consciousness involves a tendency to 
attend to aspects of the self that are not subject to public observation, such as internal 
thoughts and feelings (Fenigstein et al., 1975). Since reported self-handicapping only serves 
to enhance the image of the self from the perspective of others (and not from one’s own 
perspective), there is no reason to expect that private self-consciousness would be correlated 
with reported self-handicapping under any form of stereotype threat. Because essentially this 
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idea involved the prediction of a null-effect, I refrained from formally posing a hypothesis 
but nevertheless inspected the relevant statistical pattern in the data from experiment 12.  
In summary, it was hypothesised that other-as-source stereotype threat would induce an 
increased tendency to engage in reported self-handicapping relative to self-as-source 
stereotype threat (hypothesis 13). It was also hypothesised that public self-consciousness 
would be positively correlated with reported self-handicapping when other-as-source 
stereotype threat is induced, but not when self-as-source stereotype threat is induced 
(hypothesis 14); no such interaction was hypothesised with respect to private self-
consciousness. These hypotheses were tested in experiment 12.  
Stereotype Threat, Self-Awareness and Motor Task Performance 
In addition to investigating the interactions between the different types of stereotype 
threat and public and private self-consciousness, I also sought to explore the moderation of 
the effects of stereotype threat by public and private self-awareness. Public self-awareness is 
the state version of public self-consciousness; it refers to the extent to which a person is 
focused on publically observable aspects of the self within a given situation. Private self-
awareness is the state version of private self-consciousness; it refers to the extent to which a 
person is focused on internal thoughts and sensations within a given situation (Govern & 
Marsch, 2001). I noted in the introduction that some of the aspects of the psychological 
profile that emerges following exposure to stereotype threat are similar to the attentional 
tendencies that characterise public and private self-awareness. For instance, in the context of 
other-as-source stereotype threat, individuals exhibit an increased desire to avoid displaying 
low ability to others (Zhang et al., 2013), which mirrors the finding that public self-
awareness is associated with the desire to create favourable impressions on others (Wiekens 
& Staple, 2010). Likewise, stereotype threat induces a tendency to monitor the content of 
one’s own thoughts in order to suppress unwanted material (Schmader et al., 2008), which 
mirrors the tendency of individuals in a privately self-aware state to focus on the content of 
their own thoughts (Govern & Marsch, 2001). However, there is also reason to believe that 
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the psychological consequences that can be triggered by stereotype threat are not entirely 
overlapping with those described in the literature on self-awareness (Beilock et al., 2006; 
Schmader et al., 2008).  
Stereotype Threat as a moderator of the effects of public and private self-
awareness 
I will argue that public and private self-awareness are likely to influence 
performance on motor tasks in the context of high stereotype threat.  
Effortfully monitoring one’s own motor output hampers the operation of the 
automatic processes that typically guide skilled motor movements, thereby impairing 
performance (Beckmann et al., 2013). However, evidence indicates that, in some cases, 
consciously monitoring one’s own motor output may in fact be conducive to strong 
performance (Lohse, Jones, Healy & Sherwood, 2014; Lohse, Sherwood & Healy, 2014). 
Specifically, research conducted by Wulf (e.g. Wulf, Landers, Lewthwaite, & Töllner, 2009; 
see Wulf, 2013 for a review) indicates that performance is impaired when people are 
instructed to monitor the internal sensations associated with their movements (e.g. the 
position of their feet as they attempt to balance on an unstable object), but performance is 
enhanced when people are instructed to monitor the effects of their movements on the world 
external to their body (e.g. the position of an unstable object on which they are attempting to 
balance; Wulf et al., 2009). Monitoring the internal sensations associated with one’s motor 
output is referred to as internal attention; monitoring the external effects of one’s actions is 
referred to as external attention (Wulf, 2013). 
Given that private self-awareness is associated with attending to internal thoughts, 
feelings, and sensations (Govern & Marsch, 2001), it stands to reason that in the context of 
stereotype threat, individuals in a privately self-aware state would monitor their own motor 
output by attending to the internal sensations that it produces. Since internal attention is 
detrimental to motor task performance (Wulf, 2013), it follows that high private self-
awareness should be associated with inferior performance in the context of stereotype threat. 
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Conversely, given that public self-awareness is associated with a tendency to monitor the 
aspects of the self that are observable to others (Govern & Marsch, 2001), it stands to reason 
that individuals in a publicly self-aware state would monitor their own motor output by 
attending to its effects on their external environment in the context of stereotype threat. 
Since external attention is conducive to strong motor task performance (Wulf, 2013), it 
follows that high public self-awareness should be associated with superior performance in 
the context of stereotype threat. However, when stereotype threat is absent, the tendency to 
monitor one’s own motor output (whether by attending to internal sensations or external 
effects) would be diminished. Therefore, private and public self-awareness would be 
unrelated to the way in which monitoring of motor output is undertaken (because no such 
monitoring would be occurring), and would therefore be unrelated to performance. In 
summary, it was predicted that high public self-awareness (vs. high private self-awareness) 
would be associated with superior performance on a motor task for individuals subject to 
high stereotype threat, but not for those subject to low stereotype threat (hypothesis 15).  
Summary of Hypotheses 
In summary, the following predictions were tested. Public self-consciousness would 
correlate positively with perceptions of a forthcoming task as a challenge (not threat) when 
other-as-source stereotype threat was induced, but not when self-as-source stereotype threat 
was induced (hypothesis 11). Private self-consciousness would correlate with perceptions of 
a forthcoming task as a challenge (and not as a threat) when self-as-source was induced, but 
not when other-as-source stereotype threat was induced (hypothesis 12). Other-as-source 
stereotype threat would be associated with increased reported self-handicapping relative to 
self-as-source stereotype threat (hypothesis 13). Public self-consciousness would correlate 
positively with reported self-handicapping when other-as-source stereotype threat was 
induced, but not when self-as-source stereotype threat was induced (hypothesis 14). Public 
self-awareness would be associated with superior performance relative to private self-
awareness, but only under high (but not low) stereotype threat (hypothesis 15).  
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Experiment 11 
Experiment 11 employed a mixed experimental design: type of stereotype threat 
(self-as-source vs. other-as-source) was manipulated, and public and private self-
consciousness were measured prior to the manipulation. Participants’ perceptions of a 
forthcoming task as a challenge were then measured. This design was intended to test the 
hypothesis that public self-consciousness would correlate positively with perceptions of 
challenge for a forthcoming task under other-as-source, but not under self-as-source, 
stereotype threat (hypothesis 11). It was also hypothesised that private self-consciousness 
would be correlated with challenge perceptions under self-as-source, but not other as source, 
stereotype threat (hypothesis 12). 
Method 
Participants and Design 
108 participants (43 females) participated via CrowdFlower. Participants were paid 
$0.05 for their participation. 
 
Procedure 
Participants first reported their gender and then completed the public (7 items, α 
=.72) and private (10 items, α =.52) Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975). 
Example items are “One of the last things I do before I leave my house is look in the mirror” 
(public self-consciousness) and “I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings” (private self-
consciousness). Participants rated the extent to which each statement was true of them on a 
scale of 1 (not at all true of me) to 5 (very true of me). Item responses were averaged for 
each scale to calculate an overall score between 1 and 5 for each subscale. 
Participants were then randomly assigned to the self-as-source or other-as-source 
stereotype threat conditions. All participants were told that they were about to take a test of 
cognitive ability, and that their gender tended to perform worse on this test as a result of its 
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lower average ability level. This has previously been found to be an effective way of 
inducing stereotype threat (Smith & White, 2002; Chalabaev et al., 2008). Participants in the 
self-as-source condition were told that, after the test finished, they would see how well they 
had performed and would thereby be able to see whether their performance had been in line 
with what was typical of their gender. Participants in the other-as-source condition were told 
that, after the test finished, the experimenters would calculate their score in order to 
determine whether their performance had been typical of what was expected of their gender. 
These instructions thereby served to orient participants towards thinking about how their 
performance would influence their own private self-perception of their own and their 
gender’s ability level (self-as-source condition), or towards thinking about the 
experimenters’ perception of their ability level and that of their gender (other-as-source 
condition).  
Following the experimental manipulation, a 6-item measure of challenge and threat 
perceptions of the forthcoming test based on Drach-Zahavy and Erez (2002) was 
administered. An example item was “To me, the test seems like a challenge”. Participants 
rated their agreement with each item on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree); 
half of the items were reverse coded (α =.57). Scores across items were averaged to form an 
overall score between 1 (low challenge/high threat) to 5 (high challenge/low threat). 
The materials used in experiment 11 – other than those taken from the preceding 
experiments – are presented in Appendix J. 
Results 
Condition and public-self-consciousness were entered into the first block of a 
multiple regression; the interaction term was entered into the second block. The outcome 
variable was challenge perceptions. The beta for the interaction term was marginally 
significant: R2=.03, β=-.96; t(1,104)=1.83; p=.07. 
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However, the pattern of results was not in line with predictions. Contrary to 
hypothesis 11, there was a marginally significant correlation between public self-
consciousness and challenge perceptions in the self-as-source condition (r(54))=.24; p=.07), 
but no such correlation was observed in the other-as-source condition: r(50)=-.10; p=.46.  
In a second multiple regression, condition and private self-consciousness were 
entered into the first block, the interaction term was entered into the second block and 
challenge perceptions were used as the outcome variable. Contrary to hypothesis 12, the 
interaction was not significant: β=-.10; t(1,104)=-1.1; p=.28. 
Discussion 
Contrary to the hypotheses, public self-consciousness was correlated at marginal 
significance with challenge perceptions in the self-as-source stereotype threat condition, but 
not in the other-as-source stereotype threat condition. Moreover, there was no significant 
interaction between private self-consciousness and type of stereotype threat in predicting 
challenge perceptions.   
It is possible that the failure to observe the expected results is attributable to the 
inaccuracy of the experimental hypotheses. In the introduction to experiment 11, I reasoned 
that individuals who are high in public self-consciousness would be used to attending to 
their public appearance, making them feel better prepared for situations that involve 
managing public impressions (such as situations that trigger other-as-source stereotype 
threat; Neuberg & Shapiro, 2007). Likewise, I argued that individuals high in private self-
consciousness would be used to thinking about their personal characteristics (Campbell & 
Trapnell, 1999) and would therefore feel better prepared for situations involving concerns 
about damaging one’s own private self-perception (such as situations that trigger self-as-
source stereotype threat; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007). This sense of preparedness was 
proposed to engender increased perceptions of challenge (rather than threat; Blascovich et 
al., 1999).   
134 
 
However, there may have been a flaw in this line of reasoning. Although individuals 
in public self-consciousness would have had more experience with situations in which they 
were attending to their own public image (Geukes et al., 2012), this would not necessarily 
make them feel better prepared for these situations. For instance, depressed individuals are 
more likely to have experienced major negative events in the past (Monroe & Hidjiyannakis, 
2002), and they are more likely to attend to negatively valenced stimuli (Gotli, 
Krasnoperova, Yue & Joorman, 2004). Nevertheless, these individuals do not feel more 
confident about their capacity to deal with negative events – on the contrary, they tend to 
doubt their own capacity to deal with unpleasant situations (Nolen-Hoeksma et al., 2000). 
For similar reasons, individuals who are high in public self-consciousness may not 
necessarily feel well-prepared for situations involving public impression management 
concerns, in spite of their increased experience of such situations. For instance, although 
they may have well-rehearsed strategies for dealing with these situations (e.g. by regulating 
body language; Sawaoka et al., 2012), they may also feel more anxious about the prospect of 
displaying an unfavourable public image, leading to increased threat perceptions 
(Blascovich, 2008). In experiment 11, these two separate effects of public self-consciousness 
– increasing preparedness of situations involving public impression management whilst 
simultaneously enhancing anxiety over the prospect of displaying a negative self-image 
therein – may have cancelled each other out. This would explain why there was no 
significant correlation between public self-consciousness and challenge perceptions under 
other-as-source stereotype threat, and no significant interaction between public self-
consciousness and type of stereotype threat. Future research should investigate this 
possibility by directly measuring the extent to which public self-consciousness impacts 
perceived familiarity and anxiety in situations that evoke other-as-source stereotype threat.  
Similarly, the absence of a significant interaction between private self-consciousness 
and type of stereotype threat in experiment 11 could be attributable to the fact that self-
perception concerns may have been relevant in both the self-as-source and other-as-source 
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stereotype threat conditions. In the self-as-source condition, participants were told that they 
would be able to evaluate the stereotype-consistency of their own performance following the 
test, which would be expected to cause participants to worry about preserving a favourable 
self-perception (which was the intended purpose of the instructions in this condition; 
Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007). In the other-as-source condition, participants were told that the 
“experimenters” would evaluate their ability level. Although this would presumably have 
activated concerns with public impression management (as intended; Shapiro & Neuberg, 
2007), participants may nevertheless have believed that they themselves would also be able 
to assess their own performance. Indeed, people typically expect to receive feedback 
following task performance (Dowden et al., 2013), and even if explicit feedback is not 
provided they are likely to monitor their own thoughts and behaviour to assess the quality of 
their performance (Beilock et al., 2007; Schmader et al., 2008). This means that participants 
in the other-as-source condition of experiment 11 may have expected that they would be 
able to evaluate their own performance, which would have activated private self-perception 
concerns. If, as argued in the introduction, private self-consciousness is associated with a 
belief that one is capable of dealing with the demands of situations that involve private self-
perception concerns, then it would follow that private self-consciousness would be 
correlated with challenge perceptions under both self-as-source and other-as-source 
stereotype threat. This might explain the null-results obtained in the study.  
Experiment 12 
 
Experiment 12 sought to test the hypothesis that other-as-source stereotype threat 
would be associated with increased reported self-handicapping relative to self-as-source 
stereotype threat (hypothesis 13). It also sought to test the hypothesis that public self-
consciousness would correlate positively with reported self-handicapping when other-as-
source stereotype threat was induced, but not when self-as-source stereotype threat was 
induced (hypothesis 14).  
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Method 
Participants  
 470 participants were recruited via CrowdFlower, of which 7 were excluded 
due to dual participation. 165 of the remaining 463 participants were female.  
Measures 
Public and Private Self-consciousness. Experiment 12 used the same measures of 
public (α =.60) and private self-consciousness (α =.65) as were employed in experiment 11. 
Tiredness and Anxiety. Participants were asked to rate how tired and anxious they 
felt in two questions with responses ranging from 1 (not at all tired/anxious) to 7 (extremely 
tired/anxious). The order of these two questions was randomised across participants. 
Responses to the two questions (r(461)=.37; p=.001) were averaged to obtain an overall 
measure of self-reported tiredness and anxiety. The extent to which the impact vs. no impact 
manipulation (see procedure below) affected scores on this measure was used to index self-
handicapping. 
Procedure  
Experiment 12 used a similar design to experiment 11 – participants completed 
measures of public and private self-consciousness before being subject to the stereotype 
threat manipulation (self-as-source vs. other as-source).  However, the perceived challenge 
measure in experiment 11 was replaced with a procedure designed to assess reported self-
handicapping tendencies. Specifically, participants completed the measure of anxiety and 
tiredness, with some participants being told that tiredness and anxiety had been found to be 
detrimental to performance on the forthcoming task (impact conditions), and other 
participants being told that these states would not affect their performance (no-impact 
conditions). Given that tiredness and anxiety would only serve as potential handicaps if they 
were perceived as obstacles to strong performance, participants seeking to engage in 
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reported self-handicapping would express greater tiredness and anxiety in the impact 
conditions, but not in the no-impact conditions. Thus, experiment 12 inferred participants’ 
degree of reported self-handicapping by assessing how the effect of the impact vs. no impact 
manipulation varied as a function of the other independent variables. This method of 
assessing reported self-handicapping has been used in numerous previous studies (e.g. 
Berglas & Jones, 1978; Hirt et al., 1991; Hirt, McCrea & Kimble, 2000). 
Due to this feature of the experimental design, hypotheses 13 and 14 led to 
predictions of a two-way and three-way interaction, respectively. Hypothesis 13 led to the 
prediction that reported tiredness and anxiety would be higher in the impact (vs. no-impact) 
conditions, but only when other-as-source stereotype threat (and not self-as-source 
stereotype threat) was induced. Hypothesis 14 led to the prediction that public self-
consciousness would be correlated with reported tiredness and anxiety in the impact 
conditions (but not the no-impact conditions), but only when other-as-source stereotype 
threat was induced; under self-as-source stereotype threat, the correlation between public 
self-consciousness and reported tiredness and anxiety was not predicted to vary across the 
impact vs. no impact conditions.  
The materials used in experiment 12 – other than those taken from the preceding 
experiments – are presented in Appendix K. 
 
Results 
A multiple regression was conducted, with anxiety and tiredness as the independent 
variable. Terms for the main effects of public self-consciousness, type of stereotype threat 
and ostensible impact of anxiety and tiredness were entered into the first block; terms for the 
three two-way interactions between these independent variables were entered into the second 
block and the three-way interaction term was entered into the third block. Contrary to 
hypothesis 13, there was no significant interaction between type of stereotype threat and 
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ostensible impact of tiredness and anxiety t(455)=.93; p=.35. Contrary to hypothesis 14, 
there was no significant three-way interaction between public self-consciousness, type of 
stereotype threat and ostensible impact of tiredness and anxiety: t(455)=34; p=.74.  
In a separate multiple regression, the same steps outlined above were repeated, 
except that public self-consciousness was replaced with private self-consciousness in all the 
main effect and interaction terms. Consistent with predictions, none of the main effects or 
interactions were significant.  
Discussion 
Contrary to hypothesis 13, no interaction between type of stereotype threat and 
ostensible impact of tiredness and anxiety was observed, indicating that the tendency to 
engage in reported self-handicapping did not differ as a function of stereotype condition. 
Moreover, contrary to hypothesis 14, there was no three-way interaction between public 
self-consciousness, type of stereotype threat and ostensible impact of tiredness and anxiety, 
indicating that the relationship between public self-consciousness and tendency to engage in 
reported self-handicapping did not vary as a function of stereotype threat condition. Thus, 
neither hypothesis was supported by the results of experiment 12.  
It is possible that the failure to find supporting evidence in experiment 12 is 
attributable to the nature of the “type of stereotype threat” manipulation employed therein 
(this would also explain the unexpected patterns observed in experiment 11). Hitherto, no 
previous studies have used a manipulation to create self-as-source stereotype threat and 
other-as-source stereotype threat conditions, meaning that the manipulation used in 
experiment 12 was constructed without reference to an empirically validated template. It is 
therefore possible that the manipulation failed to achieve its intended goal, namely to induce 
a concern with validating the negative stereotype from the perspective of others (other-as-
source condition) or from the participant’s own perspective (self-as-source condition).  
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Indeed, the other-as-source stereotype threat condition attempted to induce a 
concern with the prospect of validating the negative stereotype from the perspective of an 
anonymous group of experimenters referred to very briefly as “we”. Although previous 
studies have demonstrated that participants generally seek to convey favourable impressions 
about themselves and their ingroup to experimenters (Johns et al., 2008; Stone, 2002; Stone 
& McWhinnie, 2008; Zhang et al., 2013), the experimenters in these experiments were 
physically present and interacted with participants. Conversely, the online participants in 
experiment 12 had no direct exposure to the “experimenters”, and may therefore have been 
unconcerned by the prospect of making a negative impression on them. Indeed, evidence 
indicates that people are more concerned about cultivating favourable attitudes among others 
who are physically or psychologically close rather than distant (Milgram, 1974; Latane, 
1981). It is therefore possible that participants in the other-as-source condition were not 
concerned about the impression made by their test performance on the physically and 
psychologically distant “experimenters”, and that they consequently experienced no other-
as-source stereotype threat. This would explain the failure to observe hypothesis-confirming 
patterns in the present experiments, which both used the same manipulation of type of 
stereotype threat.  
However, it may be that the failure to confirm the hypotheses is attributable to a 
problem with the hypotheses themselves. For instance, although individuals who are high in 
public self-consciousness may be more concerned with the need to display high personal or 
ingroup ability to others (Baumeister, 1984; Mesagno et al., 2012), they are also likely to be 
more concerned with the need to create a favourable impression on others in domains that 
are independent of ability (e.g. being perceived as likeable and attractive; Fenigstein et al., 
1975; Sawaoka et al., 2012). Since reported self-handicapping tends to induce others to view 
the individual engaging therein as more competent but less likeable (McCrea et al., 2008), it 
may be that individuals high in public self-consciousness perceive reported self-
handicapping to confer both greater benefits (because they value its capacity to enhance 
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others’ impressions of their ability) and greater costs (because they fear its capacity to 
damage others’ impressions of their likeability). They may consequently perceive no net 
benefit to self-reported handicapping, such that they would be neither more likely nor less 
likely to engage therein in situations that involve public impression management concerns 
(such as other-as-source stereotype threat). This would explain the lack of effects for public 
self-consciousness on a tendency to engage in reported self-handicapping in experiment 12.  
It is unclear why individuals subject to other-as-source stereotype threat did not 
exhibit more reported self-handicapping relative to those subject to self-as-source stereotype 
threat, given that only other-as-source stereotype threat would be expected to induce a desire 
to evoke favourable ability attributions in others. One possibility – other than the 
ineffectiveness of the stereotype threat source manipulation mentioned above – is that the 
distinction between self-as-source stereotype threat and other-as-source stereotype threat 
proposed by Shapiro and Neuberg (2007) simply does not exist. Although studies in which 
participants are asked to report the thoughts and feelings that they experienced while under 
stereotype threat have indicated that people do focus to varying degrees on managing their 
own impressions or the impressions formed by others (Shapiro, 2011), these studies are 
limited in that people’s introspective reports of the psychological processes underlying their 
behaviour are often highly inaccurate (Bryce & Bratzke, 2007; Clark, Luguri, Ditto, Knobe, 
Shariff & Baumeister, 2014). To my knowledge, experiments 11 and 12 were the first to 
attempt to experimentally manipulate the “source” dimension of stereotype threat. Their 
failure to produce hypothesis-confirming results and the absence of any other experimental 
evidence supporting the notion that stereotype threat can take on “other-as-source” and “self-
as-source” forms questions the extent to which this distinction has any meaningful 
significance for the theoretical understanding of stereotype threat. 
Indeed, evidence indicates that people’s beliefs, including their beliefs about 
themselves and their ingroups, are heavily influenced by the views of others (Asch, 1956; 
Cialdini, 2001; Ritsher & Phelan, 2004). Conversely, people tend to over-estimate the extent 
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to which the views of others accord with their own (the false consensus effect; Ross, Greene 
& House, 1977; Welborne, Gunter, Vezich & Lieberman, 2017). Consequently, an 
individual seeking to enhance their own perception of their ability level would also have an 
incentive to cultivate favourable impressions of their ability among others, because the 
knowledge that others view them as having higher ability would make it easier for the 
individual to accept that this view is accurate (Cialdini, 2001). Likewise, an individual 
seeking to cultivate favourable impressions of their ability among others would also have an 
incentive to convince themselves of their own high ability level – by doing so, they would 
increase their own inclination to believe that others share their view due to the false 
consensus effect. 
This consideration blurs the theoretical boundary between other-as-source and self-
as-source stereotype threat, because it indicates that the motivational tendencies 
characterising each form of stereotype threat are likely to co-occur. This would mean that 
other-as-source and self-as-source stereotype threat would be unlikely to arise in isolation 
(i.e. it would be very rare to experience one without the other), except under very artificial 
circumstances that would be unlikely to occur in ecologically valid settings (e.g. when 
taking a test for which only the test-taker will know the score; Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2003). 
As such, the self-as-source vs. other-as-source stereotype threat distinction may be of 
minimal theoretical and practical utility. 
Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that the null results of experiments 11 
and 12 only mean that the relevant alternative hypotheses cannot necessarily be accepted; 
they do not mean that the null hypothesis (that the source of stereotype threat has no 
meaningful impact) should be accepted. Thus, further evidence would be required before it 
will be possible to establish that the self-as-source vs. other-as-source distinction is of no 
meaningful significance. Regardless, the burden of evidence rests on the theorists seeking to 
claim that the self-as-source vs. other-as-source distinction is a theoretically useful one – in 
the absence of such evidence, this theoretical utility cannot be assumed. 
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Experiment 13 
Having explored interactions between stereotype threat and the different forms of self-
consciousness, experiment 13 investigated stereotype threat’s interaction with public and 
private self-awareness. A 2x2 experimental design was used, wherein stereotype threat (high 
vs. low) and self-awareness (public vs. private) were manipulated, with performance on a 
motor task as the dependent variable. As well as being manipulated, self-awareness was also 
measured prior to the motor task. Following the motor task, a test was administered to assess 
the extent to which participants had employed internal or external attention during the task. 
It was hypothesised that public self-awareness would be associated with superior 
performance relative to private self-awareness, but only under high (but not low) stereotype 
threat (hypothesis 15).  
Method 
Participants 
80 Psychology students at Royal Holloway University (70 females) participated in 
exchange for course credit.  
Measures 
Motor task performance. Following Baumeister (1984), motor performance was 
assessed using the ‘roll-up’ game, which requires the player to adjust the position of two 
metal rods in order to guide a ball into a target area (See: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HnZuuCCdJAA).  
Participants completed this task twice: once during a practice phase and once during 
a test phase. During the practice phase, participants had 20 attempts to get the ball as close to 
the target area as possible. There were six positions in which it was possible for the ball to 
land. Participants gained 1 point if the ball landed in the farthest position from the target, 2 
points for the second farthest position, 3 points for the third farthest position etc. The 
average score across all 20 trials was then calculated for each participant to create a single 
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score for the practice task, of which the highest possible value was 6 and the lowest possible 
value was 1. Participants were told that this was just a practice phase and that they should 
not worry about how well they performed.  
In the test phase, the scoring system was the same as in the practice phase. However, 
unlike in the practice phase, in the test phase participants were told about the scoring system 
and were asked to make their best effort to obtain a high score.  
Public and Private Self-Awareness. Govern and Marsch’s (2001) Situational Self-Awareness 
Scale was used to measure public (α =.84) and private self-awareness (α =.76). The scale 
contains 3 items for each type of self-awareness. Example items are “Right now, I am 
conscious of my inner feelings” (private self-awareness) and “Right now, I am self-
conscious about the way I look” (public self-awareness). Responses were given on a scale of 
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
An average score for each subscale was calculated, after which the private score was 
subtracted from the public score in order to produce a variable on which higher scores 
indicated predominant public self-awareness whilst lower scores indicated predominant 
private self-awareness. For simplicity, this variable will henceforth be referred to as 
predominant public self-awareness. 
This measure served two purposes. First, it was used as a manipulation check to 
determine whether or not the manipulation of public vs. private self-awareness (see 
procedure) was effective. Secondly, it was used to investigate whether individual differences 
in self-awareness would interact with stereotype threat to predict motor performance in the 
same way that was hypothesised for the manipulation of self-awareness. 
Procedure 
Participants first completed the practice phase of the motor task and were then 
subject to the public vs. private self-awareness manipulation. Participants in the public 
condition were asked to remember a time when they had been thinking about the way other 
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people were perceiving them. In the private condition, participants were asked to simply 
recall any event and to think about the thoughts and feelings that they had been experiencing 
during that event (see Govern & Marsch, 2001, for a similar manipulation). Participants 
were asked to take up to 2 minutes to write about their memory in as much detail as they 
could remember. 
Participants were then asked to complete the self-awareness measure as a 
manipulation check. They were then subject to the stereotype threat manipulation. 
Participants in the high threat condition were told that the experimenter was interested in 
comparing the performance of Psychology and Engineering students on the roll-up task (all 
of the participants were psychology students). They were told that previous research 
suggested that engineering students would perform better because they have stronger spatial 
abilities. Similar stereotype threat manipulations have been used successfully in previous 
studies (Croizet, Després, Gauzins, Huguet, & Leyens, 2004). Participants in the low threat 
condition were not presented with this information. 
Following the stereotype threat manipulation, participants completed the test phase 
of the motor task. To minimise variation in motor task performance attributable to individual 
differences in ability, a “performance improvement” variable was created by subtracting 
participants’ score in the practice phase of the motor task from their performance in the test 
phase thereof. Since practice scores were obtained before any of the measures or 
manipulations had been administered, they can be assumed to index sources of variation in 
motor performance that are independent of the causal influences that experiment 13 sought 
to investigate. As such, subtracting these practice scores from the test scores allowed the 
influence of these unwanted sources of variance to be minimised. 
The materials used in experiment 13 – other than those taken from the preceding 
experiments – are presented in Appendix L. 
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Results 
To assess the effectiveness of the self-awareness manipulation, a one-way ANOVA 
was conducted using self-awareness condition (public vs. private) as an independent variable 
and predominant public self-awareness as a dependent variable. No significant effect was 
observed (F(1,74)=.099; p=.75), which indicates that the manipulation of self-awareness 
may not have had the intended effect.  
Nevertheless, the data were further explored by testing for the hypothesised 
interaction. A 2x2 between subjects ANOVA was conducted using stereotype threat (high 
vs. low) and self-awareness (public vs. private) as independent variables and motor 
performance as the dependent variable. Neither of the main effects were significant (both 
Fs<1). Consistent with hypothesis 15, the interaction was significant: F(1,76)=4.88; p=.03; 
ηp2=.06 (see Table 10). Furthermore, the simple effect of self-awareness was significant in 
the high stereotype threat conditions, wherein public self-awareness was characterised by 
superior motor performance relative to private self-awareness (F(1,76)=5.17; p=.03; 
ηp2=.06). Conversely, there was no effect of the self-awareness manipulation in the low 
stereotype threat conditions (F(1,76)=.85; p=.36; ηp2=.01. These findings are consistent with 
hypothesis 15. 
Table 10 
Belief in AGW as a function of Stereotype Threat and Self-Awareness in experiment 13 
 
  Stereotype Threat 
 
  High  Low 
Self-Awareness 
Condition 
Private .09 (.50) a  .42 (.63) a 
Public .55 (.69) b   .22 (.85) a 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. Postscripts denote significant differences 
(clomun-wise). 
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It was also deemed useful to test the hypothesised interaction using the measure, as 
opposed to the manipulation, of self-awareness. A multiple regression was conducted, using 
motor performance as a dependent variable. Terms for the main effects of stereotype threat 
and self-awareness were entered as predictor variables into the first block, with the 
interaction term entered into the second block. Contrary to hypothesis 15, none of the 
predictors were significant (all ps>.30). 
 
Discussion 
In accordance with hypothesis 15, the results of experiment 13 revealed an 
interaction between stereotype threat (high vs. low) and self-awareness (public vs. private) 
in predicting performance on a motor task, although this effect was only marginally 
significant. As predicted, public self-awareness was associated with superior performance 
relative to private self-awareness, but only under high, and not low, stereotype threat. 
However, these results were not replicated when using the measure – rather than the 
manipulation – of self-awareness. Moreover, no effect of the self-awareness manipulation 
was observed on the measure thereof. This casts doubt on the construct validity of the 
manipulation that was employed, although it is also possible that the measure of self-
awareness lacked construct validity. However, since this measure has previously been found 
to have high construct validity (Governs & Marsch, 2001) whereas the manipulation of self-
awareness used in experiment 13 has not, the low validity of the manipulation may be a 
more plausible explanation for the null results observed.  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that only one study (Governs & Marsch, 2001) has 
examined the psychometric properties of the measure of self-awareness used in experiment 
13. This study’s sample was fairly homogenous (participants all attended a University in 
New Jersey) and may have had characteristics that limit the extent to which Govern and 
Marsch’s (2001) findings can be generalised to the population from which experiment 13’s 
sample was taken. Thus, although Governs and Marsch’s (2001) data indicate that the 
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measure of self-awareness used in experiment 13 has good construct validity, this validity 
may not have been present when the measure was used with the participants of experiment 
13. Moreover, when Governs and Marsch (2001) tested the measure of self-awareness, they 
included several items addressing an additional construct (“surroundings focus”) alongside 
the items assessing public and private self-awareness. An individual item on a scale can 
affect how other items are interpreted (Schwarz et al., 1998), meaning that the psychometric 
properties of the public and private self-awareness scales may not have held constant when, 
in experiment 13, the items assessing “surroundings focus” were omitted. As such, it is 
possible that the failure to observe any interaction between the measure of predominant 
public self-awareness and stereotype threat in experiment 13 is attributable to the measure’s 
lack of construct validity. This would also explain why the manipulation of self-awareness 
failed to exert any effect on the measure thereof.  
 Indeed, the fact that the manipulation of self-awareness interacted with stereotype 
threat in the predicted manner provides evidence for its construct validity. It is difficult to 
think of a causal mechanism that could have given rise the pattern of observed inter-
condition differences other than the one hypothesised, indicating that the significant 
interaction was either a false positive or was indeed driven by the hypothesised causal 
mechanism. Thus, although the results of experiment 13 are clearly not as strong as might 
have been desired, they do provide some support for hypothesis 15. 
Limitations 
A number of limitations should be noted with regard to experiment 13. The 
disproportionate number of females among the participants raises questions in terms of the 
extent to which the results can be expected to generalise to male populations, particularly 
given that the mechanisms of stereotype threat sometimes differ for males and females 
(Chalabaev et al., 2012). Moreover, the failure of the self-awareness manipulation to affect 
scores on the measure thereof casts doubt on the construct validity of the manipulation, and 
the failure to observe an interaction between the measure of self-awareness and stereotype 
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threat limits the extent to which experiment 13’s results can be said to support hypothesis 
15. 
A further limitation with experiment 13 that applies to the vast majority of studies 
investigating the impact of attentional focus, stereotype threat, self-monitoring or choking 
under pressure on motor performance is that it assessed performance on only a single task. 
There is evidence that motor tasks vary widely in terms of the underlying abilities 
influencing their performance, meaning that effects observed for specific tasks may not 
generalise to other tasks. For instance, some motor tasks require pristine performance of a 
single, rapid and highly automated action sequence (e.g. shooting at a dart board), whereas 
others involve complex chains of action sequences that must be adapted to account for 
dynamic situational changes (e.g. dribbling past a defender in a football match; Huber, 
Brown & Sternad, 2016). Some motor tasks require complex planning (e.g. planning the 
optimal position to aim the ball in a squash game) and therefore recruit working memory, 
whereas other have minimal working memory demands (Furley & Memmert, 2010). Some 
tasks are heavily dependent on the muscle activity occurring in the first few milliseconds of 
key movements, whereas others are not (Chalabaev, Brisswalter, Radel, Coombes, Easthope, 
& Clément-Guillotin, 2013). Some tasks are likely to be highly vulnerable to the detrimental 
impact of specific physiological responses, whereas others are not. For example, dart-
shooting performance would presumably be greatly impaired by anxiety-induced hand 
trembling, whereas it is unlikely that this would also be true for running performance. 
These inter-task differences are important because they indicate that stereotype 
threat’s effects would be likely to differ for different types of task. Indeed, there is evidence 
indicating that the effects of stereotype threat on performance are moderated by response 
automaticity (Huber et al., 2016), working memory (Schmader et al., 2008), and early 
muscle activity in the course of action generation (Chalabaev et al., 2016). As such, motor 
tasks that vary in terms of the involvement of these processes may be differentially affected 
by stereotype threat. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider the impact of stereotype threat - 
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and of statistical interactions in which it is involved – across a wide range of motor tasks, 
rather than for a single task as was the case in experiment 13. Thus, it would be useful for 
future research to determine whether the findings of experiment 13 can generalise to 
different motor tasks.   
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Chapter Five: General Discussion 
The experiments presented herein tested a wide range of hypotheses relating to 
statistical interactions involving stereotype threat. Chapter 2 investigated the moderation by 
motivational state and regulatory focus of the effects of stereotype threat and stereotype lift 
on task performance. As predicted, experiment 1 found that different point systems could be 
used to induce challenge, threat, promotion, or prevention foci. Following from this finding, 
experiment 2 found that, as hypothesised, stereotype lift was associated with superior 
performance relative to stereotype threat when a promotion focus or threat was induced (the 
trend did not reach significance in the latter case), and that stereotype threat was associated 
with superior performance relative to stereotype lift when a prevention focus or challenge 
was induced. Experiment 3 replicated the finding that stereotype lift was associated with 
superior performance relative to stereotype threat in the context of a promotion focus-
inducing point system, and experiment 4 largely confirmed the findings of experiment 2 
using a different manipulation of regulatory focus and motivational state. Thus, overall, the 
experiments of chapter 2 provided fairly strong evidence for the proposed interactions 
between stereotype threat and regulatory focus, and between stereotype threat and 
motivational state. Although some of the hypothesised simple effects in experiments 2 and 4 
did not reach significance, the results were broadly in line with predictions.  
Chapter 3 focused on an outcome variable that has hitherto never been examined 
empirically in studies of stereotype threat, namely belief in Anthropogenic Global Warming. 
Experiment 5 confirmed the assumption - which was central to the subsequent studies in 
chapter 3 - that people generally perceive (non-)belief in AGW to be indicative of scientific 
(in)competence. Guided by cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), the 
remaining experiments in chapter 3 tested a range of hypotheses concerning interactions 
between stereotype threat and a number of other variables in determining belief in AGW. 
The results of experiments 6 and 7 indicated that high (vs. low) stereotype threat caused 
increased belief in AGW, but only for individuals who were induced to adopt an entity (as 
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opposed to increment) theory regarding the nature of scientific ability. Experiment 8 found 
that the impact of high (vs. low) stereotype threat on belief in AGW varied as a function of 
the type of message to which religious Christian participants were exposed: those who were 
exposed to a message describing agreement between Church leaders and scientists about the 
importance of tackling climate change displayed increased belief in AGW under high (vs. 
low) stereotype threat, whereas this was not the case for those exposed to messages 
describing agreement among scientists alone or Church leaders alone about the need to 
tackle climate change. However, no stereotype threat*message content interaction was 
observed when using a behavioural measure (donations towards a climate change activist 
website) as the dependent variable. Similarly, experiment 9 failed to confirm the 
hypothesised interaction between message framing and stereotype threat: the effects of 
stereotype threat on belief in AGW did not vary depending on whether a message about 
AGW was positively or negatively framed. Similarly, experiment 10 failed to confirm the 
hypothesised interaction between stereotype threat and temperature in predicting belief in 
AGW. Across all of the experiments of Chapter 3, the results were broadly consistent with 
the prediction of a main effect wherein high stereotype threat is associated with increased 
belief in AGW relative to low stereotype threat – this trend was present in all experiments 
and significant or marginally significant in the majority of them. 
Chapter 4 then explored interactions involving stereotype threat (other as source vs. 
self-as-source) and public and private self-consciousness or self-awareness. Although 
experiment 11 found marginally significant evidence for an interaction between public self-
consciousness and type of stereotype threat in predicting motivational state, the observed 
trends were not in the predicted directions and do not lend themselves to a straightforward 
theoretical explanation. Moreover, experiment 12 failed to find a significant interaction 
between type of stereotype threat and public or private self-consciousness in predicting 
reported self-handicapping. However, experiment 13 did find evidence for the hypothesised 
interaction between stereotype threat and type of self-awareness (public vs. private) in 
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predicting performance on a motor task, although the results failed to confirm the proposed 
mechanism underlying this interaction. 
Thus, the body of data presented within this thesis provides varying degrees of 
support for the different hypotheses that were proposed. However, even in instances where 
the hypotheses were not confirmed, the results still reflect on important theoretical issues 
that warrant further exploration; these are discussed in the following section. 
Theoretical Implications 
A number of broad theoretical implications emerge from the findings presented in 
this thesis. Contrary to the view that stereotype threat invariably produces undesirable 
consequences (e.g. Appel & Kranberger, 2012; Steele, 1997), some of the experiments 
reported herein indicated that, in some instances, stereotype threat can produce desirable 
consequences. In experiments 2 and 4, exposure to negative (vs. positive) stereotypes was 
associated with superior performance when prevention foci or challenge were induced. 
Moreover, the experiments of chapter 3 indicate that stereotype threat can have the 
beneficial effect of increasing belief in AGW, and the results of experiment 13 suggest that 
motor task performance is improved when high stereotype threat is coupled with public self-
awareness. Thus, a key contribution of the current thesis is the demonstration that, in many 
instances, stereotype threat can in fact have desirable effects. This is consistent with a small 
but growing portion of the stereotype threat literature showing that the typical detrimental 
effects of stereotype threat on a range of outcome variables can sometimes be reversed 
(Grimm et al., 2009; Keller & Bless, 2008; Nguyen & Ryan, 2008; O’Brien & Crandall, 
2003). By this, I do not mean to belittle the important negative consequences which 
stereotype threat can have for stigmatised and disadvantaged groups, such as non-whites or 
women. I would, however, want to argue for the need to remain open-minded about the fact 
that stereotype threat can have a multitude of effects, and that in addition to the well-
documented detrimental effects psychologists should also focus on potential positive effects 
in other contexts.  
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Crucially, these potential benefits of stereotype threat only appear to be manifest 
when certain moderating variables (regulatory focus; motivational state; implicit theories; 
self-awareness) are set at the appropriate levels. Likewise, the results of the experiments in 
chapter 2 indicate that positive stereotypes may sometimes have negative consequences, 
which is consistent with a number of previous studies showing detrimental effects of 
positive stereotypes in certain circumstances (Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000; Grimm et al., 
2009; Keller & Bless, 2008). Thus, the interactions involving stereotype threat and 
stereotype lift highlighted by the current work have practical utility with respect to attempts 
to harness the potential positive effects of these two phenomena. They also challenge more 
simplistic notions of stereotype threat and stereotype lift that assume that these phenomena 
only ever have negative or positive effects, respectively. 
The current findings also have more specific theoretical implications that apply 
primarily to the domains that they sought to investigate. For instance, the experiments of 
chapter 2 explain the apparent contradiction between the results of Keller (2007; Keller & 
Bless, 2008) and Grimm et al. (2009, 2015). These two research teams made opposing 
conclusions about the interaction between regulatory focus and exposure to positive vs. 
negative stereotypes. Grimm et al.’s (2009) data led them to conclude that negative 
stereotypes enhance performance when coupled with a prevention focus (rather than 
promotion focus) induction, whereas positive stereotypes enhance performance when paired 
with a promotion focus (rather than prevention focus) induction. Keller and Bless (2008) 
reached exactly the opposite conclusion based on their own data. Chapter 2 provides a 
resolution to this apparent contradiction: when Keller and Bless (2008) intended to induce 
promotion vs. prevention foci, the nature of their experimental manipulation was such that 
they actually induced challenge vs. threat. Given the aforementioned difference between the 
way in which stereotype threat and lift interact with regulatory focus and motivational state, 
this explains both Keller and Bless’ (2008) and Grimm et al.’s (2009) results. 
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The findings also shed light on the relationship between regulatory focus and 
motivational orientation (approach vs. avoidance). Approach and avoidance motivation refer 
to motivational states wherein an individual is focused on the prospect of reaching a 
desirable end-state (approach) or an undesired end-state (avoidance; Eder, Elliot & Harmon-
Jones, 2013). This approach-avoidance distinction is often confused with the promotion-
prevention distinction, which involves focusing on losses or gains, respectively (Scholer & 
Higgins, 2008). Theoretically, however, the approach-avoidance distinction is orthogonal to 
the promotion-prevention distinction (Scholer & Higgins, 2013). Specifically, it is possible 
to focus on a desirable or an undesirable end-state regardless of whether one is aiming to 
minimise losses or maximise gains. To use a concrete example, let us say that John wishes to 
gain a large amount of money – since John is seeking to actualise a gain, he will have a 
promotion focus (Förster et al., 1998; Förster et al., 2001). If he is thinking about the 
prospect of successfully obtaining the desired money (i.e. if the representation of this 
successful future outcome is highly accessible to him), then he will be approach-motivated 
because he will be focused on a desired end-state. However, he might be thinking about the 
prospect of failing to actualise the desired money, in which case he will be avoidance 
motivated because he will be focused on an undesirable end-state. Thus, the fact that John is 
seeking to actualise a gain (and is therefore promotion focused) does not constrain his 
approach/avoidance status (Malaviya & Brendl, 2014). Likewise, if John was seeking to 
avert a monetary loss (and was thus prevention-focused), it would be possible for him to be 
either approach-motivated (if he was thinking about the prospect of successfully averting the 
loss) or avoidance-motivated (if he was thinking about the prospect of failing to avert the 
loss). Hence, in theory, the promotion-promotion distinction is orthogonal to the approach-
avoidance distinction.  
However, in spite of this theoretical orthogonality, it is not uncommon to find cases 
in which researchers conflate promotion-prevention with approach-avoidance (Scholer & 
Higgins, 2008). For instance, experimental manipulations that are known to induce 
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promotion vs. prevention foci are sometimes described as manipulations of approach vs. 
avoidance motivation, and vice-versa (eg. Chalabaev et al., 2015; Roskes, Elliot, Nijstad & 
Dreu, 2013). Given that challenge and threat states are characterised by approach and 
avoidance motivation, respectively (Blascovich & Mendes, 2010), the results of chapter 2 
support the theoretical distinction between the approach-avoidance and promotion-
prevention dimensions. Specifically, the results of chapter 2 indicated that regulatory focus 
(promotion vs. prevention) modulates the effects of positive and negative stereotypes in a 
way that is different to the modulation by motivational state (approach vs. avoidance). This 
is consistent with existing research showing that manipulations of regulatory focus have 
different effects on a range of outcome variables than do manipulations of motivational state 
(Sassenberg et al., 2015).  
Moreover, the experiments of chapter 2 inform our understanding of the relationship 
between stereotype threat and stereotype lift. As noted in the introduction, these phenomena 
may be qualitatively distinct (i.e. their effects may be mediated by different variables) or 
only quantitatively distinct (i.e. their effects may arise because they have opposite impacts 
on the same mediating variable). For example, it could be that stereotype threat impairs task 
performance by increasing task-related anxiety (Schmader et al., 2008), whilst stereotype lift 
enhances performance by reducing task-related anxiety. This would be a quantitative 
difference, because it would involve the stereotype threat and stereotype lift having an 
opposing effect on the same mediating variable. Alternatively, it could be that stereotype 
threat impairs performance by increasing anxiety, whilst stereotype lift enhances 
performance by increasing the accessibility of useful task-relevant information (Wheeler & 
Petty, 2001). This would be a qualitative difference because it would mean that the effects of 
stereotype threat and stereotype lift are mediated by independent mechanisms. 
The results of chapter 2 support the former alternative, because they indicate that the 
effects of both stereotype threat and stereotype lift are at least partly attributable to the extent 
to which they induce regulatory fit or mismatch. This means that stereotype threat and 
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stereotype lift are quantitatively different (but not qualitatively different) phenomena, 
because their effects are mediated by similar mechanisms. 
Likewise, the experiments of chapter 3 also have important theoretical implications. 
The finding that high (vs. low) science-related stereotype threat tends to trigger increased 
belief in AGW is consistent with the view that stereotype threat can be characterised as a 
form of cognitive dissonance (Schmader et al., 2008). Awareness of a stereotype that implies 
low ingroup scientific ability is inconsistent with people’s desire to appear scientifically 
competent and thus generates cognitive dissonance. This dissonance can be eliminated by 
affirming one’s own scientific ability (Jamieson & Harkins, 2007), and one way to do this is 
to express increased belief in AGW. Thus, the experiments of chapter 3 support the view 
(Schmader et al., 2008) that stereotype threat is a form of cognitive dissonance.  
Fewer theoretical inferences can be made on the basis of the experiments of chapter 
4 due to the dearth of significant trends identified therein. The absence of significant 
findings in experiments 11 and 12 may be attributable to the manipulation of self-as-source 
vs. other-as-source stereotype threat that was employed in these experiments. Although the 
source dimension of stereotype threat has been subject to theoretical speculation (Shapiro & 
Neuberg, 2007) and measurement (Shapiro, 2011), no experiments have hitherto attempted 
to manipulate it. As such, the manipulation used in experiments 11 and 12 was newly 
improvised and may have failed to accomplish its intended effect. Alternatively, the 
proposed “source” dimension of stereotype threat may be of minimal theoretical utility. This 
highlights the importance of further research to establish construct-valid manipulations of 
self-as-source vs. other-as-source stereotype threat. 
More broadly, the current findings have implications for the understanding of the 
relationship between stereotype threat and choking under pressure. Previous research has 
shown that the effects of choking under pressure on performance are moderated by 
regulatory focus (Worthy et al., 2009), motivational state (McKay et al., 2012), implicit 
theories of ability (Molden & Dweck, 2006) and public self-awareness (Beilock & Carr, 
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2001). The current work found these same variables to moderate the effects of stereotype 
threat on performance, highlighting the overlap between stereotype threat and choking under 
pressure. 
Limitations 
It is important to note a number of limitations that apply to the experiments 
presented within this thesis. Most of these were online experiments and thus carry all of the 
associated drawbacks (Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014). For instance, there is evidence 
indicating that online participants are more likely to be distracted by experiment-irrelevant 
environmental stimuli such as mobile phones (Clifford & Jerit, 2014), and that they may 
take less care to ensure that they have understood task instructions (Crump, Mcdonell & 
Guericks, 2013). These factors can potentially corrupt data collected in online studies, which 
would question the validity of the results presented herein.  
Moreover, it is reasonable to suspect that stereotype threat and stereotype lift may be 
experienced differently depending on whether or not they are induced in online contexts. For 
example, the fear that one’s own behaviour will be interpreted by others as stereotype-
consistent is an important component of stereotype threat (Brown & Pinel, 2003). This fear 
would be expected to be greater when performing a task in the immediate vicinity of other 
people who may hold the stereotype, and may diminish markedly for individuals 
participating alone in the comfort of their own homes. Indeed, evidence indicates that the 
impact and nature of stereotype threat can vary as a function of the extent to which fear of 
confirming the stereotype is reinforced by the behaviour and characteristics of the people 
present during task performance (Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2003; Pennington & Heim, 2016; 
Stone & McWhinnie, 2008).  
As noted previously, this is particularly relevant to experiments 11 and 12, which 
attempted to manipulate self-as-source stereotype threat vs. other-as-source stereotype 
threat. Clearly, a central aspect of other-as-source stereotype threat is the sense that one’s 
performance will be used by others to inform the perceived truth value of the negative 
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stereotype in question (Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007). The fact that online participation is likely 
to reduce concerns relating to the way in which one’s performance will be perceived by 
those who have access to it (Maglio, Trope & Liberman, 2013) therefore raises doubts with 
respect to the feasibility of inducing other-as-source stereotype threat in the context of an 
online experiment. Indeed, the null results of experiments 11 and 12 suggest that in-person 
participation may be of particular importance for studies examining differences between 
self-as-source and other-as-source stereotype threat. 
Nevertheless, it should also be noted that some studies have found online samples to 
be more attentive to task instructions than traditionally recruited participants (Hauser & 
Schwarz, 2016). Moreover, where cross-referencing is possible, the online data from the 
current thesis is consistent with data collected in person. Specifically, experiment 3 was 
consistent with experiments 2 and 4 in indicating that performance is enhanced when a 
promotion focus is coupled with a positive (vs. negative) stereotype. Thus, although it would 
be useful to attempt to replicate the findings of the current thesis using in-person samples, 
the online data presented herein is still informative with respect to the hypotheses being 
tested.  
An additional limitation that applies to the experiments herein relates to the number 
of stereotype threat conditions that were used in each experiment. In chapter 2, participants 
were exposed to either positive or negative ingroup stereotypes – there was no control 
condition involving exposure to no stereotype at all. This means that the observed 
differences between the stereotype valence conditions could be attributable to the impact of 
ingroup stereotypes relative to no stereotypes, the impact of negative ingroup stereotypes 
relative to no stereotypes, or both. The same limitation applies to a number of previous 
studies of interactions between stereotype valence, regulatory focus, and motivational state 
(Alter et al., 2010; Grimm et al., 2009; Keller & Bless, 2008). In chapter 3, although the 
inclusion of a stereotype threat condition and a control condition permitted causal inferences 
about the effect of stereotype threat on the dependent variables of interest, it may have been 
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informative to include conditions in which participants were exposed to positive ingroup 
science-related stereotypes.  
Indeed, if a stereotype threat-induced desire to display scientific ability encouraged 
people to express belief in AGW (as argued in chapter 3), then it may also be the case that a 
positive science-related stereotype would cause people to feel self-assured with respect to 
their own scientific ability and, consequently, less prone to use belief in AGW as a means of 
displaying this ability. Just as reminders of one’s own positive moral credentials (as 
reflected by past acts of kindness) liberate people to behave immorally (moral self-licencing; 
Merritt, Effron & Monin, 2010), it is possible that reminders of once group’s (and, by 
extension, one’s own) scientific credentials liberate people to express unscientific views 
such as denial of AGW. It would have been useful to include positive stereotype conditions 
in chapter 3 to test this possibility, although it would also be helpful for future research 
could also address this point. 
In particular, it would be useful to address the potential moderation of the effects of 
stereotype lift by implicit theories of ability. Prior research (Mendoza-Denton et al., 2008; 
Froehlich et al., 2016) indicates that holding an increment theory of the stereotyped ability 
can eliminate the typical beneficial effect of stereotype lift. This challenges the common 
assumption that it is always preferable to hold an increment theory rather than an entity 
theory (Molden & Dweck, 2006) and raises questions about the appropriateness of using 
implicit theory manipulations as interventions to eliminate the detrimental impact stereotype 
threat. For example, some researchers have promoted the use of school-wide interventions 
designed to induce increment beliefs as a means of reducing the impact of stereotype threat 
on students from negatively stereotyped groups (Aronson et al., 2002) However, if the same 
intervention would be expected to impair the performance of students from positively 
stereotyped groups (Mendoza-Denton et al., 2008l Froehlich et al., 2016), then its 
appropriateness would be questionable, because the ethical acceptability of enhancing the 
scores of some students at the expense of others is open to debate.  
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Similarly, it would have been useful to include control conditions in experiments 11 
and 12 in order to disentangle the effects of the different types of stereotype threat being 
induced. With a design that includes only self-as-source and other-as-source stereotype 
threat conditions, it is impossible to determine whether any cross-condition difference is due 
to the effects of self-as-source stereotype threat, other-as-source stereotype threat or both. 
However, given that experiments 11 and 12 failed to yield meaningful significant findings, 
this point is purely academic as far as these experiments are concerned. Conversely, the lack 
of a control condition in experiment 13 does affect the interpretation of the results obtain 
therein. Specifically, the self-awareness manipulation involved an induction of either public 
or private self-awareness, but there was no control condition in which neither type of self-
awareness was induced. As such, the self-awareness manipulation of experiment 13 cannot 
provide unambiguous evidence for the impact of public or private self-awareness in 
isolation, because differences between the two conditions could be attributable to the effect 
of public self-awareness alone, private self-awareness alone, or both. Nevertheless, 
experiment 13 does allow inferences to be made regarding the impact of high public self-
awareness relative to high private self-awareness, which is useful in the context of the 
current thesis because it reflects on the veracity of the stated hypothesis. 
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Concluding Comment 
The current work has shed light on a number of statistical interactions involving stereotype 
threat and stereotype lift. The results of chapter 2 indicate that the effects of stereotype threat 
and stereotype lift are moderated by regulatory focus and motivational state. The results of 
chapter 3 indicate that science-related stereotype threat can influence belief in anthropogenic 
global warming, and that this effect is moderated by implicit theories of scientific ability and 
the content of messages relating to AGW. The results of chapter 4 suggest that stereotype 
threat can modulate the effects of self-awareness on motor task performance, and that online 
participation platforms may not be appropriate for studies attempting to manipulate self-as-
source vs. other-as-source stereotype threat. Taken together, the results highlight the overlap 
between stereotype threat and choking under pressure, the nature of the difference between 
stereotype threat and stereotype lift, and the importance of understanding moderating 
relationships when attempting to use stereotype threat research to enhance performance in 
real-world settings.  
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Appendices 
Throughout the appendices, any text that was not part of the described materials is 
underlined. Any non-underlined text presented below would have been part of the 
materials themselves.    
 
Appendix A: Materials for Experiment 1 
 
Point System Manipulation 
 
Challenge Condition 
In this experiment, you will complete a test of reasoning ability. 
In total, there will be 10 questions on the test. 
For each question that you get right, you will gain 1 point. 
If you get a question wrong or if you do not submit an answer, you will gain 0 
points. 
 
Threat Condition 
In this experiment, you will complete a test of reasoning ability. 
In total, there will be 10 questions on the test. 
For each question that you get right, you will gain 1 point. 
If you get a question wrong or if you do not submit an answer, you will lose 1 point. 
 
Promotion Condition 
In this experiment, you will complete a test of reasoning ability. 
In total, there will be 10 questions on the test. 
At the beginning of the test, you will start with 0 points. 
For each question that you get right, you will gain 1 point. 
If you get a question wrong or if you do not submit an answer, you will gain 0 
points. 
You should aim to gain at least 6 points out of 10 by the end of the test. 
 
Prevention Condition 
In this experiment, you will complete a test of reasoning ability. 
In total, there will be 10 questions on the test. 
At the beginning of the test, you will start with 10 points. 
If you get a question wrong or if you do not submit an answer, you will lose 1 point. 
For each question that you get right, you will gain 0 points. 
You should aim to lose no more than 4 points out of 10 by the end of the test. 
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Motivational Orientation Measure  
On a scale of 1 to 7, Do you see the test as a threat or as a / challenge? / 1 is 'I see it 
as a threat’; 7 is ‘I see it as a challenge’. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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Appendix B: Materials for Experiment 2 
 
 
Point System Manipulation 
 
Challenge Condition 
In this experiment, you will complete a test of reasoning ability. 
In total, there will be 20 questions on the test. 
For each question that you get right, you will gain 1 point. 
If you get a question wrong or if you do not submit an answer, you will gain 0 
points. 
 
Threat Condition 
In this experiment, you will complete a test of reasoning ability. 
In total, there will be 20 questions on the test. 
For each question that you get right, you will gain 1 point. 
If you get a question wrong or if you do not submit an answer, you will lose 1 point. 
 
Promotion Condition 
In this experiment, you will complete a test of reasoning ability. 
In total, there will be 20 questions on the test. 
At the beginning of the test, you will start with 0 points. 
For each question that you get right, you will gain 1 point. 
If you get a question wrong or if you do not submit an answer, you will gain 0 
points. 
You should aim to gain at least 14 points out of 20 by the end of the test. 
 
Prevention Condition 
In this experiment, you will complete a test of reasoning ability. 
In total, there will be 20 questions on the test. 
At the beginning of the test, you will start with 20 points. 
If you get a question wrong or if you do not submit an answer, you will lose 1 point. 
For each question that you get right, you will gain 0 points. 
You should aim to lose no more than 6 points out of 20 by the end of the test. 
 
 
Stereotype Valence Manipulation (employed in experiments 2, 3 and 4). 
 
The content below shows the text that was presented to female participants in each 
stereotype valence condition. The manipulation was applied in the reverse manner 
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for male participants – in other words, males in the stereotype threat condition saw 
the same text as females in the stereotype lift condition, whilst males in the 
stereotype lift condition saw the same text as females in the stereotype threat 
condition. 
Stereotype Threat Condition 
Previous research has established that different types of people vary in terms of how 
well they tend to perform on this test - for example, men tend to perform better than 
women. 
Stereotype Lift Condition 
Previous research has established that different types of people vary in terms of how 
well they tend to perform on this test - for example, women tend to perform better 
than men. 
 
Scientific Reasoning Questions used in Experiments 2, 3 and 4 
 
Question 1 
Determine what should replace the question mark in the following series: 
1   2   4   8   16   32    ? 
5 
7 
16 
22 
44 
64 
79 
85 
 
Question 2 
Seven hours ago it was five hours before the time when there would be 2/3 of the day still 
remaining. What time is it now? Assume that the day starts at 12:00 A.M.  
9:30 AM 
10:00 AM 
10:30 AM 
11:00 AM 
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11:30 AM 
12:00 PM 
12:30 PM 
1:00 PM 
Question 3 
 
 
In the image above, the four pictures on the top row follow a pattern. Which picture on the 
bottom row should complete this pattern? 
 
Is it A, B, C, D or E? 
 
 
 
 
Question 4 
There were 100 people present at a baseball card show: 
59 wore glasses. 72 were baseball card collectors 
What is the lowest possible number of people at the show who wore glasses AND collected 
baseball cards? 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
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36 
37 
38 
 
Question 5 
The words in the first column are written in a secret code in the second column. However, 
the secret writings in the second column are not in the same order. What is the code assigned 
for the letter D? 
 
BRAIN 13529 
DRAIN 35293 
RIVER 13754 
DRIVE 83754 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
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Question 6 
 
In the image above, the four pictures on the top row follow a pattern. Which picture on the 
bottom row should complete this pattern? 
Is it A, B, C, D or E? 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
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Question 7 
 
  
In the image above, the four pictures on the top row follow a pattern. Which picture on the 
bottom row should complete this pattern? 
 
Is it A, B, C, D or E? 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
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Question 8 
What letter should replace the question mark in the following series: 
C     I      D      J        F        L        I        O       ? 
 
K 
L 
M 
N 
O 
 
Question 9 
Identify the number below where the sum of the last two digits is 1/2 of the first digit, the 
second digit is 1/2 of the first digit, the fourth digit is 1/2 of the third digit and the fifth digit 
is half of the fourth digit: 
 
12346 
63142 
63412 
46321 
64321 
63421 
63241 
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Question 10 
 
Below is a series that follows a certain logic: 
 
0 2 6 12 20 30... 
 
What would be the 50th number in this series? (Assume that 0 is the 1st number in the 
series). 
2000 
2150 
2300 
2450 
2550 
2750 
2900  
 
 
Question 11 
X is not greater than Y 
Y is greater than Z 
A is greater than Y 
A is less than B 
B is equal to X+2 
C is greater than Y 
 
Which of the following MUST be true? 
C is equal to A 
B is equal to A+X 
C is greater than A 
X is equal to Y 
Z is not greater than A 
 
Question 12 
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What number comes next in this sequence: 
 11     13     17     19     23     29     31 
 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
 
Question 13 
John is Jane’s father. 
Jess is John’s mother. 
Tim is Jess’ brother. 
Tara is Tim’s daughter. 
Toby is Tara’s son. 
 
What is the relationship between Jane and Toby?  
First Cousins 
Third Cousins 
Father and Daughter 
Cousins once removed 
Second Cousins 
There is no biological relationship 
Aunt and Uncle 
 
 
Question 14 
219 
 
 
 
In the image above, the four pictures on the top row follow a pattern. Which picture on the 
bottom row should complete this pattern? 
Is it A, B, C, D or E? 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 15 
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In the image above, the four pictures on the top row follow a pattern. Which picture on the 
bottom row should complete this pattern? 
Is it A, B, C, D or E? 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
 
 
Question 16 
What number comes next in the sequence below? 
2     5     10     17     26     37     50      ? 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
Question 17 
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X is not less than or equal to a number that is one less than Y+1. 
Y is 2 greater than Z, which is not less than A+2. 
Z is not more than A+2. 
 
Which of the following statements is definitely true? 
 
A is greater than itself 
Z is greater than Y 
X is greater than A+Y 
X is greater than A+5 
Y is greater than A+5 
Y is greater than A+4 
X is greater than A+4 
X is less than A+6 
A=0 
 
 
 
Question 18 
X+Y=12 
2X+3Y=31 
What is the value of X? 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Question 19 
At a classic car auction, thirty buyers were present. Ten of the buyers bought fewer than 6 
cars. Eight of the buyers bought more than 7 cars. Five buyers bought more than 8 cars. One 
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buyer bought more than 9 cars. What is the total number of buyers who bought 6, 7, 8, or 9 
cars? 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
 
 
 
Question 20 
What number comes next in this sequence? 
1     1     2     3     5     8      13     ? 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
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Appendix C: Materials for Experiment 4 
 
 
Mouse in the Maze Manipulation 
 
Challenge/Promotion Condition 
 
 
 
 
Michael the mouse was in the middle of a maze when suddenly he smelt a piece of 
cheese lying outside its entrance. He knew that if he did not get to the cheese soon, 
then somebody else would eat it before he had even taken a single bite. However, he 
also knew that if he could find his way out of the maze quickly, then he would be 
able to eat all of it before anybody else could get their hands on it. He began hastily 
making his way out, thinking longingly of how tasty and pleasurable it would feel to 
eat the huge chunk of delicious cheese all by himself.  
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Challenge/Prevention Condition 
 
 
Michael the mouse was in the middle of a maze when suddenly he noticed Oscar the 
owl flying high above him. Michael knew that if he let Oscar catch him, he would 
certainly be eaten in one gulp. However, Michael also knew that if he managed to 
get out of the maze and into his mouse hole in the wall, then there would be no way 
for Oscar to eat him. He began hastily making his way out, thinking longingly of the 
safety and security of his mouse hole and of how much of a relief it would be to 
arrive there before Oscar managed to catch him. 
 
 
 
Threat/Promotion Condition 
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Michael the mouse was in the middle of a maze when suddenly he noticed Oscar the 
owl flying high above him. Michael knew that if he let Oscar catch him, he would 
most certainly be eaten in one gulp. However, Michael also knew that if he managed 
to get out of the maze and into his mouse hole in the wall, then there would be no 
way for Oscar to eat him. He began hastily making his way out, thinking in intense 
fear of how horrible it would feel to spend his last moments in the mouth of a hungry 
owl.  
   
 
Threat/Prevention Condition 
 
 
 
 
Michael the mouse was in the middle of a maze when suddenly he smelt a piece of 
cheese lying outside its entrance. He knew that if he did not get to the cheese soon, 
then somebody else would eat it before he had even taken a single bite. However, he 
also knew that if he could find his way out of the maze quickly, then he would be 
able to eat all of it before anybody else could get their hands on it. He began hastily 
making his way out, thinking desperately about how hungry he felt – if he did not 
reach the cheese before somebody else did, then it would be a long time before his 
next meal.  
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Appendix D: Materials for Experiment 5 
 
 
Manipulation of target belief in AGW 
 
“Target Believes in AGW” condition 
Please read the following description of John, and then answer the questions below. 
 
John is 35 years old. 
John has black hair. 
John likes to walk in his local park. 
John is married. 
John has a pet dog. 
John believes in man-made global warming. 
 
“Target does not Believe in AGW” condition 
Please read the following description of John, and then answer the questions below. 
 
John is 35 years old. 
John has black hair. 
John likes to walk in his local park. 
John is married. 
John has a pet dog. 
John does not believe in man-made global warming. 
Description of Chloe 
Please read the following description of Chloe, and then answer the questions below. 
 
Chloe's favorite colour is blue. 
Chloe likes swimming. 
Chloe has known her best friend for 11 years. 
Chloe attends an Origami class. 
Chloe has brown hair. 
Chloe is 48 years old.  
 
Questions about John and Chloe  
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These questions were asked once in reference to John and then again in reference to 
Chloe.  
 
On a scale of 1 to 7, how kind do you think John is? 7 is "extremely kind" and 1 is 
"extremely unkind". 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
On a scale of 1 to 7, how funny do you think John is? 7 is "extremely funny" and 1 is 
"not funny at all". 
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7 
       
On a scale of 1 to 7, how good do you think John is at thinking scientifically? 7 is 
"extremely good at thinking scientifically" and 1 is "not at all good at thinking 
scientifically". 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
228 
 
 
 
 
Scientific Competence Question 
 
People who do not believe in man-made global warming are worse at thinking 
scientifically relative to people who do believe in man-made global warming. Do 
you agree? 
 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Somewhat agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Somewhat disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
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Appendix E: Materials for Experiment 6 
 
Stereotype Threat Manipulation  
High Stereotype Threat Condition 
Thank you. In this experiment, you will complete a test of Scientific ability. We are 
assessing the test performance of people who live in and outside of America. Our 
past research indicates that people who live in America have superior scientific 
ability to people who live outside America.  
 
Low Stereotype Threat Condition 
 
Thank you. In this experiment, you will complete a test of Scientific ability. Past 
research indicates that performance on this test is not related to the nationality of the 
test-taker. 
 
 
Belief in AGW Measure for experiments 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 
 
1.) How likely do you think it is that global warming is occurring now? 
Very Unlikely        Unlikely      Somewhat Unlikely Somewhat Likely
 Likely 
     
2.) Global temperatures have been rising significantly over the past decade. Do 
you agree with this statement? 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
     
3.) Climate change is definitely NOT occurring. Do you agree with this 
statement? 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
     
4.) The Earth's oceans have NOT been increasing in temperature in recent 
decades. Do you agree with this statement? 
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Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
     
5.) Human activities such as burning fossil fuels can significantly raise the 
planet's temperature. Do you agree with this statement? 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
     
6.) Human actions have NOT resulted in an increase in global temperatures. Do 
you agree with this statement? 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
     
7.) Global warming CANNOT be reduced by regulating fossil fuel use. Do you 
agree with this statement? 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
     
8.) Climate change is real and man-made. Do you agree with this statement? 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree  
 
 
Implicit Theory Manipulation for Experiments 6 and 7 
 
Increment Theory Condition 
Our past research has shown that performance on this test can be substantially 
improved through practice. In other words, natural ability has very little influence on 
how well people perform, whereas effort and practice are strong predictors of 
performance. 
 
Entity Theory Condition 
Performance on the test is largely a matter of natural ability and is not strongly 
affected by effort or practice. In other words, some people are naturally gifted when 
it comes to reasoning scientifically and tend to perform well regardless of how much 
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relevant practice they have had beforehand. Others lack natural ability and are 
unlikely to improve even after extensive practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
232 
 
Appendix F: Materials for Experiment 7 
Religiosity Measure 
1.) "I attend religious services regularly."  
 
Is the above statement true of you? 
Not at all true of me Not very true of me Somewhat true of me Quite true of me
 Very true of me 
     
2.) "Spiritual values are more important than material things." 
 
Do you agree with the above statement? 
Strongly Agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
     
3.) What is the general importance of God in your life?  
 
Not at all important Unimportant Somewhat important Important Very 
important 
     
4.) How would you characterise yourself in terms of religiosity? 
 
Very religious Moderately religious Slightly religious Not at all religious
 Anti-religious 
 
Stereotype Threat Manipulation for Experiments 7 and 8 
 
Italicised text only appeared in the low stereotype threat condition. 
 
In this experiment, you will complete a test of Scientific ability.  
This test has been shown to be a fair test of ability for different groups of people. For 
instance, people of different religious groups tend to perform equally well. 
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Appendix G: Materials for Experiment 8 
 
Message Manipulation 
Scientists and Christian clergy unite in urging world leaders to take drastic action to 
combat climate change 
 
Prominent scientists and clergymen have issued urgent calls for world governments 
to take a strong stance in restricting carbon dioxide emissions as a means of 
combatting climate change. In July, 72 Nobel prize winning Scientists came together 
in the signing of the Mainau declaration, expressing their shared concern that the 
continued consumption of fossil fuels will "lead to wholesale human tragedy". The 
move follows statements made by other prestigious scientific organizations, such as 
the African Academy of Sciences, the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, the European Science Foundation and the International Council of 
Academies of Engineering and Technological Sciences, all of which have implored 
world leaders to take a firm stance in tackling climate change. "The year 2014 ranks 
as Earth’s warmest since 1880, according to two separate analyses by NASA and 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) scientists. The 10 
warmest years in the instrumental record, with the exception of 1998, have now 
occurred since 2000. This trend continues a long-term warming of the planet, 
according to an analysis of surface temperature measurements by scientists at 
NASA’s Goddard Institute of Space Studies (GISS) in New York." 
Meanwhile, Christian clergymen from across countries and denominations have 
added their voices to those of the Scientific community in urging prompt and 
comprehensive action against climate change. Bishops, Priests, Ministers and Pastors 
have emphasized the religious duty to protect the world's most vulnerable 
populations from drought, famine, flooding and natural disasters, all of which have 
been growing more frequent and intense in the wake of continued global warming. 
Speaking about the catastrophic effects of climate change, Pope Francis said that 
"the problems are getting worse. We are at the limits. If I may use a strong word I 
would say that we are at the limits of suicide." A diverse range of Christian leaders 
and organizations have joined the chorus of proclamations on the need to 
aggressively tackle climate change, including the Eastern Orthodox Church, Quakers 
International, the Baptist council of Europe, the United Methodist Church and the 
All Africa Conference of Churches. "There is a fundamental Christian imperative to 
help the poor, the needy and the hungry and to protect God's Earth. We are currently 
failing to meet that obligation. Those who have contributed the least to greenhouse 
gas emissions stand to suffer most from their effects. If we continue along the path of 
endless, glutinous consumption then the consequences will not be good" said 
Michael Jones, a prominent British pastor, at a recent meeting of Church leaders. 
Christian clergy unite in urging action to combat climate change 
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Christian clergymen from across countries and denominations have come together to 
urge prompt and comprehensive action against climate change. Bishops, Priests, 
Ministers and Pastors have emphasized the religious duty to protect the world's most 
vulnerable populations from drought, famine, flooding and natural disasters, all of 
which have been growing more frequent and intense in the wake of continued global 
warming. Speaking about the catastrophic effects of climate change, Pope Francis 
said that "the problems are getting worse. We are at the limits. If I may use a strong 
word I would say that we are at the limits of suicide." A diverse range of Christian 
leaders and organizations have joined the chorus of proclamations on the need to 
aggressively tackle climate change, including the Eastern Orthodox Church, Quakers 
International, the Baptist council of Europe, the United Methodist Church and the 
All Africa Conference of Churches. "There is a fundamental Christian imperative to 
help the poor, the needy and the hungry and to protect God's Earth. We are currently 
failing to meet that obligation. Those who have contributed the least to carbon 
dioxide emissions stand to suffer most from the effects. If we continue along the path 
of endless, glutinous consumption then the consequences will not be good" said 
Michael Jones, a prominent British pastor, at a recent meeting of Church leaders. 
Scientists unite in urging action to combat climate change 
Prominent scientists have issued urgent calls for world governments to take a strong 
stance in restricting carbon dioxide emissions as a means of combatting climate 
change. In July, 72 Nobel prize winning Scientists came together in the signing of 
the Mainau declaration, expressing their shared concern that the continued 
consumption of fossil fuels will "lead to wholesale human tragedy". The move 
follows statements made by other prestigious scientific organizations, such as the 
African Academy of Sciences, the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, the European Science Foundation and the International Council of 
Academies of Engineering and Technological Sciences, all of which have implored 
world leaders to take a firm stance in tackling climate change. In a recent press 
statement, NASA said that "the year 2014 ranks as Earth’s warmest since 1880, 
according to two separate analyses by NASA and National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) scientists. The 10 warmest years in the instrumental record, 
with the exception of 1998, have now occurred since 2000. This trend continues a 
long-term warming of the planet, according to an analysis of surface temperature 
measurements by scientists at NASA’s Goddard Institute of Space Studies (GISS) in 
New York." 
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Donation Question 
Before we began collecting responses for this survey, we set aside a sum of money 
that would potentially go to organizations that aim to increase public awareness 
about the threats posed by man-made global warming. For each person that 
completes this survey, we will donate up to 5 cents to 'Skeptical Science', which is a 
website run by climate Scientists designed to raise awareness about man-made 
global warming and its likely consequences. You can see this website for yourself 
here: 
 
http://www.skepticalscience.com/ 
  
The amount that we donate for your survey completion is up to you. Use the 
selection below to choose the amount of money that you would like us to donate. For 
instance, if you choose '3', we will donate 3 cents of the 5 cents allocated for your 
survey completion to Skeptical Science, keeping 2 cents for ourselves. If you choose 
'0', we will donate 0 of the 5 cents allocated for your survey to the skeptical science 
blog, keeping all 5 cents for ourselves. This money will NOT be taken from the 
amount that you will be paid for completing this survey - you will be paid 5 cents 
regardless of the option that you select below. 
 
How many cents would you like us to donate to Skeptical Science for your survey 
completion? This money will NOT be taken from the amount that you will be paid 
for completing this survey - you will be paid 5 cents regardless of the option that you 
select below. 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
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Temperature Questions 
 
Think about the temperature outside in the place where you are currently located. If 
you had to guess, would you say the temperature right now is hotter or colder than 
the typical temperature over the past month? Give your answer on a scale of 1 to 10, 
with 1 being 'much colder than the typical temperature over the past month' and 10 
being 'much hotter than the typical temperature over the past month'. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
How hot or cold do you feel right now? Give your answer on a scale of 1 to 10, with 
1 being 'I feel extremely cold' and 10 being 'I feel extremely hot'.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Appendix H: Materials for Experiment 9 
 
 
Stereotype Threat Manipulation 
 
Text presented to participants above 34 years old in the high stereotype threat 
condition 
In this experiment, you will complete a test of cognitive ability. 
 
Our previous research has indicated that people above the age of 34 tend to perform 
more poorly compared to younger people. 
 
Before the test, you will be asked to read a short article and complete a brief 
questionnaire addressing a number of topics. 
 
Text presented to participants below 35 years old in the high stereotype threat 
condition 
Thank you. In this experiment, you will complete a test of general knowledge.  
 
We are investigating the effects of age on cognitive ability. Our previous research 
has indicated that people below the age of 35 tend to perform more poorly compared 
to older people. 
 
 
Text Presented to all participants in the low stereotype threat condition 
Thank you. In this experiment, you will complete a test of cognitive ability.  
 
We are investigating the effects of age on cognitive ability. Our test has been 
specially designed to be fair for people of all ages, which means that younger people 
are just as likely as older people to perform well. 
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Frame Manipulation 
 
Positive Frame 
Global warming is arguably the most pressing problem facing the world today. 
Rising temperatures are already beginning to trigger hurricanes, floods, droughts and 
heatwaves with greater and greater frequency. 
If we invest in green technologies, cut carbon emissions and protect the planet’s 
greenhouse gas-consuming forests, we can save the world from catastrophic global 
warming. This will create a happier, healthier and harmonious environment that will 
sustainably support the needs of future generations. 
Negative Frame 
Global warming is arguably the most pressing problem facing the world today. 
Rising temperatures are already beginning to trigger hurricanes, floods, droughts and 
heatwaves with greater and greater frequency. 
 
If we fail to cut carbon emissions, invest in green technologies and protect the 
planet’s greenhouse gas-consuming forests, the world will be unable to avoid 
catastrophic global warming. This will lead to a polluted, dangerous and inhospitable 
environment that will not support the needs of future generations.  
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Appendix I: Materials for Experiment 10 
 
 
Political Orientation Measure 
On a scale of 1 to 9, how liberal or conservative would you say you are? "1" 
indicates "extremely conservative" and "9" indicates "extremely liberal" 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
    
Stereotype Threat Manipulation 
 
High Stereotype Threat 
In this experiment, you will complete a test of scientific ability. We are investigating 
differences in scientific ability between Americans and Europeans. There is currently 
evidence suggesting that Americans tend to have low scientific ability compared to 
Europeans. 
Low Stereotype Threat 
In this experiment, you will complete a test of scientific ability.  
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Temperature Manipulation 
 
The purpose of this section is to classify the pictures below according to whether or 
not they contain animals. 
Please look at each picture and decide whether or not it contains an animal. 
 
1.) Is there an animal in this picture? 
Yes, there is an animal. 
No, there is no animal. 
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2.) Is there an animal in this picture? 
Yes, there is an animal. 
No, there is no animal. 
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3.) Is there an animal in this picture? 
Yes, there is an animal. 
No, there is no animal. 
 
Image displayed in high temperature condition                 
 
 
Image displayed in low temperature condition 
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Temperature Measure 
 
On a scale of 1 to 9, how hot do you feel right now? "1" indicates "extremely cold" 
and "9" indicates "extremely hot". 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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Appendix J: Materials for Experiment 11 
 
 
Stereotype Threat Manipulation (Self-as-source vs. Other-as-source) used in 
experiments 11 and 12 
 
The text below was shown to female participants; male participants were shown 
exactly the same text, except that the words “men” and “women” were reversed. 
Self-as-Source Condition 
You are about to complete a test of cognitive ability. Previous research strongly 
suggests that women tend to have inferior cognitive abilities to men.  
After you finish the test, you will be able to evaluate your own cognitive ability 
based on your performance to see whether it is consistent with you gender.   
Other-as-source condition 
You are about to complete a test of cognitive ability. Previous research strongly 
suggests that women tend to have inferior cognitive abilities to men.  
After you finish the test, we will calculate your score in order to evaluate whether or 
not your cognitive abilities are consistent with this gender difference.   
 
Measure of Public and Private Self-Consciousness for experiments 11 and 12 
1.) I'm always trying to figure myself out. (Private) 
Not at all true of me 
Not true of me 
Somewhat true of me 
True of me 
Very true of me 
 
2.) I'm concerned about my style of doing things. (Public) 
Not at all true of me 
Not true of me 
Somewhat true of me 
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True of me 
Very true of me 
 
3.) Generally, I'm not very aware of myself. (Private) 
Not at all true of me 
Not true of me 
Somewhat true of me 
True of me 
Very true of me 
 
4.) I reflect about myself a lot. (Private) 
Not at all true of me 
Not true of me 
Somewhat true of me 
True of me 
Very true of me 
 
5.) I'm not concerned about the way I present myself. (Public) 
Not at all true of me 
Not true of me 
Somewhat true of me 
True of me 
Very true of me 
 
6.) I'm often the subject of my own fantasies. (Private) 
Not at all true of me 
Not true of me 
Somewhat true of me 
True of me 
Very true of me 
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7.) I'm not self-conscious about the way I look. (Public) 
Not at all true of me 
Not true of me 
Somewhat true of me 
True of me 
Very true of me 
 
8.) I never scrutinize myself. (Private) 
Not at all true of me 
Not true of me 
Somewhat true of me 
True of me 
Very true of me 
 
9.) I rarely worry about making a good impression. (Public) 
Not at all true of me 
Not true of me 
Somewhat true of me 
True of me 
Very true of me 
 
10.) I'm generally not attentive to my inner feelings. (Private) 
Not at all true of me 
Not true of me 
Somewhat true of me 
True of me 
Very true of me 
 
11.) One of the last things I do before I leave my house is look in the 
mirror. (Public) 
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Not at all true of me 
Not true of me 
Somewhat true of me 
True of me 
Very true of me 
 
12.) I rarely examine my motives. (Private) 
Not at all true of me 
Not true of me 
Somewhat true of me 
True of me 
Very true of me 
 
13.) I'm not concerned about what other people think of me. (Public) 
Not at all true of me 
Not true of me 
Somewhat true of me 
True of me 
Very true of me 
 
14.) I sometimes have the feeling that I'm off somewhere watching myself. 
(Private) 
Not at all true of me 
Not true of me 
Somewhat true of me 
True of me 
Very true of me 
 
15.) I'm not alert to changes in my mood. (Private) 
Not at all true of me 
Not true of me 
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Somewhat true of me 
True of me 
Very true of me 
 
16.) I'm often aware of my appearance. (Public) 
Not at all true of me 
Not true of me 
Somewhat true of me 
True of me 
Very true of me 
 
17.)  I'm aware of the way my mind works when I'm working through a 
problem. (Private) 
Not at all true of me 
Not true of me 
Somewhat true of me 
True of me 
Very true of me 
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Motivational Orientation Measure 
 
1.) To me, the test seems like a challenge. 
Strongly agree 
Somewhat agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Somewhat disagree 
Strongly disagree 
 
2.) To me, the test seems like a threat. 
Strongly disagree 
Somewhat disagree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Somewhat agree 
Strongly agree 
 
3.) Overall, I think I will be successful on the test. 
Strongly agree 
Somewhat agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Somewhat disagree 
Strongly disagree 
 
4.) Overall, I think I have the abilities necessary for successful performance. 
Strongly agree 
Somewhat agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Somewhat disagree 
Strongly disagree 
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5.) Overall, it seems that I cannot succeed on a test like this. 
Strongly agree 
Somewhat agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Somewhat disagree 
Strongly disagree 
 
6.) Overall, I'm worried I lack the abilities to perform well on the test. 
Strongly disagree 
Somewhat disagree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Somewhat agree 
Strongly agree 
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Appendix K: Materials for Experiment 12 
Impact vs. No Impact Manipulation  
The text shown to participants in the Impact and No Impact conditions is shown 
below. Text that varied across conditions is in bold. 
Impact Condition 
The test that you are about to complete has been designed to ensure that factors like 
anxiety and tiredness do not affect people's performance. People who are tired or 
anxious do not tend to perform any worse on the test than people of equal ability 
who are neither tired nor anxious. 
No Impact Condition 
Our previous research shows that factors anxiety as tiredness and stress can influence 
people's performance on the forthcoming test. People who are tired or anxious tend 
to perform worse on the test, even though they may not have lower levels of 
cognitive ability.  
 
Self-Handicapping Questions  
1.) On a scale of 1-7, how tired do you feel at the moment? 1 indicates “not at all 
tired”; 7 indicates "extremely tired". 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
2.) On a scale of 1-7, how anxious do you feel at the moment? 1 indicates “not at 
all anxious”; 7 indicates "extremely anxious". 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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Appendix L: Materials for Experiment 13 
 
 
Stereotype Threat Manipulation 
 
After the description of the motor task’s point system, the following text was shown 
to participants in the high stereotype threat condition only. 
Our past research shows that certain groups vary in their performance on this task. 
For instance, engineering students tend to have stronger motor skills than 
Psychology students and therefore perform better on this task. 
 
Self-Awareness Manipulation 
 
Private Self-awareness condition 
Please try to think of a memory of a significant event in your past. You can pick any 
event you like (it can be positive or negative, for example), but please try to build a 
detailed image of the memory in your mind. In the space below, please write a few 
sentences about what was going on inside your head during this event – write about 
the thoughts and feelings that you experienced, the sensations that you felt in your 
body and the sights, sounds and smells that you perceived. 
You have 2 minutes to describe your memory (you can use slightly more time if you 
wish). Please try to provide as much detail as possible within this time. 
Public Self-awareness condition 
Please try to think of a memory of a significant event in your past when you were 
paying attention to the way that other people were perceiving you. Please try to build 
a detailed image of the memory in your mind. In the space below, please write a few 
sentences about what was going on inside your head during this event – what 
impression did you make on the people who were watching you? What aspects of 
your behaviour or appearance were they focusing on? 
You have 2 minutes to describe your memory (you can use slightly more time if you 
wish). Please try to provide as much detail as possible within this time. 
 
Self-Awareness Measure 
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1.) Right now, I am conscious of my inner feelings. 
How true is the above statement of you? Give your answer on a scale from 1 to 7, 
with 1 being ‘strongly agree’ and 7 being ‘strongly disagree.’ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
2.) Right now, I am concerned about the way I present myself. 
How true is the above statement of you? Give your answer on a scale from 1 to 7, 
with 1 being ‘strongly agree’ and 7 being ‘strongly disagree.’ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
3.) Right now, I am reflective about my life. 
How true is the above statement of you? Give your answer on a scale from 1 to 7, 
with 1 being ‘strongly agree’ and 7 being ‘strongly disagree.’ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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4.) Right now, I am self-conscious about the way I look 
How true is the above statement of you? Give your answer on a scale from 1 to 7, 
with 1 being ‘strongly agree’ and 7 being ‘strongly disagree.’ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
 
5.) Right now, I am concerned about what other people think of me. 
How true is the above statement of you? Give your answer on a scale from 1 to 7, 
with 1 being ‘strongly agree’ and 7 being ‘strongly disagree.’ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
 
6.) Right now, I am aware of my inner-most thoughts. 
How true is the above statement of you? Give your answer on a scale from 1 to 7, 
with 1 being ‘strongly agree’ and 7 being ‘strongly disagree.’ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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